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INTRODUCTION
The ghost of Richard Nixon still haunts the halls of the Supreme
Court. The "Nixon Bloc" of judicial appointments—Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist—has come of age as a force
to be reckoned with on the Court. In the twenty-five labor law cases de-
cided by the Court during its 1976 Term,' the Nixon Bloc voted together
in twenty-one cases, including eleven of fifteen decisions, or about seventy-
five percent, in which there was no unanimous judgment by the Court.' In
every case in which the Nixon Bloc voted as a unit, it was able to carry at
least one more vote thereby achieving a majority. 3 In only one of the four
cases in which the Nixon Bloc was split did one of the Justices vote alone;"
in the other three instances the Bloc split two-two in each cases As signifi-
cant as the numerical coherence of the Nixon Bloc was its ideological
coherence. The influence of the Nixon Bloc was decidedly conservative and
the opinions written by members of the Bloc signal both a retreat from
Title VIPs protection against discrimination and a reduction in labor's ar-
senal of economic weaponry.
* Copyright © 1977 by Harry T. Edwards, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
** Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1962, Cornell University; J.D. 1965,
University of Michigan. (This article was prepared by Professor Edwards while he was Secre-
tary of the Labor Relations Law Section of the American Bar Association, and it was the basis
for a speech, entitled "Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court-1976 Term," delivered at
the annual meeting of the Section in Chicago on August 8, 1977.) [Professor Edwards wishes
to acknowledge and express his gratitude for the research assistance given him by Andrew D.
Ness, J.D., 1977, Harvard and Phoebe Salten, J.D., 1978, Harvard.).
' This tally does not include summary opinions rendered by the Court.
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 Although there were no dissenting opinions in 10 of the 25 cases, the Court's opinion
in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), cannot be read as a unanimous judg-
ment. The concurring opinions in Abood evidence a badly split Court. Thus, in analyzing the
Court's opinions, it is more accurate to summarize the result as: 15 split decisions, 9 unani-
mous judgments, and one hybrid result.
3 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,,97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532
(1977); Batterton v. Francis, 97 S. Ct. 2399 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefit-
ters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977); Walsh v. Schlecht,
429 U.S. 401 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
' Justice Rehnquist joined with Justice Stewart in dissenting in Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local
358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
5
 United Airlines,•Inc. v. McDonald, 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977); Occidental Life Insurance
Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977); Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery,
429 U.S. 305 (1977).
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The ideological and numerical coherence of the Nixon Bloc was
further evidenced by the fact that Justices Brennan and Marshall, the
reigning members of the Court's liberal wing, dissented in nine out of fif-
teen, or sixty percent, of the cases in which no unanimous judgment was
reached.° Justice Stevens, President Ford's addition to the Court, joined the
liberal wing in four of their dissents' and then outdid Justices Brennan and
Marshall by writing a lone, strong dissent in Hazelwood School District V.
United States. 8
The labor relations cases considered by the Supreme Court during
the 1976 Term covered a range of issues. Among the twenty-five labor law
opinions issued by the Court were ten cases involving employment dis-
crimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 9 six cases in-
volving more traditional labor law problems arising under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the Labor Management Relations Act, and
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA);"
four cases dealing with labor relations law in the public sector;" and five
cases in miscellaneous categories." Justice Stewart, with seven opinions to
his credit, wrote the largest number of decisions for the Court.' 3 Otherwise,
the decisions were fairly evenly split with four written by Justice Rehn-
" Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2732 (1977); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532, 2545 (1977); Batterton v. Francis, 97 S. Ct. 2399, 2409
(1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977); United Airlines, Inc.
v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 377 (1977); NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipetitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507, 532
(1977); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 629 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.' 125,
146 (1976).
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532, 2545 (1977);
Batterton v. Francis, 97 S. Ct. 2399, 2409 (1977); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 631 (1977);
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976).
" 97 S. Ct. at 2745.
° Hazelwood School Din. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rod-
riguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977); International Union of Electrical, Radio and Mach. Workers
Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976).
" Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S.
243 (1977); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); NLRB v. En-
terprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977); Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S.
401 (1977); Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977); Bayside Enter-
prises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
" Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624
(1977); Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Madison Joint School Dist.
No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
" Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977); Batter-
ton v. Francis, 97 S. Ct. 2399 (1977); Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 97 S. Ct. 2002 (1977); Ohio
Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety Sc Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
" Hazelwood School Din. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977); Occiden-
tal Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 595
(1977); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
3
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
quist," three by Justice White," two each by Justices Blackmun," Bren-
nan" and Chief Justice Burger," one by Justice Marshall," one by Justice
Powell" and one per curiam opinion. 21
The diversity of subject matter of the cases before the Court in 1976
makes the Burger Court's ideological coherence more significant. It was not
simply a case of the conservative wing of the Court joining together on a
single issue. Rather, it was a demonstration of both ideological and in-
tellectual consistency over a spectrum of discrete issues. This article will re-
view the cases of the 1976 Term to assess the impact of the Nixon Bloc on
these areas and to analyze the effect of the 1976 decisions on future labor
cases.
1. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW; THE YEAR OF TITLE VII
Without doubt, the most significant labor law developments ,during
the 1976 Supreme Court Term involved the adjudication of employment
discrimination claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 22
 The Court issued ten decisions in this area. 25 Justice Stewart wrote
for the majority in six cases, 24 with Justices Brennan and Marshall author-
ing strong dissenting opinions in the five most controversial cases. 25 The
opinions regarding employment discrimination were often very lengthy and
the substantive reach of the holdings is greater than anyone could have
anticipated at the start of the 1976 Term. While the decisions with the
greatest impact deal with substantive areas under Title VII, the Court also
clarified some important procedural issues arising under Title VII. Within
' 4 Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977); Mount Healthy
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n
of Steam Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
16 Batterton v. Francis, 97 S. Ct. 2399 (1977); Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v.
Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
" Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977); Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery,
429 U.S. 305 (1977).
" Nolde Bros., Inc. v, Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S.
243 (1977); Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167 (1976).
" Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 97 S. Ct. 2002 (1977).
2° Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
" Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
12 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e
et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
23 See note 9 supra.
I' Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977); Occiden-
tal Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395
(1977).
25 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2732 (1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1077); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 (1977); In-
ternational Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 377 (1977); General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 146 (1976).
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the ten decisions of the Term the Court limited the meanings of "sex dis-
crimination"26 and "religious discrimination"; 27 broadened the meaning of
the "bona fide seniority system" exception; 28 defined the bu'rdens of proof
in "pattern and practice" cases; 26 explained the evidentiary weight to be
given to statistical evidence and proof's concerning "relevant labor markets"
in employment discrimination cases; 3" and decided a number of mis-
cellaneous issues concerning class action suits, the statute of limitations, and
the scope of remedies under Title VII. 3 ' In short, last Term the Court vir-
tually rewrote the law under Title VII, perhaps ensuring many lawyers full
employment for years to come.
The Court's ten decisions will have a lasting, far reaching impact on •
the development of Title VII law. Only time will tell the true meaning of
many of these decisions. Although there are hopeful signs in some of the
opinions—at least enough to suggest that we have not as yet seen the com-
plete demise of Title VII's proscription against discrimination—it is,
nevertheless, fair to say that the Court's Title VII opinions leave little for
civil rights proponents to cheer about.
A. Narrowing the Substantive Scope of Title VII
Probably the greatest reasons for gloom among civil rights advocates
are the Court's decisions in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States 32 and General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 33 These cases, along with United
Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 34 seemingly mark a retreat by the Court in Title VII
protection and may hereafter make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
in employment discrimination suits.
1. Remedies for Past Discrimination—International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States
Teamsters ranks with Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 35 and Washington v.
Davis" as one of the most important employment discrimination decisions
handed down by the Court in the past decade. Unfortunately, the Court
28 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977); United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
"Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
28
 International Bhd. or Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
29 Id.
39
 Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
31 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977); East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Mach. Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S.
229 (1976).
32
 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
as 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
34
 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
35 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits the use of employ-
ment procedural or testing mechanisms that act as barriers to the employment of minorities
even in the absence of discriminatory intent unless they are related to job performance).
36
 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (in order to prevail under an equal protection standard, the
plaintiff must show both discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent).
5
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used Teamsters to destroy one of the most important principles developed
under Title VII. Section 703(h) of Title VII 37
 provides that application of
different standards of compensation to employees pursuant to a bona fide
seniority system does not constitute an unlawful employment practice. This
section had been interpreted in an unbroken line of decisions by eight cir-
cuit courts of appeals to stand for the principle that Title VII does not
immunize seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimina-
tion. 38 These courts primarily based their rulings on the oft-cited district
court opinion in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, inc. . 39 In Quarles, the district
court determined that "a departmental seniority system that has its genesis
in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system" under Title
VII." In rejecting this line of reasoning, the Court in Teamsters held that
"an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful
under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discriniina-
don."'" This holding thus overturns established precedent on which many
courts and parties have relied over the years in attempting to undo the ef-
fects of past discrimination. As such, it is a startling setback for civil rights
advocates.
The facts in Teamsters highlight the impact of the decision. The Court
found that the employer was guilty of "systematic and purposeful employ-
ment discrimination" by limiting blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons to
less desirable jobs as "servicemen" or "local city drivers," while reserving
most of the better over-the-road "line driver" truck driving jobs for
whites." This discrmination was reinforced by a seniority system which
created separate lines of seniority for line drivers and city drivers and pro-
vided that any city driver who transferred to a line driver position had to
forfeit all his prior seniority and start at the bottom of the line driver
seniority list. 43 On the basis of this showing of discrmination the court of
appeals, relying on Quarles, ruled that all of the minority incumbent
employees were entitled to bid for future line-driver jobs on the basis of
their company seniority rather than in-job seniority, 44 and that once a class
member had filled a job, he could use his full company seniority—even if it
predated the effective date of Title VII—for all purposes, including bid-
ding and layoff. 45 In vacating the court of appeals decision, Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, attempted to distinguish Quarles by observing that
Quarles was based on the proposition that a seniority system perpetuating
pre-Act discrimination will not be a bona fide system if' the intent to
discriminate existed at the plan's inception."
The weakness in Justice Stewart's analysis of Quarles lies in his narrow
reading of that case. The Quarles court said that a bona fide seniority sys-
tem is one without discrimination and that there is nothing in the Act
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
28 See cases listed in Justice Marshall's dissent in Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 378 n.2, 379 n.3.
39 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
40 1d. at 517. See also Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States,
416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
41
 431 U.S. at 353-54.
"Id. at 342 & n.23.
"Id. at 343-44.
44
 517 F.2d 299, 317, 319 (5th Cir. 1975).
45 1d. at 317.
4°431 U.S. at 346 n.28.
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which provides that a pre-Act racially discriminatory system is deemed bona
fide. 47 In order to distinguish Quarles, Justice Stewart interpreted that case
to mean that a seniority system will be invalidated only when intent to dis-
criminate existed at the system's inception. In his dissent'to Teamsters, Jus-
tice Marshall construed Justice Stewart's observation to mean that the re-
sults. in "a large number" of the Quarles line of cases can survive the
Teamsters decision. 48 It is not at all clear, however, that this is what Justice
Stewart meant to say. Indeed, Justice Marshall's point touches the heart of
the problem raised by Teamsters. It is unfortunately possible to construe
Teamsters to mean that any seniority system that was revised from "de-
partmental" to "plant-wide" pursuant to a Quarks-type remedy for the
present effects of past discrimination might now be found discriminatory
against whites. Such a finding could , result because, if pre-Act discrimina-
tion is no longer cognizable, such a plan could be seen as adopted with an
intent to discriminate. If the lower courts follow such a reading of
Teamsters, the results could be disastrous, for it could mean that the hun-
dreds of seniority plans that have been changed voluntarily, by consent de-
cree, or by court order since Quarles might now be subject to challenge.
Moreover, the decision in Teamsters upholding a seniority system
which perpetuates pre-Act discrimination severely restricts the ability of
parties to obtain relief from such discrimination. This restrictive impact is
compounded by the Court's observation in a footnote that "[t]he opera-
tion of a seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII even though it
perpetuates post-Act discrimination that has not been the subject of a
timely charge by the discriminatee."49 Thus, the Court rather summarily
disposed of the question of the legality of the seniority system to the extent
that it perpetuates post-Act discrimination. The Court took this holding di-
rectly from United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans," a case decided on the same day
at Teamsters. In Teamsters, however, the Court enlarged on the holding in
Evans by further observing that:
[In Teamsters] the Government has sued to remedy the post-Act
discrimination directly, and there is no claim that any relief
would be time barred. But this is simply an additional reason not
to hold the seniority system unlawful, since such a holding would
in no way enlarge the relief to be awarded. Section 703(h) on its
face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not dis-
tinguish between the perpetuation of pre- and post-Act dis-
elimination . 51
Thus, in Teamsters, the Court held that since "the seniority system [at issue]
did not have its genesis in racial discrimination, and [since] it was
negotiated and ... maintained free from any illegal purpose," it is pro-
47 279 F. Supp. at 517.
" 431 U.S. at 379 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' 9 1d. at Z48 n.30.
55 431 U.S. 553 (1977). In Evans, a female flight attendant alleged that the airline's re-
fusal to credit her with seniority from an earlier period of employment was a violation of Title
VII when her separation from that employment had been a Title VII violation. Id. at 554-57.
Justice Stevens wrote the 'opinion for the Court upholding the seniority system with a dissent
by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
51 431 U.S. at 348 n.30 (citations omitted).
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tected under section 703(h) even though it perpetuates the effects of pre-
Act and post-Act unlawful discrimination. 52
In vacating and remanding the decision of the appeals court, the Su-
preme Court ruled that, pursuant to Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
Inc., 53
 a case decided in the previous Supreme Court Term, individual
members of the class who prove that they are victims of post-Act dis-
crimination, are entitled to "full 'make whole' relief, including retroactive
seniority ...." 64 However, the Court clearly stated that this relief can be
granted "without attacking the legality of the seniority system as applied to
them."" The Court also made it clear that no person may be given senior-
ity retroactive to a date earlier than the effective date of Title VII. 66
One aspect of Teamsters does provide a small gain for civil rights liti-
gants. The Court ruled that failure to apply for a position will not automati-
cally bar an award of retroactive seniority. Rather, plintiffs must be given
the chance to show that they should be treated as applicants for the pur-
poses of granting relief." This holding clearly expands the decision in
Franks by allowing relief to unidentified nonapplicant victims of dis-
crimination who were discouraged from applying for preferred jobs be-
cause of an employer's existing pattern of discrimination. Justice Stewart
made it clear, however, that such nonapplicants carry a heavy burden of
proof to show that they were indeed victims of discrimination. The
nonapplicant must show both that he would have applied for the job but
for his knowledge of the employer's discriminatory practices, and that he
possessed the necessary qualifications to fill past job vacancies." It is not
clear, however, just how these matters may be proven. Justice Stewart in-
dicated only that a nonapplicant's current willingness to transfer into a pre-
ferred position is not by itself evidence of his past desire for the job."
Thus, the extent of the gain realized by civil rights litigants will depend
upon whether, as a practical matter, nonapplicants can meet this burden of
showing that they were victims of discrimination.
Finally, there are two additional rulings of great significance in
Teamsters. The first concerns the burden of proof in a "pattern and prac-
tice" case under Title VII and the second addresses the issue of the weight
to be given statistical evidence. On the first issue, the Court confirmed the
holding in Franks that a rebuttable presumption in favor of relief arises
upon establishing a pattern and practice of discrimination." Thus, on re-
mand in Teamsters, the employer must show that its denial of line driver po-
sitions to minority applicants did not emanate from its discriminatory pol-
icy." This holding surely will inure to the benefit of future Title VII plain-
tiffs in class actions.
With regard to statistical evidence, the Court made it clear that such
evidence may be used to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in a
" 2 1d. at 356.
53
 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
" 431 U.S. at 347.
55 id.
"Id. at 356-57.
2 Id. at 363-64.
"id. at 367-69 & 369 n.53.
59 /d. at 371.
""Id. at 359 n.45.
("Id. at 362.
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pattern or practice action brought under Title VII. The Court elaborated
on this point by indicating that statistics concerning racial or ethnic im-
balance have probative value, since in the absence of some discriminatory
policy, the workforce over time should roughly reflect the community from
which it is drawn. 62 Thus, in the Court's view, Title VII does not require a
workforce which reflects the general population. A disparity between the
two, however, can show a prima facie case of a pattern or practice of dis-
criminatory hiring which must be rebutted by the employer to avoid a
Title VII violation. Despite this willingness to base a prima facie Title VII
case on statistical evidence, the Court cautioned that "statistics are not ir-
refutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evi-
dence, they may be rebutted."" 3
In sum, the decision in Teamsters is a potentially disastrous one for
civil rights litigants for several reasons. First, the Court's restrictive reading
of the Quarles cases will make future challenges 'to discriminatory seniority
systems increasingly difficult. Additionally, the Court in Teamsters has
thrown ,open to question the validity of seniority systems that have already
been revised to remedy past discrimination. There is also a question as to
whether Teamsters can be read to require the nullification of affirmative ac-
tion programs adopted pursuant to Executive Order 11246. 64 When meas-
ured against these setbacks, the small gain—that a nonapplicant may be
awarded retroactive seniority—made by plaintiffs in Teamsters represents a
hollow victory.
2. Statistical Evidence—Hazelwood School District v. United States
The Court expanded upon the weight to be given statistical evidence
in Title VII cases in Hazelwood School District v. United States," issued after
Teamsters. In Hazelwood, the Attorney General brought suit against the
school district and various school officials, alleging that they were engaged
in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination in violation of Title
VI1. 66 The evidence in the case showed the following: the black student
population within the school district amounted to just over 2 percent in
1972-73; at the time of trial in 1973, less than 2 percent of the teachers
within the school district were black; after Title VII became applicable to
the school district in 1972, only about 3.5 per cent of the new teachers
hired by the school district were black; and there were no black teachers
working in the school district prior to 1969. 67 In addition, the evidence
showed that new teachers were hired on the basis of subjective interviews,
and each school principal possessed virtually unlimited discretion to hire
teachers for his or her school on the basis of general criteria such as com-
petence, "personality, disposition, appearance, poise, voice, articulation, and
ability to deal with people."" Evidence also showed that the school district
normally recruited new teachers from predominantly white colleges and
"Id. at 339 & n,20.
"Id. at 340.
"Compare United States v. East Texas Motor Freight Sys., 16 FEP Cas. 163, 167-68 (5th
Cir. 1977) with EEOC v. AT & T Co., 14 FEP Cas. 1210, 1218-20 (3d Cir. 1977).
65 97 S. Ct. 2736 (1977).
"Id. at 2738.
"id. at 2738-43.
"Id. at 2739.
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universities in Missouri and bordering states. 89 Finally, evidence indicated
that 15.4 per cent of all teachers in the St. Louis area were black and 5.7
per cent of all teachers in the county, excluding the City of St. Louis, were
black.'"
On the basis of this evidence, the district court ruled that the Gov-
ernment had failed to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination be-
cause there was no significant disparity between the percentages of black
teachers and of black students in the school district. 7 ' The Eighth Circuit
reversed and ruled that the relevant statistical comparison was between
black teachers in the Hazelwood School District and black teachers in the
relevant labor market area. 72 The court of appeals further ruled that the
relevant labor market area included St. Louis County and St. Louis City;
accordingly, the court found a significant disparity between the number of
black teachers employed in Hazelwood and the number of black teachers
employed in the relevant labor market."
In a decision written by Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the decision of the court of appeals, but only on the narrow
ground that the appeals court had failed to consider the possibility that the
statistical evidence might be rebutted by statistics concerning Hazelwood's
post-Act hiring practices. 74 In so ruling, the Court relied on Teamsters for
the observation that "the employer must be given an opportunity to show
'that the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring
rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination.' "75
The Court left two questions for the district court to resolve on re-
mand. First, the district court must determine what constitutes the relevant
labor market. Second, the court must decide whether Hazelwood engaged
in a-pattern or practice of employment-discrimination based on a compari-
son of its work -force_with this market: 78
 The -determination of the relevant
labor market will turn on whether the market should include the St. Louis
City School District." Although die— Court made it clear "that the District
Court's comparison of Hazelwood's teacher work force to its student popu-
lation fundamentally misconceived the role of statistics in employment dis-
crimination cases,"" it did not indicate how this question as to the labor
market should be resolved. Instead, the Court instructed the district court
to consider a number of factors in order to make this determination. These
factors included:
(i) whether the racially based hiring policies of the St. Louis City
School District were in effect as far back as 1970; (ii) to what ex-
tent those polices have changed the racial composition of [the St.
"Id.
7° This was based on 1970 census figures. Id. The Court noted that the St. Louis School
District had, in recent years, followed a policy of attempting to maintain a 50% black teaching
staff. Id.
71
 United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1287-88 (E.D. Mo.
1975).
" United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 812, 820 (8th Cir. 1976).
73 Id. at 811 n.7.
74 97 S. Ct. at 2742, 2744.
"id. at 2743.
"Id. at 2744.
"Id. at 2743-44.
"fd. at 2742.
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Louis] district's teaching staff' from what it would otherwise have
been; (iii) to what extent St. Louis's recruitment policies have di-
verted to the city teachers who might otherwise have applied to
Hazelwood; (iv) to what extent Negro teachers employed by the
city would prefer employment in other districts such as Hazel-
wood; and (v) what the experience in other school districts in St.
Louis County indicates about the validity of excluding the city
school district from the relevant labor market. 79
The majority in Hazelwood, then, while endorsing the use of statistics to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, cautioned that the employer
must be given a chance to rebut such statistical proof. The majority opinion
also gave no real guidance for determining the relevant labor market, but
instead listed a number of factors which ultimately would seem to make the
district court's determination turn on its own perception of what is fair
under the circumstances.
In dissent, Justice Stevens indicated that he would have affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals." In his opinion, Justice Stevens made
the telling point that: "[t]he government is entitled to prevail on the pres-
ent record. It proved a prima facie case, which Hazelwood failed to rebut.
Why, then, should we burden a busy federal court with another trial?""
Justice Stevens concluded in light of all the evidence that the Government
established a prima facie case in Hazelwood and that it should prevail since
the defendants failed to offer any evidence rebutting the Government's
case. Iniplicitly, however, the majority seems to have assumed that, since
the trial in Hazelwood occurred long before the decision in Teamsters, .the
Hazelwood defendants had no reason to know of their burden of proof.
Thus, the Court gave the defendants an opportunity to respond to the
Government's evidence in light of Teamsters. The difference between the
majority and Justice Stevens seems to be over whose interests in this in-
stance merit more protection. Justice Stevens would seem to side with the
government in view of its unrebutted prima facie case. The majority fa-
vored giving the defendant the fullest chance to rebut this case.
In considering the quantum of statistical proof necessary to make out
a prima facie case, both the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan and the
dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens asserted forcefully that whether the
5.7 percent or 15.4 percent labor market figure is used, the Government
had made out a prima facie case. 92 Indeed, Justice Stevens highlighted this
point with the observation that:
[w]ith the city [of St. Louis] excluded, 5.7 percent of the
teachers in the remaining market were black. On the basis of a
random selection, one would therefore expect that 5.7 percent
of the 405 teachers hired by Hazelwood in the 1972-73 and 	 •
1973-74 school years to have been black. But instead of twenty-
three black teachers, Hazelwood hired only fifteen, less than
two-thirds of the expected number.... It is perfectly clear ...
"Id. at 2743-44.
"b Id. at 2747-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2747 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 2744-45 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2746-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that whatever probative force this disparity has, it tends to prove
discrimination and does absolutely nothing in the way of carry-
ing Hazelwood's burden of overcoming the Government's prima
facie case."
The implication of Justice Stevens' and Justice Brennan's argument there-
fore is that under either figure Hazelwood's performance fell far short of
anything which would rebut the prima facie case of discrimination made
out by the government.
Although the Supreme Court left unresolved the methodology for
factual determination of the relevant labor market and of the existence of a
pattern or practice of employment discrimination, the decision in Hazelwood
nevertheless must be read as a relatively strong statement in favor of the
use of statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under Title VII. While this endorsement may not surprise some, the deci-
sion is nevertheless significant, especially when read in light of some of the
dicta less favorable to statistical evidence in Washington v. Davis" and Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert. 85 In this respect, the decision in Hazelwood re-
inforces some of the Court's similarly strong statements in Teamsters." To
the extent that Hazelwood endorses the use of statistical evidence in making
out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, it is a favorable
decision for Title VII litigants. The real impact of the decision, however,
tied as it is to a determination of the relevant labor market, must await fu-
ture assessment.
3. Sex Discrimination—General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and Dothard v. Rawlin-
son
Apart from Teamsters and Hazelwood, the two most important employ-
ment discrimination cases deCided by the Court during the 1976 Term
were General Electric Co. v. Gilbert"' and Dothard v. Rawlinson. 88 Both of
these cases raised issues concerning the meaning of "sex discrimination"
under Title VII.
The Supreme Court's most controversial labor law decision during the
1976 Term was undoubtedly the ruling in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that
the exclusion of "pregnancy" from the list of disabilities included in an
otherwise comprehensive private-sector employee. disability benefits plan
does not constitute sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII."" The
83 1d. at 2746-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a rare show of candor for a Supreme Court
Justice, Stevens then adds in a footnote, the following observation:
After I had drafted this opinion, one of my law clerks advised me that, given the
size of the two-year sample, there is only about a 5% likelihood that a disparity
this large would be produced by a random selection from the labor pool. If his
calculation ... is correct, it is easy to understand why Hazelwood offered no ex-
pert testimony.
Id, at 2747 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 4 26 U.S. at 246.
85
 429 U.S. at 136.
se 341 US. at 338-40.
87 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
" 97 S. Ct, 2720 (1977).
88
 429 U.S. at 145-46. The plaintiff employees claimed that the plan violated 703(a)(1)
of Title VII, 42 U.S.G. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), which makes it an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer "... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
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Court's six to three decision was accompanied by comprehensive, elaborate
opinions from both the majority and the dissenting justices."
The majority opinion in Gilbert, written by Justice Rehnquist, offered
several novel analyses of both Title V11 and prior cases which interpret it.
These viewpoints may have significance far beyond this case. First, Justice
Rehnquist seemingly applied a fourteenth amendment equal protection test
to determine whether there was a seximsed classification prohibited under
Title V11. 9 ' Second, the Justice gave curt treatment to the principle, de-
veloped in earlier discrimination cases, that a prima facie violation of Title
VII can be established by demonstrating that a facially neutral employment
rule or classification has an adverse impact on a protected class." Indeed,
Justice Rehnquist's citation of Washington v. Davis for the proposition that
"a prima facie violation of Title VII can be established in some circum-
stances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or
classification is to discriminate against members of one class or another," 99
may be seen as an attempt to establish the predicate for possible re-
consideration by the Court of the previous decisions supporting the "effects
test" under Title VII. Third, Justice Rehnquist found no sex-based classifi-
cation under the equal protection test which he applied, because the plan at
issue did not deny benefits to one sex which were granted to another but
instead eliminated a physical condition from the list of compensable dis-
abilities." Such a test may result in the failure to find discrimination in
all but the most blatant of cases. Finally, Justice Rehnquist sharply
downgraded the importance of and deference to be given to the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines of Title VII.95 The result in Gilbert undoubtedly is
discouraging to civil rights advocates. More discouraging than the specific
result, however, is the generally restrictive effect Gilbert will have on future
Title VII cases if Justice Rehnquist's reasoning is adopted.
Justice Rehnquist began his analysis in Gilbert by questioning what
Congress meant by the term "discrimination" in Title VII." To resolve this
question, Justice Rehnquist turned to decisions under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment: 97 He linked Title VII to the four-
teenth amendment by stating that the case law under the fourteenth
amendment examines the term discrimination ."in a legal context not wholly
dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title
VII."'" From this platform, Justice Rehnquist leaped to the assumption that
the tests used under Title VII and the equal protection clause are similar,
if not identical. Accordingly, he relied on the Court's 1974 decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello," in which the Court held that a disparity in treatment be-
don, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . .." '429 U.S at 128-29.
9° Justice Brennan authored the more extensive dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Marshall. See id. at 146. Justice Stevens dissented in a separate opinion. See id. at 160
51 1d. at 133,
"See id. at 136-37.
93 1d, at 137 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in the original).
94 1d. at 134-35.
95 1d. at 141.
" Id. at 133.
97 /d.
" Id.
se
	U.S. 484 (1974).
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tween pregnancy-related and other disabilities under a state disability in-
surance plan is not sex discrimination under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment."° Justice Rehnquist found Geduldig "precisely
in point" in its holding that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability-
benefits plan providing general coverage does not constitute gender-based
discrimination at 'all."' His conclusion that there was no sex discrimination
in Gilbert thus followed inevitably from Geduldig.
Justice Rehnquist did not justify adequately the application of a test
for sex discrimination under Title VII identical to that under the equal
protection clause. Instead, he reached this result through rather shallow
rhetoric. Rehnquist began tentatively, admitting there is `no necessary in-
ference" that the same test should be used, and stating only that equal pro-
tection analysis is a "useful starting point" and the contexts are "not wholly
dissimilar." 102 He stated the proposition so weakly that there is not much
with which to disagree. Then, without adding more substance to his argu-
ment, he found Geduldig "quite relevant,"'" and finally "precisely in
point." 104 This hardly seems a strong enough basis for such a significant
step.
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the statutory and constitutional
analyses of discrimination are identical ignores, or at least eludes, the dis-
tinctions which have existed between the two. 105 It is strongly at odds with
cases in which the Court has presumed that Congress' expressed belief in
Title VII that strong affirmative steps were needed to eradicate employ-
ment discrimination carried Title VII's requirements well beyond the re-
quirements imposed by the equal protection clause. Only in the previous
term, Justice White, writing for the Court in Washington v. Davis,'" re-
ferred to Title VII's "more probing judicial review" and "more rigorous
standard" than is appropriate under the Constitution.'°?
In addition, the application to Title VII of constitutional limitations
on what is considered sex discrimination introduces elements irrelevant and
inappropriate to Title VII analysis. It is clear that the characterization of
the classification in Geduldig and the analysis of whether that classification
was sex-based was influenced at least partially by the Court's reluctance to
'°0 1d. at 486, 494.
101 429 U.S. at 136.
'"Id. at 133.
109 Id.
'"Id. at 136.
"5
 The first step in evaluating a claim arising under either the equal protection clause
or Title VII is usually to determine how the challenged rule or practice draws a line between
two definable classes of persons who have been treated differently. Once the classification
scheme has been determined; the next inquiry under the equal protection clause is to examine
the nature of the classification. The nature of the classification involved will then determine
the degree of strictness with which the Court will scrutinize the rationale for the classification
scheme. By contrast, under Title VII, once the dassification scheme has been determined, the
statute specifically delineates those classiF -ations which are illegal. Absent a showing by the
employer that the classification is justifieu by some "business necessity" or "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" there normally will be a finding of an unlawful employment practice.
"5 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
107 1d. at 247. Justice White also expressly refused to limit Title VII. by the 14th
Amendment: "We have never held that the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of
invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we
decline to do so today." Id. at 239.
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come to grips with the proper standard of review for sex-based classifica-
tions. 1 ° 8 The Court quite often has evaded hard questions such as whether
sex is a suspect classification, and the Court can be expected to continue
such evasion through somewhat strained reasoning on preliminary issues.
But Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Gilbert makes this kind of strained rea-
soning equally applicable to Title VII cases. Such maneuvering is entirely
inappropriate in Title VII cases, for the statute already has answered the
question analogous to the difficult constitutional one: Title VII treats sex
discrimination on exactly the same footing as racial discrimination. In the
end then, what Justice Rehnquist accomplished in Gilbert was to introduce
some of the necessary, but unfortunate uncertainties of constitutional ad-
judication into cases which could and should be decided straightforwardly
under the statutory language of Title VII.
Amid all of the unfortunate reasoning in the majority opinion, the
fundamental rationale of the case seems to be that there was no sex dis-
crimination present because "underinclusiveness" in an insurance plan
does not produce a•disparate effect 1 ° 8 or, alternatively, that sex discrimina-
tion in Gilbert was justified by some compelling business necessity."° Justice
Rehnquist expanded upon the question of underinclusiveness in a footnote,
in which he stated that the insurance provided by the employer is nothing
more than added compensation to employees. If this compensation were
given in the form of wages instead of insurance, as long as all employees
were treated equally, there could be no claim of discrimination, even
though female employees would have to spend more to insure them-
selves."' This seemingly is the heart of the majority's rationale in Gilbert.
This analysis ignores that once a fringe benefit is given it must be seen as
unlawfully discriminatory if men enjoy full coverage while women receive
less than complete coverage. Perhaps what Justice Rehnquist envisioned is a
claim that a partial disability plan—for example, one covering only dis-
abilities caused by broken limbs—could be viewed as sex discrimination if
pregnancy were excluded. This hypothetical case need not have been a
problem for the Court in Gilbert, however, because the plan in that case
provided for substantial inclusiveness, with pregnancy the notable excep-
tion." 2 In such circumstances, the patent disparate effect of excluding
pregnancy from the plan should be viewed as more than mere "un-
derinclusiveness."
With respect to whether the discrimination in Gilbert could be justified
by some "business necessity," Justice Rehnquist's opinion may be read as
1 " See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 & n.20. In fact, it appears from that opinion that
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, only later added his classification argument to answer
the charge of the dissenters that he was applying the rational basis test to a sex-based classifi-
cation. The Court had previously handled the question of whether sex is a suspect classifica-
tion indecisively. See Frontier° v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
75-76 (1971). In Frontiero only four members of the Court, Justices Brennan, Douglas, White
and Marshall, held that sex "like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin,
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." 411 U.S. at
688.
1 " 429 U.S. at 137.
" Id. at 134-35.
"' Id. at 139 n.17.
"2 Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sdggesting that the pregnancy exclusion was justified because pregnancy
benefits are too costly or because many pregnancies are voluntary." 3
 This
analysis in Gilbert seems wholly unsatisfactory. As Justice Stevens correctly
observed:
[t]he company [did] not [establish] any such justification [for the
discrimination between men and women] .... An analysis of the
effect of a company's,rules relating to absenteeism would be ap-
propriate if those rules referred only to neutral criteria, such as
whether an absence was voluntary or involuntary, or perhaps
particularly costly. This case, however, does not involve rules of
that kind. 14
Moreover, these asserted justifications should have failed simply because
they . were never offered by the employer in Gilbert as proof of a "business
necessity." The Court, in considering the issue of justification, should not
have rebutted a prima facie case of discrimination on its own supposition.
Once Justice Rehnquist•completed his analysis of the General Electric
disability plan, he faced as a final hurdle a 1972 EEOC interpretive
guideline which required that pregnancy be treated as any other temporary
disability. 13 Brushing aside the Court's repeated statements that the
EEOC's guidelines are entitled to "great deference,"" 6 he applied a stan-
dard which gave them only "consideration."" 7 The standard which Justice
Rehnquist applied was taken from a 1944 decision" 8 concerning adminis-
trative interpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act." 3 Under the "con-
sideration" standard administrative regulations were considered a body of
experience upon which the Court may draw, with the weight to be given
the regulation to be decided in each particular case.'" By applying this
standard, Justice Rehnquist was able to adjust the weight of the 1972
EEOC pregnancy guideline to suit his own analysis of the General Electric
disability plan. Accordingly he determined that the guideline failed to merit
judicial deference.'" Then, having dismissed the probative value of the
guideline, Justice Rehnquist concluded his discusssion on this issue by
characterizing the EEOC interpretation as standing "virtually alone." 12 " Jus-
tice Brennan's dissent strongly challenged this characterization, citing a
substantial volume of material which at the least indicated that the
guideline hardly stood alone.'" Yet it all seems hardly worth Justice Bren-
13 1d. at 136, 139.
"' Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
" 5 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1976) provides: "Disabilities caused or contributed to by
pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment."
14
 929 U.S. at 140.
'"Id. at 141.
1 " Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
" 4 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
"° 323 U.S. at '140.
"' Justice Rehnquist relied on a statement by the Senate floor manager of the 1964
Civil Rights bill and particularly on the fact that the EEOC General Counsel issued opinion
letters taking a contradictory position several years before the guideline was issued. 429 U.S.
at 142-44.
"Id. at 145.
"3 1d. at 156-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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nan's effort to rebut Justice Rehnquist's reasoning. The latter made no pre-
tense at reasoning his way around the "great deference" standard or the
material supporting the EEOC guideline; he simply ignored them. What is
particularly egregious about this treatment is that it was unnecessary; Jus-
tice Rehnquist might have reached the same result without reducing the
deference which courts give to the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. Instead,
he made it clear that these guidelines may not be worth the paper they are
written on unless the Supreme Court agrees with them.
The Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert is disheartening to
all who take a broad view of the protection offered by Title VII. Examina-
tion of Justice Rehnquist's opinion suggests a pervasive hostility toward the
full and effective achievement of Title VII's goals, a marked retreat from
the expansive tone of the Court's Title VII decisions in the early 1970's. 124
If Justice Rehnquist continues to marshal! a majority of the Court, there
may issue in years to come a series of decisions that will give force to the
hostility implicit in the language of Gilbert.
, While Gilbert may have been a disappointment to Title VII pro-
ponents, some of its cutting edge was dulled by the Court's later decision in
Dothard v. Rawlinson. 125 In Dothard, the plaintiff was a woman who was de-
nied employment with the Alabama Board of Corrections as a prison
guard, or "correctional counselor." 28 She brought a class suit under Title
VII and under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
claiming that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.'"
At issue in the case were certain state-established qualifying standards for
employing correctional counselors in state prisons.' 28 One of these required
that all applicants for correctional counselor positions be "not less than five
feet two inches nor more than six feet ten inches in height, [and] weigh not
less than 120 pounds nor more than 300 pounds ...." 28 The plaintiff was
refused employment because she failed to meet the statutory minimum
weight requirement.'" Also at issue was a state administrative regulation
which established gender criteria for assigning correctional counselors to
Maximum security institutions in "contact positions," positions that require'
continual physical proximity to prison inmates.'" Under this regulation,
women were precluded from assuming "contact positions" in male
maximum security prisons. Since most of the correctional counselor posi-
tions were classified as "contact positions," and since most such positions
involved assignments in male maximum security prisons, the effect of the
regulation was to exclude women from approximately seventy-five percent
of the available correctional counselor positions.' 32
In a forceful opinion written by Justice Stewart, the Court found that
the Alabama statutory height and weight requirements were unlawful
under Title VII. 133 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a strict
124 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
1 " 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
' 24 1d. at '1723.
1 " Id. at 2723.24.
' 25 1d. at '1724-25.
122 Id. at 2724 n.2, quoting ALA. Cone. Title 55, § 373 (109) (1973 Supp.).
131 97 S. Ct. at 2724.
" 1 Id.
'" Id. at 2726.
' 33 /d. at 2728.
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"effects test" and specifically reaffirmed its 1971 decision in Griggs v. Duke
Poiver Co.'" In Griggs, the Court held that a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie Title VII violation by showing that employment criteria result in a dis-
criminatory pattern of hiring. Once such a prima facie case is made, the
burden falls on the employer to show clearly that the criteria are job re-
lated.' 35 Applying the Griggs principle in Dothard, the Court found that the
Alabama height requirement operated to exclude 33.29 percent of the
women in the United States between the ages of eighteen to seventy-nine,
while excluding only 1.28 percent of the men between the same ages, and
that the one hundred and twenty pound weight restriction excluded 22.29
percent of the women and only 2.35 percent of the men in the same age
group. 13 " Accordingly, the Court upheld the district court's ruling that the
plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of unlawful sex discrimination
pursuant to the effects test enunciated in Griggs.'" The Court then ruled
that the defendant failed to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case because
the defendant had not produced any evidence "correlating the height and
weight requirements with the requisite amount of strength thought essen-
tial to good job performance." 13" The Court therefore affirmed the finding
of a Title VII violation stemming from the height and weight re-
quirements.
Once the Court decided that the height and weight requirements un-
lawfully discriminated against women, Justice Stewart next considered
whether the challenged regulation exluding women from "contact posi-
tions" fit within the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception
to the proscription against sex discrimination under section 703(e) of Title
VII.' 39 Section 703(e) permits sex-based discrimination —in those certain in-
stances where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational qualification rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular. business or
enterprise....""° In considering whether the regulation excluding women
from contact positions was job-related, the Dothard Court initially noted, for
the first time in a Title VII case, that "it is impermissible under Title VII
to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes...." 141 The Court then determined on the
basis of the narrow language of section 703(e), its legislative history, and
past rulings by the EEOC, that the BFOQ exception to the proscription of
sex-based discrimination was intended to be a narrow one.' 42 On the facts
of Dothard, however, the Court found that the regulation excluding women
from "contact positions" is lawful as a bona fide occupational qualification
under Title VII.' 43
It was in this finding that the majority opinion faltered badly. Justice
Stewart's rationale for this conclusion is completely at odds with his ac-
U1
 40I U.S. 424 (1971).
' 35 1d. at 432.
I"
 97 S. Ct. at 2727.
137 1d.
138 1d, at 2728.
i " Id. at 2728 n.14.
"°42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e) (1970).
'" 97 S. Ct. at 2729 (footnote omitted). But see Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-45.
I" 97 S. Ct. at 2729.
"3 1d.
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knowledgement that "the argument that a particular job is too dangerous
for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the purpose
of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice for her-
self."'" Despite this acknowledgement, Justice Stewart determined that
since there is "a jungle atmosphere" in the Alabama state prisons and a
number of the prisoners in the Alabama prisons are sex offenders who
have criminally assaulted women, the State is justified in excluding women
from correction counselor positions in male maximum security in-
stitutions. 145 Then, despite his ruling that Title VII forbids sexual
stereotyping in employment, Justice Stewart revealed his opinion about the
limits of the "weaker sex" by stating that:
The essence of a correctional counselor's job is to maintain
prison security. A woman's relative ability to maintain order in a
male, maximum security, unclassified penitentiary of the type
Alabama now runs could be directly reduced by her wom-
anhood....
The likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because
she was a woman would pose a real threat not only to the victim
of the assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and
protection of its inmates and the other security personnel. The
employee's very womanhood would thus directly undermine her
capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correc-
tional counselor's responsibility. 198
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice Brennan, exposed Justice
Stewart's rationale as both specious and inconsistent with the Court's nar-
row construction of the BFOQ exception to Title VII. Justice Marshall first
pointed out that nothing indicated that the presence of women guards
would increase the dangers already present in the Alabama prison sys-
tem. 147 He cited examples of the use of women prison guards from
California and Washington to support his assertion that women who are
qualified and properly trained have the necessary attributes to succeed as
effective prison guards in male maximum security institutions.' 48 Finally,
Justice Marshall rejected the majority view that the possibility of sexual as-
sault against women guards is sufficient justification for denying them
jobs.' 48 In this respect, Justice Marshall properly observed that the majori-
ty's rationale "regrettably perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old
myths about women—that women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual ob-
jects."'" He argued that whether or not there is a likelihood that inmates
will assault women guards, "[t]he proper response ... is not to limit the
employment opportunities of law-abiding women who wish to contribute to
their community, but to take swift and sure punitive action against the in-
mate offenders." 151
'44 Id. at 2729-30 (footnote omitted).
1 411
141 Id. at 2730.
' 47 1d. at 2753 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 45 1d. at 2733, 2734 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. at 2734-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' 50 1d. at 2734 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 2735 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The majority's application of the BFOQ exception in Dothard is
troublesome. It is based on the unstated premise that women may be de-
nied jobs, whether or not they are otherwise qualified, if those who will be
servedby their work react with hostility to their employment. This premise
cannot be reconciled with the Court's otherwise narrow reading of the
BFOQ exception. The proscription against sex discrimination under Title
VII should be read to mean that women as a class cannot be excluded from
a job merely because many women are not qualified to perform the job.
Indeed, Justice Stewart gave explicit recognition to this proposition in his
opinion for the Court, but he then failed to apply it.I52
In a separate dissent, Justice White made the interesting observation
that he doubted that the number of women applicants for employment as
prison guards would correspond to the number of women in the popula-
tion generally. 153
 Accordingly, he questioned the appropriateness of the
Court's use of national population statistics in proving the disparate impact
of the height and weight requirements seen in Dothard. 154 Justice White
thus urged that in both the Dothard and Hazelwood cases, the district court
should consider applicant pool data rather than comparative workforce
statistics in determining whether the discriminatory effects shown are at-
tributable to unlawful employment practices or other permissible factors.' 55
In Dothard, however, Justice White's concerns seem misplaced. It should not
matter that most women in Alabama are uninterested in applying for
prison guard positions; the main point of the opinion is that the state's
height and weight requirements effectively will exclude a large percentage
of those women who might wish to apply for the available prison guard po-
sitions. A strict application of Griggst" would suggest that even if no
women currently desire employment as prison guards, the height and
weight requirements should still fall because they are unvalidated tests that
will exclude many more women than men should women choose to apply
for prison guard work.'5 7 Thus, while Justice White's assumptions about
the number of women who would apply for guard positions may be cor-
rect, his rationale fundamentally misconceives the role of statistics in Title
VII actions, and accordingly should not be followed.
In light of the strong statements in Dothard upholding the use of the
effects tests to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, 155 it is difficult
to believe that this decision was written by the same Court which decided
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert during the same term. Whereas Justice Rehn-
quist in Gilbert equated Title VII analysis with equal protection analysis,
Justice Stewart completely avoided the problem of the meaning of sex dis-
crimination under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment by observing in a footnote that:
The parties do not suggest ... that the Equal Protection Clause
requires more rigorous scrutiny of a State's sexually dig-
"2 Id. at 2729-30.
' 53 1d. at 2749 (White, J., dissenting).
' 54 1d. at 2748-49 (White, J., dissenting).
"old. at 2748, 2749. The district court in Hazelwood will have to deal with the question
raised by Justice White since it is one of the issues on remand of that case to the district court.
See text and notes 76 and 77 supra.
15e 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See text and notes 134-35 supra.
"7 401 U.S. at 430-31.
1"
 97 S. Ct. at 2726.
20
1976 LABOR LAW DECISIONS
criminatory employment policy than does Title VII. There is
thus no occasion to give independent consideration to the Dis-
trict. Court's ruling that Regulation 204 violates the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as Title VII. 15 "
Without considering how Justice Stewart might decide the case under the
fourteenth amendment, it is plain that the legal analysis that the Court
used in Dothard at least implicitly rejects the leg-al analysis used by Justice
Rehnquist in Gilbert. The reasoning process which the Court employed in
Dothard was straightforward. The Court looked first to see if the regulation
had a disproportionate impact upon a protected class, and finding that it
did, went on to see whether the requirements in question were job related.
In contrast, the Gilbert Court held that a plan which excludes a disability af-
fecting only one sex, while underinclusive, does not constitute sex-based
discrimination. The Court reached this result both through the strained
application of equal protection standards to Title VII and through almost
total disregard for EEOC guidelines.
Although Gilbert tied to the limits of equal protection analysis only the
narrow segment of Title VII dealing with the identification of a dis-
criminatory classification, it opened the way for further such limitations of
Title VII that could result in a major restriction of the statute's coverage
and usefulness. This retreat from earlier decisions especially threatens the
ability to show a prima facie Title VII violation by demonstrating the dis-
criminatory impact of a facially neutral classification. In his opinion for
the Court, justice Rehnquist recognized that prior cases have established
such an "effects" test under other sections of Title VII."° Without endors-
ing this test, however, he held that there was no showing of gender-based
discriminatory effect in Gilbert.'" But for the adherence to the effects test
expressed in the concurring opinions by Justices Stewart and Blackmun
and the strong dissents by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, the
Court's rather cool treatment of the effects test in Gilbert could be seen as
establishing the predicate either for doing away with this test or for limiting
its applicability in future cases. Justice Stewart noted that he did "not un-
derstand the [Gilbert] opinion to question either Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
specifically, or the significance generally of proving a discriminatory effect
in a Title VII case."'" Justices Blackmun,'" Brennan, Marshall 164 and Ste-
vens'" expressed similar opinions. The Court's subsequent opinion in
Dothard v. Rawlinson clearly adopted an "effects" test and thus dulled some
of the potential impact of Gilbert.'" Indeed, even Justice Rehnquist ap-
ld. at 2729 n.20.
" 0 429 U.S. at 136-37, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976), and Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
16 ' 429 U.S. at 136, Justice Rehnquist also threw in a "but cf." citation to McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S, 792, 802-06 (1973). 429 U.S. at 137. The dissent correctly
characterized this reference as . "mystifying," and expended considerable effort to dispel any
inference that McDonnell Douglas in any way undercuts the effects test. 429 U.S. at 153 n.6
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
12 429 U,S. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
163 Id. (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part).
144 Id. at 153.55 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
166 ld. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
""Id. at 2726. See text and notes 134-38 supra.
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peared to have modified his position somewhat in Dothard,'" where he
agreed that the statistics in Dothard were sufficient to make out a prima
facie case. Accordingly, although Justice Rehnquist's equation of Title VII
with equal protection standards in Gilbert points toward a definition of dis-
crimination based on intent and not effect, the Court does not appear
ready to abandon its established effects test under Title VII.
4. Religious Discrimination—Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison'es was one of the most interesting
and difficult cases decided by the Court last term. The plaintiff in Hardison
was an employee of Trans World Airlines (TWA) who, after his initial date
of hire, became a member of the Worldwide Church of God.'" One of the
tenets of this religion is that believers must refrain from work from sunset
on Friday until sunset on Saturday."° Under the existing collective bargain-
ing agreement between TWA and the International Association of
Machinists, employees could bid for preferred work shifts on the basis of
their seniority."' When the plaintiff elected to move to a new job location
within the company, he went to the bottom of the seniority list in the new
location pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and
thus did not have sufficient seniority to avoid working on his Sabbath. 12
The employer advised union officials that they could seek a change of work
assignments for the plaintiff by arranging a swap between the plaintiff and
other employees: the union, however, refused to violate the seniority provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreement.' 73 Company officials attempted
without success to find alternative work for the plaintiff,'" but they re-
fused to assign him to a four-day work week because he was needed for
Saturday work.'" When the plaintiff refused to report for work on Satur-
days, he was discharged for insubordination in refusing to work assigned
shifts.'"
After his discharge, the plaintiff filed suit under Title VII charging
religious discrimination on the grounds that the employer had failed to
make a "reasonable accommodation" to the plaintiffs religious needs pur-
suant to the requirements of sections 7010 77 and 703(a)(1) 179 of Title
VII.' 79 In 1972, Congress modified the proscription against religious dis-
crimination in section 703(a)(1) with an addition to the definition of "reli-
gion" so that section 701(j) now reads, "[Ole term 'religion' includes all as-
pects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an em-
167
 97 S. Ct. at 2731. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result and concurring in part).
'ea 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
"2 1d. at 67.
' 70 1d.
1 " Id.
"2
 Id. at 68.
"3 Id.
"'Id. at 68-69.
'" Id. at 68. The evidence indicated that plaintiff was the only employee on shift avail-
able to perform Saturday work. Id.
'" Id. at 69.
'" 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (Supp. V. 1975).
i " 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
"9 432 U.S. at 69.
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ployer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice with-
out undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.""° Prior to
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the EEOC, in a 1967 interpretive
guideline, had declared that employers are required "to make reasonable
accommodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective
employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hard- .
ship on the conduct of the employer's business."'" Neither the 1972
amendments to Title VII nor the EEOC guidelines gives any significant
guidance as to what is required by the twin tests of "reasonable accommo.
dations" and "undue hardship."
The extent of the required accommodation under Title VII has long
remained an unsettled issue. In 1971 and again in 1976, in Dewey v. Rey-
nolds Metals Co.'" and in Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins,' 83 the Court con-
fronted this issue, but failed to decide it because in both instances the
judgments of the courts of appeals were affirmed without opinion by an
equally divided court. In Hardison, the Court addressed the issue once
more.
The court of appeals in Hardison ruled that the company had failed to
accommodate the plaintiff's religious needs by failing to permit the plaintiff
to work a four day week, to fill the plaintiff's Saturday shift from other
available personnel competent to do his job, and to arrange a swap between
the plaintiff and another employee so that the plaintiff could observe his
Sabbath.' 84 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, re-
jected the ruling of the _court of appeals. Instead, the Court held that the
employer had satisfied its obligations under Title VII when it attempted to
accommodate the plaintiff by authorizing the union to search for someone
to swap shifts with him and when it attempted without success to find him
another job.' 85 The Court determined that the employer had no obligation
or right unilaterally to arrange a swap in work assignments that would have
amounted to a breach of the parties' collective bargaining agreement." 8
Rather, Justice White stated,
[wle do not believe that the duty to accommodate requires TWA
to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement. ...
Without a clear and express indication from Congress, we cannot
agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed-upon senior-
ity system must give way when necessary to accommodate reli-
gious observances.'"
Justice White evinced concern that a decision in favor of Hardison
might raise serious first amendment problems. In a footnote to the opin-
ion, Justice White noted that the district court had raised the question
whether it might not conflict with the establishment clause of the first
amendment to find an undue hardship in the present case, since requiring
"3 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(j) (Stipp. V. 1975).
"i 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1, 32 Fed. Reg. 10298 (1967).
"2
 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
"3 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
I" 527 F.2d 33, 39-41 (8th Cir. 1975).
1 $3 432 U.S. at 77-79.
' 8"Id. at 78-79.
187 Id. at 79.
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accommodation of Hardison's religious observances might amount to favor-
ing the religious over the secular.'" To avoid these problems, the Court
narrowly construed the "reasonable accommodation" requirement in rela-
tion to what is required of the employer. The narrowness of the Court's
definition is demonstrated by the Court's statement that:
TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift
preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a reli-
gion that observes the Saturday Sabbath. Title VII does not con-
template such unequal treatment. ... It would be anomalous to
conclude that by "reasonable accommodation" Congress meant
that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in
order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others,
and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to
go that far.' 89
The Court found further support for this position in section 703(h) of Title
VII. That section provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to apply different ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system ...." 1 " Accordingly, the
Court reasoned that section 703(h) validates some seniority systems even
though they have a discriminatory effect so long as there is no intent to
discriminate. This finding supports the Court's position in Hardison that an
employer does not have a duty to create a perfect system for the exercise
of the employee's religious beliefs. •
Justice White added in Hardison that the employer was not required to
incur costs in the form of higher wages or lost efficiency either by allowing
the plaintiff to work an abnormal four day week or by paying premium
pay to attract 'employee replacements who could substitute for the plain:
tiff."' Thus, Justice White concluded that to force TWA to bear the addi-
tional costs in the case of the petitioner, while incurring no such costs for
other employees who want particular days off, would itself be discrimina-
tion based upon religion.'"
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, asserting that
the decision in Hardison "deals a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to
accommodate work requirements to religious practices." 193 In this, he is
probably correct. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion fails to
detract from the soundness of the majority decision. In the context of col-
lective bargaining under our national labor policy as embodied in the
NLRA, 194 the Court has emphasized the subjugation of the interests of the
"a Id. at 69 n.4.
"9 1d. at 81.
'Bald at 81-82, quoting 42 U.S.C. t 2000e-2(h) (1970).
" 1 Id. at 84-85.
192 Id. at 84.
I" Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
191
 Much of the material in the text and notes between notes 194 and 211 is taken di-
rectly from Edwards and Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title
VII, 69 MICH, L. REV. 599, 631-40 (1971).
24
1976 LABOR LAW DECISIONS
individual to those of the group—the union.' Thus, in the absence of
hostility or unfair representation, a union can deprive an individual of his
seniority rights'" or settle a grievance adversely to an individual
employee,'" even though the individual objects. In the collective bargain-
ing setting, it makes little sense to require a compelling interest in order to
uphold an evenhandedly applied contractual provision against a claim of
uneven impact on an employee's religious beliefs when such a rule obvi-
ously would impair the effectiveness of' the statutorily recognized bargain-
ing representative. Similar considerations apply in the context of alleged re-
ligious discrimination under Title VII. Given the need for uniform applica-
tion of contractual provisions, as articulated by law under the NLRA, no
finding of discrimination should be made nor accommodation required un-
less a Title VII plaintiff shows that a challenged contract clause is intended
to achieve the prohibited discrimination. Otherwise, the requisite "accom-
modation" itself will establish a pattern of discrimination that favors and
exempts certain religious believers from their obligations to perform under
admittedly lawful contract provisions.'"
A collective bargaining contract by its very nature represents a series
of compromises. To be sure, there are issues that result in complete victory
for one side and complete capitulation for the other; on the whole, though,
the collective bargaining process is one of give and take between company
and union. Moreover, at least on the union side, the demands put forth
and settlements made also represent' compromises among political factions
within the bargaining unit itself—between the young and the old, the
skilled and the unskilled, the dayshift and the nightshift. In view of' these
pluralistic influences on the terms of any given collective bargaining
agreement, an expansive interpretation of "reasonable accommodation" to
religious belief for the purposes of Title VII might be impossible to ad-
minister. Take, for example, the question of seniority systems. There are
innumerable kinds of seniority systems —job, department, and plant, to
name but three: The particular seniority system in any one plant may well
be a reflection of' the political ebb and flow within a union over long
periods of time, the ability of that particular union to impose its demands
on the employer, or the priority which the union has given to such a de-
mand. Suppose that one system of seniority means that. a Seventh Day Ad-
ventist or an Orthodox Jew would have to work on Saturdays, while
another system would require Sunday but not Saturday work. Since the
first such seniority system will affect Seventh Day Adventists and Orthodox
Jews adversely, would it have to be discarded for the second? To com-
pound the problem, the second seniority system affects members of the
Faith Reformed Church adversely. Must the company discard both senior-
ity systems? Or should the legality of either seniority system depend upon a
comparison of the number of Orthodox Jews and Seventh Day Adventists
versus Faith Reformed Church members working at the plant at the time
' 9° Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349
(1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-39 (1953). See generally Edwards, Due
Process Considerations in Labor Araration, 25 Abs. J. (N.S.) 141 (1970).
'°° Humphrey v, Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330, 338-39 (1953).
1 °' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
"" See Linscott v, Millers Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1372-73 (D. Mass. 1970).
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the system was adopted? Examples such as these can be cited ad infinitum,
because the definition of religious discrimination is a functional variant of
the definition of religion and there is no meaningful definitional limit to
the scope of "religion." Thus, if the test of "reasonable accommodation" is
read too broadly or if the test of "undue hardship" is read too narrowly,
any seniority system could be found to be discriminatory, depending only
upon the religious beliefs of the employee population at any given time.
The result reached in Hardison is therefore sound in that it protects
employers (or fellow employees) to incur substantial costs to aid the reli-
the same time it . does not weaken the collective bargaining process.
In his dissent in Hardison, Justice Marshall recognized that "important
constitutional questions would be posed by interpreting the law to compel
employers (or fellow employees) of incur substantial costs to aid the reli-
gious observer."'" He argued, however, that the "Court has repeatedly
found no Establishment Clause problems in exempting religious observers
from state-imposed duties.""° Accordingly, Justice Marshall suggested that
"[i]f the State does not establish religion over nom eligion by excusing re-
ligious practitioners from obligations owed the State, I do not see how the
State can be said to establish religion by requiring employers to do the
same with respect to obligations owed the employer." 20 ' For this argument,
Justice Marshall cited the Supreme Court's 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner.202 His argument fails, however, to recognize certain crucial distinctions
between Sherbert and Hardison.
Sherbert involved South Carolina's refusal to give unemployment com-
pensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who declined to work on
Saturday.'" The state asserted that the claimant's refusal to accept Satur-
day work disqualified her from receiving benefits under the South Carolina
Unemployment Compensation Act. 204 While the Supreme Court used
rather broad language in its opinion striking down this aspect of South
Carolina's scheme of unemployment compensation, the Court asserted that
if' a legislative scheme could be justified by a compelling state interest
within the state's police power, than an incidental burden on the free exer-
cise of religion would not render the scheme unconstitutional."' In Sher-
bert, the Court found no such compelling state interest p res ent.2o6 The
Court distinguished cases involving Sunday closing laws, 20 ' which impose
an additional burden on Orthodox Jews and Seventh Day Adventists, on
the grounds that in those cases there was a compelling state interest in pro-
viding one uniform day of rest. Thus, the Sherbert Court reasoned that the
interest in providing for such a day of rest could only be met by making
Sunday the day. To allow exemptions from that scheme for religious re-
asons would, aside from the administrative difficulties, make the entire
plan ineffective due to the financial advantage given to the parties exemp-
ted."'
19° 432 U.S. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
"°/d. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
201 1d. at 90-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
153 /d. at 399, 401.
2 °' Id. at 401. The relevant portion of the act is contained in S.C. CODE 68-114 (1975).
2 °5 374 U.S. at 408.
20014 at 407-08.
"OTSee,	 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
2 ° 5 374 U.S. at 408-09.
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Sherbert, of course, can be read as lending support to the EEOC's
guidelines if "compelling state interest" can be equated with "undue hard-
ship" for an employer. This equation, however, simply does not balance.
The relationship of government and the individual under the first amend-
ment is wholly different from the employment relationship, especially when
the latter •s'governed by a collective bargaining agreement operating
alongside Title VII. The first amendment has long been a bulwark of in-
dividual rights, and the Court has viewed group values as less compelling
than those asserted by individuals. 209 Thus, if a crowd dislikes what a
speaker is saying, it is th.e responsibility of the police not to quiet the
speaker, but to calm the crowd."' In the collective bargaining setting, on
the other hand, the rights of the individual must of necessity be reduced.
Concomitantly, the business interest which can override religious freedom
in that setting is less. Thus, "undue hardship" need not rise to the level of
the compelling interest required in Sherbert, and Justice Marshall's reliance
on Sherbert is misplaced.
Even if Sherbert is seen to be on point in the context of a collective
bargaining contract, evenhanded administration may well serve as the sort
of compelling interest that Sherbert requires. The importance of
evenhanded administration has served as the basis of awards by arbitrators
who have been confronted with individual employee claims of religious dis-
crimination resulting from the uneven impact of contractual provisions.
One arbitrator has said that while he sympathizes with the hardship im-
posed upon religious believers whose scheduled work days conflict with the
practice of their religion, he is also aware of the confusion that would re-
sult if employees could rearrange their contractual work schedule. 2 " Sher-
bert, then, is inapposite to the religious discrimination issue in Hardison. Not
only does the relationship of government to the individual in the first
amendment setting differ from the relationships among the individual, the
collective bargaining group, and the private employer, but the evenhanded
application of a collective bargaining contract is also a significant interest of
labor relations within the plant and in national labor policy.
One interesting aspect of the ruling in Hardison is that it may be read
as suggesting that nonunion employers who are not bound by collective
bargaining agreements will have a greater obligation to make "reasonable
accommodations" for religious believers than will unionized employers.
Under Hardison, an employer subject to a collective bargaining agreement
which limits work assignments may not be required to incur special costs
for the accommodation of religious believers; 212 however, if the employer
has the unfettered right to make work assignments and other employees
have no right by contract or employment practice to select preferred work
shifts, the employer arguably may be compelled to readjust work schedules
to accommodate the needs of religious believers. Such a result is not
anomalous given that employees covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment, including religious believers, frequently receive special benefits not
"9 In the obscenity cases, for example, the jury determination of obscenity has been
overturned by the Court's finding that the material was constitutionally protected. Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964).
!" See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969).
"' Combustion Engineering, Inc., 49 Lab, Arb. Rep. 204, 206 (1967).
$'x 432 U.S. at 84.
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accorded to employees working for a nonunion company. The question left
for future resolution, then, is how Hardison will apply when there is no col-
lective bargaining relationship between the employer and the employee
who wants his schedule changed to accommodate his religious beliefs.
The decision in Hardison is consistent with the Court's tenor in the
Title VII cases of the 1976 Term. The balance struck in these decisions
consistently has favored a narrow rather than expansive reading of, the
mandate of Title VII. In a case such as Hardison where the competing in-
terest of noninterference with the collective bargaining system is a consid-
eration, the effect on antidiscrimination policy of a narrow reading of Title
VII will be minimal and even salutary. In cases such as Teamsters and Gil-
bert, the effect may be disastrous. In these two decisions, the Court nar-
rowed the substantive scope of Title VII. More serious than this actual nar-
rowing, especially after it was mitigated in Hazelwood and Dothard, is its por-
tent of future narrowing. In its substantive Title VII decisions during the
1976 Term, a majority of' the Court, anchored by the Nixon Bloc, re-
peatedly evinced hostility toward the antidiscrimination policy of Title VII.
Perhaps only stare decisis prevents the Court from emasculating this policy
altogether. Yet, the Court's all too casual treatment of established prec-
edent in these decisions suggests that even this restraint may prove too
weak to repress the Burger Court's maturing hostility to Title VII.
B. Adjustments in Title VII Procedure
The final four Title VII cases of the 1976 Term all involved pro-
cedural claims having to do with statute of limitation questions and matters
pertaining to class actions under the Act. While they do not have the far-
reaching impact of the Court's substantive Title VII decisions they do help
to clarify some of the procedural questions which have arisen under the
statute.
1. Statute of Limitations
In International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers Local 790
v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 213 the Supreme Court gave full retroactive effect to
the 1972 amendments to Title VII. 214 These amendments extend the
period for filing charges from ninety days to 180 days after the alleged un-
lawful practice occurred. At the same time, however, the Court held that
the statute of limitations for Title VII actions is not tolled, or suspended,
while the complainant attempts to settle a charge through a contractual
grievance arbitration procedure. 215 The Court also effectively reached the
same result when it rejected the contention that the date of conclusion of
the grievance arbitration should be considered the date of the "alleged un-
lawful practice" for purposes of filing charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. 216
213 429 U.S. 229 (1976).
111 1d. at 241 -43.
115 1d. at 236. Contra, Sanchez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 499 F.2d 1107, 1108 (10th
Cir. 1974); Malone v. North American Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1972);
Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F2d 811, 827 (7th Cir. 1972); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
216 429 U.S. at 234-35.
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The complainant in Robbins & Myers filed charges with the EEOC 108
days after being discharged from employment, but only 84 days after the
grievance arising from her discharge was denied in arbitration. 2 " At the
time of the filing with the EEOC, such charges were required to be filed
within 90 days of the alleged unlawful practice. 218 Subsequently, but less
than 180 days after the complainant's discharge, the 1972 amendments to
Title VI1 2 " took effect and extended this limitations period to 180 days. 22°
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court on this issue, held that
this extended limitations period applies to all events occurring within 180
days of the effective date of the 1972 amendments. 221 Although Congress
had specifically instructed that these amendments were to apply "with re-
spect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment"
as well as to "all charges filed thereafter," 222 the meaning of the term
"pending" was somewhat indefinite. The Court in Robbins & Myers refused
to adopt a narrow construction of the term that would limit the provision's
application to those charges that were still before the EEOC as of the
amendments' effective date and were timely when filed. 223 Since charges
filed after the effective date benefitted from the 180-day period, a narrow
construction merely would have required the complainant in this case to
have waited until after the effective date to file, or refile, her complaint.
The Court correctly refused to require such needless refiling without a
clearer indication that Congress intended a narrow construction of the
term "pending. "224
The Court could have reversed and remanded on this first ground
and left the remaining issues 'argued by the complainant for future de-
termination. Against the wishes of four members of the Court, 223 however,
Justice Rehnquist went on to decide the other two questions against the
complainant. The complainant's first argument was that the conclusion of
the complainant's grievance process was an "occurrence" separate from her
21 T/d, at 232.
2 " Id, at 232 & n.l. See § 706(d), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(d) (1970). Section 706(d) was re-
numbered as § 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975) as a result of the 1972 amend-
ments to the Act.
219 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103.
m 429 U.S. at 241.
"' Id. at 243.
223 Id, at 241, quoting § 14 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat.
113. This section applied by its terms to all of the 1972 amendments, although Robbins &
Myers contended it was intended to apply just to the EEOC's new enforcement powers. 429
U.S. at 241.
223
 429 U.S. at 242-43.
224 The Ninth Circuit similarly had refused to adopt a narrow construction of "pend-
ing." Davis v. Valley Distributing Co., 522 F.2d 827, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf. Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1972) ("To require a second 'filing' by the aggrieved party
... would serve no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural technicality.")
Curiously, Justice Rehnquist does not cite this last case. He does state that a narrow construc-
tion would create an "odd hiatus in retroactivity," 429 U.S. at 242-43, but the reason the
hiatus is "odd" is that it unnecessarily adds complexity and technical requirements to a process
often initiated by persons without legal counsel.
""' 429 U.S. at 244. In a separate statement Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and
Stevens stated that they would not have addressed the remaining two issues.
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discharge, so that charges filed with the EEOC within ninety days of that
date were timely. 226 Justice Rehnquist, however, disposed of this argument
in short order. The complainant had argued that the initial discharge was
not "final" and would not become so until her supervisor's decision was
adopted by management at the end of the grievance arbitration proce-
dure."' Justice Rehnquist simply noted that the complainant stopped work
and ceased receiving•pay as of the time her supervisor fired her, not at the
end of the grievance procedure. 228
 Furthermore, he noted that the parties'
contract did not appear to treat the discharge as anything but final,
although it could have done so, and the parties themselves seemed to have
assumed the finality of the discharge, subject only to possible reinstatement
through the grievance procedure. 229 Therefore, both in a practical sense
and under the terms of the employment contract, the occurrence date was
the date on which the complainant was fired. Although Justice Rehnquist's
treatment of this argument was perhaps cavalier, his holding that com-
plainant's argument was without merit has much to recommend it. Not only
would upholding this delayed occurrence argument raise the difficulty of
determining the final "occurrence" in each discrimination claim, but it
would raise myriad questions of application in other contexts, many of
which could not be foreseen and dealt with in advance. Starting the run-
ning of the Title VII statute of limitations at the time of actual discharge
provides for greater certainty.
The second and more plausible argument raised by the complainant
was that the statute of limitations in Title VII should be tolled where a
complainant first tries to work out a complaint through a grievance-
arbitration process. 29' A bare majority of the Court ruled otherwise."' In
reaching this decision, Justice Rehnquist focused on the precedents of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver C0. 232 and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 233
 and concluded that they "virtually foreclosed" the complainant's ar-.
gument. 234
 These cases establish the independence of Title VII remedies
from other remedies. Justice Rehnquist correctly indicated that in every
way Title VII's remedies are completely independent of any other dis-
crimination remedy. Hence, Title VII's statutory commands will be carried
out both unhindered and unassisted by any other remedy. 235
 The com-
plainant argued that, despite the cases establishing that Title VII remedies
are separate from any other remedy for employment discrimination,
226 Id. at 234. This argument seems to be based on language in Moore v. Sunbeam
Corp., 459 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1972), an opinion by then- Judge Stevens which can be in-
terpreted as holding favorably to the complainant on such a theory. Id. at 826-27. The opinion
can be interpreted equally well as merely following Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421
F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970) (statute of limitations tolled during contractual grievance proce-
dure).
2"
 429 U.S. at 234.
z" Id.
222 1d. at 234-35.
239 /d. at 236.
231 1d. at 244 (separate statement
232
 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title VII
plaint to arbitration).
"3 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (filing of
limitations for action brought under 42
224 429 U.S. at 236.
232 Id.
by Justices who would decline to address this issue).
remedies unaffected by employees submitting corn-
Title Vii charge with EEOC does not toll statute of
U.S.C. 11981 (1970) based on same occurrence).
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equitable tolling principles apply because they are necessary to vindicate
her rights. 236 The basis of the plaintiff's claim for the application of equita-
ble tolling principles was that the plaintiff's need for relief in this case out-
weighed the policy of the limitations period to protect defendants. Justice
Rehnquist answered this argument by thoroughly distinguishing Burnett v.
New York Central Railroad, 227 the precedent from which the complainant was
arguing. 239 In Burnett, the plaintiff brought an action in a state court of
improper venue. This action was dismissed and a later action brought in a
federal district court. Justice Rehnquist noted that the petitioner in Robbins
& Myers was not asserting the same claim in a different forum but rather
was asserting an independent claim based on contract. 239
The complainant's corollary arguments for equitable tolling, based
upon the central role of arbitration in labor-management relations, the pos-
sibility of conflicts between arbitration and Title VII remedies, and the
slight delays that. would result from tolling, were given extremely short
shrift in the opinion. Justice Rehnquist merely cited Alexander and Johnson,
and stated that these arguments were adequately answered there. 24 " The
only other basis which Justice Rehnquist offered for the decision was that
Congress had provided only a single specific exemption to the ninety clay
limitations period, implying that Congress intended no other exemp-
tions."'
Justice Rehnquist's refusal to permit an exemption to the statute of
limitations on the basis of ongoing arbitration and his restriction of exemp-
tions to those mandated by Congress, although only dicta, further clarified
the role of arbitration in the resolution of Title VII claims. Thus, although
the arbitration of employment discrimination claims is not barred by Title
VII, the arbitration of a claim cognizable under Title VII will not bar a
subsequent Title VII suit even if the complainant loses in arbitration."'
Indeed, the Court in Alexander determined that the resolution of employ-
ment discrimination claims is "a primary responsibility of courts, and judi-
cial construction has proven especially necessary with respect to Title VII,
96 1d. at 237.
2 " 380 U.S. 424 (1965). The narrow decision in that case was compelled by the severe
inequities involved. There, the plaintiff could have initially brought an action under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 4 51 et seq. (1970) (FELA), in a federal court, but
brought it in a state court instead, where it was dismissed for lack of venue after the statute of
limitations had run. 380 U.S. at 425, In lack of venue cases, the state required refiling the ac-
tion in the proper court, and thus the claim was barred, id. at 426, but a federal court would
have simply transferred the case to the proper court under 28 U.S.C. 11 1406(a) (1970). How-
ever, when petitioner brought an identical action in federal district court, it was dismissed on
the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal the Supreme Court held
that when a plaintiff' has brought a timely FELA action in state court, which is dismissed for
improper venue, the statute of limitations is tolled while the state suit continues. 380 U.S. at
434-35. Despite the narrow holding, Justice Goldberg's opinion for the Court does contain
some broad language to the effect that "the basic inquiry is whether the congressional purpose
is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances." Id. at 427.
"8 429 U.S. at 237.
2" Id. at 288.
248 Id. at 238-40.
241
 Id. at 240. The other exemption is contained in § 706(h) of Title VII, which provides
that the limitations period runs for an extra 120 days when the charge is first referred to a
state employment discrimination agency.
"2 415 U.S. at 59-60.
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whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference
to public law concepts."'" A number of labor law advocates nevertheless
have persisted in pushing for arbitration of employment discrimination
claims.244
 The Court suggested, in its now famous footnote 21 in Alexander,
that a court could give "great weight" to an arbitral determination in cases
where the contract conforms with Title VII, the arbitration has been pro-
cedurally fair, there is an adequate record on the issue of discrimination,
and the arbitrator is competent to decide the discrimination issue."' Foot-
note 21 in Alexander thus opened the door to judicial deference toward ar-
bitration awards in discrimination claims, and advocates of Title VII arbi-
tration have pushed for an expansive reading of this portion of the
Alexander decision. The dicta in Robbins & Myers help to close this door.
It could be contended that since complainants are never foreclosed
from bringing a Title VII suit even after losing in arbitration, a ruling
allowing for the tolling of the statute of limitations under Title VII during
arbitration could only be beneficial to plaintiffs. There is reason to believe,
however, that most complainants who file a charge of discrimination in ar-
bitration do not proceed thereafter to the EEOC or federal court with their
claims. 24° Thus, even if a complainant "wins" in arbitration, there fre-
quently would be no way to know whether the arbitrator's judgment is con-
sistent with the law under Title VII. In this respect, a policy favoring arbi-
tration could work to the disadvantage of Title VII plaintiffs by allowing
unchecked a weakening of Title VII rights. Furthermore, if the statute of
limitations in Title VII could be tolled by the processing of a similar claim
in arbitration, this surely would suggest to many that legal issues arising
under Title VII could and should be decided in arbitration. This in turn
could lead more courts to defer to arbitration under the authority of foot-
note 21 in Alexander even where the arbitral results are inconsistent with
Title VII. In either case, the encouragement of arbitration at the expense
of Title VII is not a desirable result.
There are those who could argue that some remedy in arbitration is
better than a delayed remedy in court. The problem is not so simple. Equal
employment opportunity is a significant statutory right; enforcement of this
right should be carried out in the full public view in a public forum. The
results adjudicated in employment discrimination cases must be consistent
"3 1d. at 57.
" 4
 See, e.g., Coulson, The Emerging Role of Tide VII Arbitration, 26 LAB. L.J. 263, 266-67
(1975). There are numerous explanations for this. The following discussion is taken directly
from Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and Union
Representatives- , 27 LAB. L.J. 265, 265-66 (1976). First, arbitration is clearly the most expeditious
means to resolve many (single issue) employment discrimination cases. By contrast, the EEOC
is swamped by a huge backlog of cases and it is not likely that this backlog will be reduced sig-
nificantly any time soon; even alternative statutory routes to relief under Sections 1981 or
1983 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, are likely to be too time consuming due to
crowded judicial dockets and frequent appellate review. Second, the arbitration alternative is a
relatively inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism, at least compared with a full-blown court
trial including discovery and sometimes appeal. Third, many employment discrimination cases
involve issues of contract interpretation and, as a consequence, the parties to a collective
agreement may naturally prefer that such contract disputes be resolved pursuant to their
normal grievance procedures rather than in a court of law.
'4* 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
446 Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, in Pro-
ceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 59, 87 (BNA
1976).
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and complete. Whatever remedy is due to victims of employment dis-
crimination should be given without compromise. The device of com-
promise that has flowered in the context of traditional collective bargaining
and hence in arbitration should have no place in Title VII cases.
The Court's decision .in Robbins & Myers further narrows the tie be-
tween arbitration and Title VII. The decision may have the curious effect
of causing more complainants to attend to their Title VII rights, even
bypassing grievance-arbitration procedures altogether to seek remedies for
employment discrimination. To the extent that this occurs in cases involv-
ing significant and difficult legal questions, the result will have much to
commend it. There is no reason to suppose that the traditional labor arbi-
tration process is well suited to deal with important legal and public policy
issues of the sort raised by Title VII, Indeed, there is strong evidence to
indicate that labor arbitration as currently practiced in the United States is
not suitable to the disposition of legal issues arising under Title VII. 247
Thus, any action by the Court that serves to discourage the push for arbi-
tration of such cases is salutary.
While Robbins & Myers dealt with the issue of the statute of limitations
under Title VII in a private action, another case presented the issue of the
statute of limitations in an enforcement action by the EEOC. In Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EE0C, 24 " the Court ruled that Title V11's 180-day limi-
tation on employment discrimination suits does not apply to the EEOC249
and that the EEOC was therefore entitled to bring suit on a charge under
Title VII approximately three years and two months after the complainant
first communicated with the EEOC, and five months after agency concilia-
tion efforts had failed.250 The Court also ruled that such EEOC actions are
not governed by any state statute of limitations.'"
The effect of the ruling, as noted by the dissenting Justice Rehnquist,
is "that the EEOC is not bound by any limitations period at all." 252
 This re-
sult appears quite consistent with the legislative history of the 1972
amendments to Title V11 253 and with the literal terms of the statute it-
self. 254 In declining to adopt the state statute of limitations, the majority
opinion by Justice Stewart acknowledged a long line of Supreme Court
cases making state limitations periods applicable to federal actions, but de-
2" Id, at 82-83.
248 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977).
"u Id. at 2452.
2" Id. at 2450, 2452.
28 ' Id, at 2456-57.
"2 hi. at 2458 (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting).
253 See id. at 2452-54 for the Court's discussion of the legislative history.
" 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides:
If a charge filed with the Commission ... is dismissed by the Commission, or if
within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expira-
tion of any period of reference (from a state agency) whichever is later, the
Commission has not filed a civil action under this section ... , or the Commission
has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a
party, the Commission ... , shall so notify the person aggrieved and within
ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against
the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved
or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person
whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice.
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cided that a state limitation period will not be followed when it is "in-
consistent with the underlying policies of the federal statute." 255
 It is with
this part of the decision that Justice Rehnquist joined by the Chief Justice
dissented, arguing that it is "unwarranted judicial legislation" and contrary
to established precedent. 25° The Court's refusal to apply mechanically the
state statute of limitations in the absence of a limitations period under Title
VII is commendable in that it increases the ability of the EEOC to enforce
the Act's mandate with regard to ending employment discrimination.
2. Class Actions
The last two Title VII cases decided by the Court during the 1976
Term involved relatively minor issues concerning the rights of Title VII
complainants in class action suits. In one case, United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonald,'" the Court ruled that a putative member of a class in a Title
VII suit who intervenes for the purpose of obtaining appellate review of a
district court's denial of the "class action" status of a suit within thirty days
after the district court judgment on the original suit has met the "timely
application" requirement of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 258
 In McDonald, after denial of class certification the action proceeded
as a joint suit and the district court determined that those plaintiffs not yet
reinstated in their jobs were entitled to such reinstatement and that all the
plaintiffs were entitled to back pay. 259
 After the judgment, the respondent,
a discharged employee who had not been a party to the original action,
moved to intervene for the purpose of challenging the denial of class
status. 269
 The district court denied the motion to intervene and the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed."' Affirming the judgment of the court of
appeals in an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court emphasized that since
the plaintiff sought to intervene solely to challenge the district court's den-
ial of class certification, and not to litigate her individual claim, the post-
judgment application for intervention was timely filed.262
 It is noteworthy
that once the plaintiff in McDonald prevailed in her claim that the district
court had erred in refusing to certify the "class" set forth in the original
suit, she would then benefit as a member of the class of persons who would
enjoy the fruits of the district court judgment. The Court allowed this re-
sult even though the Court recognized that the plaintiff had never made a
timely application to intervene in order to join as a named plaintiff in the
original action. 2"
255 97 S. Ct. at 2455.
"'Id. at 2458-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2" 97 S. Ct. 2464 (1977).
""Id. at 2467, 2470.71, In relevant part, Rule 24(b) provides:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ...
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law
or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider
whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties.
259 Id. at 2467.
"' Id. at 2467-68.
262 Id. at 2468-69. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White
dissented in McDonald on the authority of American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
(1974). 97 S. Ct. at 2471.
"3 97 S. Ct. at 2466-67.
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The second case involving the rights of Title VII complainants in class
action suits was East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez. 264 In Rod-
riguez, a unanimous decision written by Justice Stewart, the Court ruled
that the court of appeals "plainly erred" in declaring a class action where
the plaintiffs failed to move prior to trial to have the action certified as a
class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and no such certification was made by the district court; plaintiffs failed to
offer any evidence with respect to class claims; and all of the named plain-.
tiffs lacked the necessary qualifications for the positions from which they
claimed to have been discriminatorily excluded.265 The Court held that
since the plaintiffs "suffered no injury as a result of the alleged dis-
criminatory practices, they were, therefore, simply not eligible to rep-
resent a class of persons who did allegedly suffer inury." 266 The decision
in Rodriguez was undoubtedly the easiest and least controversial Title VII
decision the Court reached during the 1976 Term.
The Court's decisions concerning procedural aspects of Title VII were
relatively benign. Perhaps because these cases chiefly involved technical
construction of Title VII and procedural rules rather than broad
policyma king, they left little room for ideological bent. Yet even here, the
Burger Court was not wholly neutral. In Robbins & Myers, the Court went
further than strictly necessary to decide the case, and resolved additional is-
sues in a way arguably unfavorable to, Title VII plaintiffs.'" While the ad-
ditional issues may well have been resolved correctly, the judicial activism
reflected in taking them up contrasts with the Court's studied judicial re-
straint when, seemingly, the shoe is on the other ideological foot. One
wonders, then, whether the Burger Court is not searching for opportuni-
ties to whittle away at Title VII.
C. An Appraisal of the Damage
When one looks back on the 1976 Supreme Court Term in years to
come, it surely will be recalled as the "year of Title VII." At least six of the
Court's ten opinions in this area were profoundly significant judgments. In
many respects, the Supreme Court rewrote the law of employment dis-
crimination during the 1976 Term. In most instances the rewriting was
unfavorable to Title VII plaintiffs. The Court's retreat from the principle
that a racially discriminatory seniority system is not a bona fide seniority
system under Title VII and the possibility of a reexamination of the effects
test are two examples of this rewriting. The question that remains is
whether in the long run the cumulative effect of the Court's sometimes
contradictory opinions will further or retard Title VII's goal of' eliminating
employment discrimination.
The problem of employment discrimination is nearly as significant
now as it was in 1964, when Title VII was enacted. An extensive study is-
sued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1977, Black
Experiences Versus Black Expectations, 268 demonstrates how extensive racial
" 4 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
288 id. at 403-04.
266 /d.
29 '429 U.S. at 234-40. See text and notes 225-47 supra.
288 Humphrey, Black Experiences Versus Black Expectations, EEOC Research Report No. 53
(1977).
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discrimination in employment remains. Based on an empirical study of
black employment in the private sector during the period from 1969 to
1974, this report shows that increases in black employment between 1969
and 1974 were "miniscule," more "a reflection of black Tokenism" than a
real gain.'" The report found that gaps between blacks and whites remain
not only in participation in the American workforce, but also in treatment,
earnings, and promotions among those who are employed. "Assuming that
black employment availability rates and black participation rates will in-
crease by some unknown quantity in the future," the report concluded, "it
will be sometime in the 21st century before the employment gaps will close
and blacks achieve fair-share levels of employment in all ... job
categories."27° Clearly, therefore, the need for Title VII remains as great
now as it was when the statute became law.
Unfortunately, the Court's work in employment discrimination law in
its 1976 Term promises to sap force from Title VII and thus to do little to
improve this situation, or even to make it worse. This destructive treatment
of Title VII is epitomized by the Burger Court's decision in Teamsters. The
decision manifests the impact of the Nixon Bloc upon Title VII in two
ways. First, Teamsters sets the tone of a general retreat from or curt treat-
ment of established Title VII principles. This tone was evidenced by the
Court's definition in Teamsters of a bona fide seniority system, and was re-
peated in Gilbert, when Justice Rehnquist ignored the "great deference"
standard generally applied to EEOC interpretations of Title VII. Instead,
Justice Rehnquist chose to apply a "consideration" standard, weighted ac-
cording to his ideological bent. Second, Teamsters epitomizes the Nixon
Bloc's tendency to address destructively issues unnecessary to resolution of
the case. In Teamsters, the Court's potentially disastrous reading of the
Quarles cases—throwing into doubt the validity of literally hundreds of
seniority plans that have been changed voluntarily—could have been
avoided and added nothing to the Court's resolution of the question
whether seniority systems which perpetuate pre-Act discrimination are
valid. Similarly, in Gilbert, the Court unnecessarily opened the door to pos-
sible reconsideration of the effects test under Title VII. In sum, it is fair to
say that in the 1976 Term the Burger Court made life harder for Title VII
plaintiffs. It is to be hoped that, in the process, it has not made life easier
for employment discrimination.
II. LABOR RELATIONS LAW UNDER THE NLRA, LMRA AND
LMRDA—THE BURGER COURT AND TRADITIONAL LABOR LAW
Although the Supreme Court during the 1976 Term rendered only
six decisions in the more traditional areas of labor law arising under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 27 ' Labor Management Relations Act
269 Id. at 38.
"° Id. at 41. The fact that employment gains by Blacks have been more a function of
tokenism than true progress is reflected in recent unemployment figures. In August, 1977 the
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for all workers was 7.1%. For black workers the rate
was 15.5%. Among black teenagers the problem is greater in that their unemployment rate is
more than twice that of white teenagers. See To Be Young, Black and Out of Work, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 23, 1977, (Magazine), at 39.
27 ' 29 U.S.C. §1 151 e seq. (1970).
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(LMRA) 272 and Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA), 278 at least three of these decisions were of considerable im-
portance. These three cases—NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Steam Pipefit-
ters Local 638, 274 Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25 275 and
Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Union 270 —will have a significant impact on the law and practice in the areas
affected by the decisions. The three remaining cases involved relatively
minor questions concerning contributions to employee benefit trust
funds, 277 eligibility rules for union office 218 and the agricultural labor
exemption. 278 In all, these decisions showed little of the pronounced in-
fluence of ideology reflected in the equal employment area, but their
reasoning occasionally left much to be desired.
A. Secondary Boycotts—NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Steam Pipefitters
Local 638
One of the most significant decisions rendered by the Court this past
term was the long-awaited opinion in NLRB v. Enterprise Association of Steam
Pipefitters Local 638. 28° Pipefitters involved the interrelationship among sec-
ondary boycotts prohibited by section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 281 hot cargo
agreements proscribed by section 8(e), 282 and legitimate union efforts to
preserve traditional work. At issue in Pipefitters was the validity of the "right
to control" test which the National Labor Relations Board (Board or
NLRB) has applied since 1956 to determine whether a boycott is secondary.
Under the "right to control" test the Board has found a violation of section
8(b)(4)(B) when employees strike to enforce a work preservation clause
where the employer does not control the disputed work.288 This test was
thrown into doubt by the Court's 1967 decision in National Woodwork Manu-
facturer's Association v. NLRB.'" In National Woodwork, the Court upheld a
contract provision which permitted carpenters to refuse to handle prefitted
doors where the object of the refusal was to preserve traditional work for
union members. 288 In reaching this decision the Court ruled that the un-
ion's objective must be determined with reference to "all the surrounding
circumstances." 288 Since the employer's right to control is only one of the
"I 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1970).
273 29 U.S.C. §1 901 et seq. (1970).
"4 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
278
 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
276 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
1 " Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977).
278 Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
280
 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
281 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(4) (1970).
282 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V 1975).
283
 International Longshoremen's Assn, 137 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1182, 50 L.R.R.M. 1333,
1335-36 (1962), modified on other grounds, enforced 331 F.2d 712, 56 L.R.R.M. 2200 (3d Cir.
1964).
224 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Since National Woodwork, the circuits have split on the question
of whether the right to control test could continue to be applied. Ste, e.g., George Koch Sons,
Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323, 84 L.R.R.M. 2957 (4th Cir. 1973); contra, NLRB v. Local 164, In-
ternational Bhd. of Elec. Workers. 388 F.2d 105, 67 L.R.R.M. 2352 (3d Cir. 1968).
282 386 U.S. at 644-46.
486 1d. at 644.
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circumstances which may be relevant to the union's objective, the question
logically arose after National Woodwork whether the Board's test focusing
solely on employer right to control remained viable in light of the standard
enunciated in National Woodwork.
The Court in Pipefitters upheld the Board's "right to control" test, and
ruled that a union seeking the kind of work traditionally performed by its
members at a construction site violates section 8(b)(4)(B) when it induces its
members to engage in a work stoppage against an employer who does not
have control over the assignment of the work sought by the union. 287 As in
National Woodwork, the Court was badly split, with Justice White writing the
majority opinion for six Justices: himself, Justice Stevens, and the Nixon
Bloc. Justice Brennan, the author of the National Woodwork opinion, filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Stewart and Marshall joined. 288
 In so
greatly limiting the applicability of the work preservation doctrine of Na-
tional Woodwork, Pipefitters  was surprising to many and dismaying to labor
leaders.
The union in Pipefitters had a work preservation clause in its collective
bargaining agreement with the employer, a construction subcontractor.
This clause provided that all internal piping work was to be performed at
the jobsite. 288 The subcontractor entered into a construction subcontract
with a combined engineer-general contractor, knowing that the job spec-
ifications of this subcontract required the use of climate control units with
factory installed internal piping, installation of which would violate the
work preservation agreement. 2"
The dispute before the Court arose when the union refused to install
the prepiped units."' The general contractor filed a complaint with the
Board, but did not challenge the underlying validity of the work preserva-
tion clause.'" The Board observed that the clause itself was valid, since its
object clearly was to protect the employees' legitimate economic interest in
preserving their unit work. 283 The Board also conceded that if the sub-
contractor had been the one who decided to use the prepiped units, then
under National Woodwork a work stoppage to enforce the clause would have
been a "primary" activity excluded from the proscription of section
8(b)(4)(8). 294 The only possible distinguishing fact between the present case
and National Woodwork was that in this case the subcontractor did not have
the power to change the specification of prepiped units. That decision
could be made only by the engineer-general contractor, and thus a work -
stoppage protesting the use of the prepiped units arguably must have been
directed at the latter. Adopting this line of reasoning, the Board concluded
that, since the subcontractor did not have the power to assign the work and
since the union informed the general contractor of its refusal to install the
units, the object of this refusal was either to change the general contractor's
282 429 U.S. at 514, 525-28.
288 /d. at 532.
288 /d. at 512.
280 /d. at 511-12.
Y8' at 512-13.
292 /d. at 513, 521 n.8.
283 1d. at 513-14.
294 1d. at 518-19.
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method of doing business or to force termination of the relationship be-
tween contractor and subcontractor. Accordingly, the Board found the
union's objectives to be secondary and hence a violation of section
8(b)(4)(B). 295 The court of appeals reversed the Board's finding that the
boycott was secondary. In reversing the Board, the court emphasized that
total reliance upon the right to control the disputed work was inconsistent
with the decision in National Woodwork. 2"
In reviewing this decision, Justice White's first concern was to dem-
onstrate that National Woodwork did not make permissible a strike to en-
force any agreement not prohibited by section 8(e), for the provision in
Pipefitters admittedly did not violate section 8(e). 297 In so doing, Justice
White used a historical approach, reviewing past Court decisions which
construed section 8(b)(4) to show that the appeals court erred in its con-
clusion that an employer whose employees strike to force him to fulfill his
contractual obligations to thein can never be a neutral bystander.2 " Justice
White began with the Court's 1958 decision in Local 1976, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door). 2" In Sand Door, the Court held that
a valid contract provision is not an absolute bar to finding that a work
stoppage to enforce such a clause is a secondary boycott prohibited by sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B). 30° Justice White plausibly asserted that this part of Sand Door
has not been disturbed by events since 1958. 3 °' In his discussion, however,
Justice White emphasized that the construction industry proviso within sec-
tion 8(e),302 enacted subsequent to Sand Door, was not intended to reduce
the scope of section 8(b)(4). 303 From this, Justice White concluded that the
prohibitions of section 8(e) and section 8(b)(4)(B) were not intended to be
completely paralle1. 3"
Justice White next sought to determine whether the Board's "right to
control" test departed from the National Woodwork requirement that a un-
ion's conduct be judged in light of all relevant circumstances. 305 Justice
White found that the administrative law judge, whose decision was adopted
by the Board, properly considered all of the relevant circumstances and did
not apply mechanically a per se test based on the right to contro1. 306 Yet,
the sole circumstance in Pipefitters which supports a finding that the general
contractor was the object of' the, union action was that the union's business
agent informed a representative of the general contractor that the union
would not handle prepiped units. 307 In view of the limited factual support
for this finding, it does appear that the Board applied a per se right to
control test rather than following the National Woodwork. formulation.
Although the Court did not expressly approve a per se test in Pipefitters, its
"3 Enterprise Mon of Steamfitters, 204 N.L.R.B. 760, 764.65, 83 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1397
(1973).
'° Enterprise Ass'n of Steamlitters v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 905 (D.C.Cir. 1975).
1°7
 429 U.S. at 520-21.
!""Id. at 514-20.
"" 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
a00 Id. at 106-08.
301 429 U.S. at 517-19.
302 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3°3 429 U.S. at 517.
" 4 1d. at 517.
"'Id. at 521.
one Id. at 522-23,
"'Id. at 511 n.3, 512-13.
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holding that the Board's conclusion was based on substantial evidence
amounts to such approval.
One must conclude that, in writing the opinion in Pipefitters, Justice
White was trapped by the rationale of National Woodwork. Thus, when Jus-
tice Brennan observed in dissent, that if "the union [had] been forced to
strike [the subcontractor] to get the [work preservation] agreement, the
strike would clearly ... have been primary and not prohibited by §
8(b)(4)(B)," and then asked—"How, then, could [the subcontractor] become
a neutral by violating the clause after agreeing to it?", 3" Justice White had
no good answer.
Justice Brennan's dissent also took issue with Justice White's emphasis
on Sand Door, asserting that the majority's reliance on that case was mis-
placed. 3" The dissent noted:
[P]rior to 1959, a contract was lawful whether primary or secon-
dary; Sand Door spoke only to the effect of the latter type of
agreement on section 8(b)(4). Section 8(e) now generally pro-
hibits the mere execution of such agreements. But if a contract is
"primary"—i.e. not within section 8(e) at all—it is equally pri-
mary to enforce it by economic pressure on the contracting em-
ployer. 31 °
Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted, Sand Door, which involved a contract
clause that prohibited the employer from assigning his employees "to han-
dle nonunion material," is entirely consistent with National Woodwork. 3 "
This is so because "the object of the pressure on the employer-contractor in
Sand Door was 'to satisfy union objectives elsewhere,' specifically, to change
the labor policy of the (nonunion) manufacturer." 3 ' 2 Therefore since Sand
Door dealt with admittedly secondary activity, it does nothing to support the
majority's proposition that even though a "primary" agreement may be
valid, activity to enforce the agreement may be secondary.
Since Justice Brennan thus viewed a strike to enforce a valid work
preservation clause as primary activity, he attacked the "right to control"
test as "patently precluded" by National Woodwork. 313 Although Justice
Brennan's criticisms of the Court's rationale are wellfounded, his own ar-
guments for overturning the Board's test stray somewhat wide of the mark.
His main point of departure from the majority's reasoning was his in-
terpretation of the key passage in National Woodwork. 314 In that passage, the
Court stated that the validity of a "will not handle clause" can be de-
termined only by "an inquiry into whether, under all the circumstances, the
union's objective was preservation of work ... or whether the agreement
and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives
elsewhere." 315
 Whereas Justice White emphasized language indicating that
3 ° 8 /d. at 538 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309 1d. at 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"° Id. at n.8 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Lesnick,Job Security and Secondary Boycotts:
The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000, 1040 (1965) (footnotes omit-
ted).
3" 429 U.S. at 541 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
518 1d. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 ' 4 1d. at 535 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644-45.
386 U.S. at 694-45.
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the test is whether the tactical object of the boycott is elsewhere,'" Justice
Brennan argued that "if the purpose 'of a contract provision, or of eco-
nomic pressure on an employer, is to secure benefits for that employer's
own employees, it is primary." 3 " Under this interpretation, any boycott
undertaken to preserve work is necessarily primary as long as its aim is to
benefit the boycotting employees.
Although the relative simplicity of Justice Brennan's "benefits" stan-
dard is attractive, it goes too far. As Justice White points out, this test
would protect a boycott for the purpose of obtaining new work not histori-
cally done by the bargaining unit, if that work is acquired for the benefit of
the unit. 3 " Such an extension is a big step, one the Court was careful to
avoid in National Woodwork by expressly limiting the scope of approved
work preservation clauses to work "traditionally done" by the unit. 3 " This
specific limitation is the strongest argument against Justice Brennan's in-
terpretation of the language of National Woodwork. Furthermore, Justice
Brennan's test focuses exclusively on the boycotting employees. Since sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) was intended to protect neutral employers, 32 ° it seems
somewhat illogical to focus only on the benefit to the employees rather
than on the effect on other employers. Justice Brennan also interpreted
loosely the language of section 8(b)(4) when he asserted that the boycott in
Pipefitters was primary rather than secondary because the union's "principal
dispute" was with the subcontractor. 3 " Section 8(b)(4)(A) merely requires
that "an object" of the work stoppage be to force the immediate employer
to stop doing business with another, whereas Justice Brennan seemingly
read the section as requiring this unlawful purpose to be the "principal ob-
ject" of the boycott. Thus, while the standard proposed by Justice Brennan
would be easy to apply, this standard was reached only through an expan-
sive reading of section 8(b)(4) and the cases that apply it, an expansion
those authorities do not seem to warrant.
In the final analysis, Pipefitters seems to have turned on the Court's
characterization of the underlying economic situation in the construction
industry. Indeed, in a footnote, Justice White cited at length from the ad-
ministrative law judge's opinion: "in the construction industry it is the un-
ions that control the labor supply and if the union steamfitter employees
of [the subcontractor] on the ... job refuse to work, other steamfitters will
not be available to [the subcontractor] or to anyone else to perform work
on the job." 322 The appropriateness of the Court's consideration of these
economic factors as a basis for the decision in PiprIfitters is questionable as a
matter of jurisprudence, especially when the facts asserted were not proven
but merely were made the "subject of official notice" by the administrative
law judge.323
ale 429 U.S. at 528.
3" Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
3 ' 8 14. at 528 n.16.
3 " 386 U.S. at 630-31. Since National Woodwork, the NLRB has held that attempts to ac-
quire new work for the unit are not within the work preservation doctrine. See, e.g., Culinary
Alliance Local 402, 175 N.L.R.B. 161, 168-69, 70 L.R.R.M. 1508, 1510 (1969) (Bob's Enter-
prises, Inc.).
32U R. GORMAN. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 241 (1976).
321 429 U.S. at 536 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
322 Id. at 524 n.I2, quoting the findings of the administrative law judge at 204 N.L.R.B.
760, 764 n.10 (1973).
323 204 N.L.R.B. 760, 764 n.10 (1973).
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The Court's characterization of the economic situation also points up
broad issues concerning the interplay of technological advances and full
employment. These issues are especially important in the construction in-
dustry, which today is under pressure to develop more efficient construc-
tion methods capable of slowing the sky-rocketing increase in construction
costs over the last ten years. There is much room for improvement, since a
great many building structures continue to be virtually custom-built. The
latter fact results at least in part from wide-spread restrictive work practices
such as those contained in work preservation agreements. Section 8(b)(4) is
a crude tool for dealing with these broad and complex problems, 324 but
Congress has provided no other. Justice Brennan, who commendably
brought the issue of technological progress into the open in his dissent, ar-
gued that Congress has directed that such issues are to be dealt with by the
parties at the bargaining table. 325 It seems more realistic, however, to con-
clude that Congress has not spoken to the issue at all. In this light, the
Court's decisions in National Woodwork and Pipefitters, and the resulting con-
fused complexity of the law in this area, perhaps are best understood as an
attempt by the Court to reach a reasonable compromise on technological
progress in the construction industry in the total absence of any useful
congressional guidance.
The effect of the decision in Pipefitters should be a more even balance
between the interests of contractors and unions than existed in the wake of
National Woodwork. 3" As a result, there will likely be an increase in the use
of prefabricated materials in the construction industry. However, work pres-
ervation agreements probably will remain as significant restraints on the
use of such materials, for although unions can no longer strike to enforce
work preservation clauses when there is no right to control, they still pre-
sumably can sue for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 327
Nevertheless, without the device of work stoppages to enforce them, such
clauses will be diminished in effectiveness. As Justice Brennan noted in dis-
sent, when work stoppages have occurred in the past, they generally were
settled by paying the union members an amount to cover the work lost. 328
32 ' [Tithe [secondary boycott] litigation ... illustrates the impoverished quality of
our national labor policy. The pressures created by momentous problems of pro-
ductivity and job security under changing technological and market conditions
are contained or released by no more sensitive a legal instrument than a legisla-
tive determination to protect neutrals from being drawn into the disputes of
others. It can be anticipated that those who administer the act will be asked to re-
fashion that instrument to serve weightier purposes.
Lesnick, fob Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NUN §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L.
Rev. 1000, 1041 (1965).
323
 429 U.S. at 543 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
326
 The effect of Pipefitters may also be felt outside the construction industry since work
preservation agreements have had significant restrictive effects in the printing and food retail-
ing industries. See H. Northrup, RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES EN THE SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY (1967).
327 This discussion assumes that there is no broad mandatory arbitration clause, which is
rare in the construction industry, in the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The
Pipefitters decision, however, by prohibiting strikes to enforce work preservation clauses, even
in the absence of a broad arbitration dause, removes one major reason why construction trade
unions have opposed arbitration clauses.
32"
 429 U.S. at 538-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To the contractor, this extra payment is
generally preferable to getting the engineer's and client's approval for changing the specifica-
tion, especially since the dispute usually does not arise until the prefabricated material has ar-
rived at the jobsite and possibly has already been paid for. Replacement with conforming ma-
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This remedy usually served to eliminate the price advantage of using pre-
fabricated materials, so that, combined with the time and effort required to
reach a settlement, it was a strong incentive for an engineer or architect to
refrain from specifying such materials. The right to strike thus served as an
effective method of forcing a quick settlement favorable to the union in
almost every case. Without the right to strike, the union loses this powerful
economic weapon, and the settlement value of the union's claim should be
reduced substantially. After Pipefitters, the use of prefabricated material
thus becomes more likely to be cost effective than it was under National
Woodwork, even if the resultant price advantage is narrowed by the likely
need for payment to settle the union's breach of contract claim. In some
cases the price advantage may yet be completely erased, but this will de-
pend more upon the facts and relative bargaining positions in each case
than it has previously.
The Pipefitters case is an example of the Nixon Bloc's use of question-
able reasoning to reach the desired result. While the decision is a dis-
appointment to labor, its effect will likely be mitigated by the collective
bargaining process.
B. Preemption Doctrine—Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters
Local 25
In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 329 the Supreme
Court once again ventured into the thicket of the federal labor law pre-
emption doctrine. Although the Farmer decision did not purport to alter
the Court's landmark decision in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 33 ° Farmer nevertheless represents a new and more expansive view of
the judicially created exceptions to the preemption rule enunciated in Gar-
man. With Justice Powell delivering the opinion, a unanimous Court in
Fanner held that federal labor law does not preempt a state court action by
a union member against his local to recover damages for the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. 3"
In Gannon, the Court established the oft-repeated rule that "bvilien it
is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State 'purports
to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal
enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield." 332 Gummi generally
has been read to mean that state jurisdiction is preempted if the disputed
activity is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by federal labor
law. 333 Indeed, in the term preceding Farmer, in Lodge 76, International Asso-
ciation of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 334 the Court
expanded the Garmon rule by holding that certain activity that is neither
"protected" nor "prohibited" is privileged against state regulation because
serial also would generally involve a substantial delay before it could be delivered. So instead,
the workers involved are usually just paid for the time it would have taken them to do the
prefabricated work.
3" 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
33° 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
331 430 U.S. at 304-05.
332 359 U.S. at 244.
"3 See, e.g., Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 276 (1971).
" 4 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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Congress meant to leave some activities unregulated and "controlled by the
free play of economic forces."335 Over the years, the Court has recognized
a few limited exceptions to the Garmon rule in cases involving suits for
"malicious libel," 33 " "mass picketing" and "threats of violence." 337 However,
no clear pattern or rule ever developed to explain rationally these excep-
tions to Garmon. The decision in Farmer marks the Court's first serious at-
tempt to formulate a standard which both explains the previously
established exceptions to the Garman rule and guides state courts in decid-
ing future preemption cases. Farmer also allows some potential flexibility in
the application of the Garmon rule, which has been criticized extensively as
being too rigid. 338
In establishing a standard for exceptions to Garmon, the Court in
Farmer looked to its 1966 decision in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers 3" which
permitted a suit for "malicious libel" in a union election contest. Justice
Powell found three factors to have been determinative in Linn, and he in-
dicated that these three factors must be present in order to create future
exceptions to the Garmon rule. 34 ° The factors are: first, that the underlying
conduct that forms the basis of the state action not be protected by the
NLRA; second, that there be an "overriding state interest" in protecting
citizens from the type of conduct complained of; and third, that there be
"little risk that the state cause of action [will] interfere with the effective
administration of national labor policy." 34 ' This third factor, the Court
suggested, is based upon at least three additional considerations: first,
whether the elements of the state cause of action are the same as they
would be in any potential unfair labor practice proceeding; second,
whether the remedies available from the state court are available from the
NLRB; and third, whether the state court action can be adjudicated with-
out regard to the merits of the underlying labor dispute. 342
Once Justice Powell identified these dispositive factors, he went on to
show that these same factors were present in prior cases in which the Court
had refused to preempt state court damage actions resulting from violence
and threats of violence in labor disputes. 343 Then, presenting these factors
as a cohesive test which rationalizes the Court's earlier decisions, the Justice
335 Id. at 140, quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971).
336
 Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
3" Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1957). In 1958 in International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), the Court had even allowed a state court suit
for "wrongful expulsion from union membership," but the Gonzales decision was thought by
many to have been at least implicitly overruled by the Court's 1971 opinion in Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). In Lockridge, the Court attempted to distinguish
Gonzales stating that that case focused purely on internal union affairs, which traditionally
have been left to the processes of other laws, while Lockridge turned on the construction of the
union security clause, a subject of pervasive federal concern and complex regulation. Id. at
296.
3" See, e.g., Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. Rev. 1337, 1363 (1972);
Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of
Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1437 (1970),
336
 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
342
 430 U.S. at 298, 305.
941 1d. at 298.
342 Id. at 298-99.
3" Id. at 299-300. See Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 640 (1958); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 669 (1954).
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applied them to Farmer, where the plaintiff claimed intentional infliction of
emotional distress by officers of his union local."' According to the plain-
tiff, the emotional distress was inflicted by the union's discrimination
against him in sending him to undesirable jobs and to jobs for which he
was not qualified."' After conceding that this claim might be preempted by
rigid application of the Garman rule, Justice Powell stated that the first part
of his test was satisfied in the present case because the "outrageous con-
duct" cited in the plaintiff's complaint clearly was not protected by the
NLRA. 346 The second condition was also satisfied, according to Justice
Powell, because the state "has a substantial interest" in protecting people
from this type of abuse."' As to the third condition, Justice Powell admit-
ted that the state action for infliction of emotional distress in the present
case involved to some extent the issue of discriminatory hiring hall prac-
tices, an area of primary federal Concern,'" and that a state claim based on
allegations of hiring hall discrimination alone "might well be pre-empted."
On balance, however, he found that the potential for interference was in-
sufficient to require preerription. 349
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell seemed to rely both on the
differences in available remedies between the state tort action and an action
before the NLRB,'" and on the "discrete concerns" of federal and state
law seen in Farmer. 3" In an unfair labor practice proceeding the focus
would be on whether there was discrimination, whereas the state tort action
would be concerned with whether there was emotional distress and physical
injury. Justice Powell, perhaps naively, seemed to think that the state tort
action could be adjudicated without deciding the merits of the underlying
labor dispute, leading him to conclude that "the tort action can be resolved
without reference to any accommodation of the special interests of unions
and members in the hiring hall context." 2"
The substance of the Court's test is further illuminated by the limita-
tions which the Court placed on the state court emotional distress action.
These limitations sought to insulate the issues in the emotional distress ac-
tion as much as possible from hiring hall discrimination issues. Justice Pow-
ell insisted that the discrimination, or even threats of it, may not form the
"outrageous conduct" that is needed to maintain the emotional distress ac-
tion. 353- Rather, the "state tort [must] be either unrelated to employment dis-
crimination or a function of the particularly abusive manner in which the
discrimination is accomplished."'" In a footnote, Justice Powell then lim-
ited the introduction of evidence of discrimination to that "necessary to
establish the context in which the state claim arose," and required a limiting
jury instruction to accompany any such evidence.'" As a final limitation on
3" 430 U.S. at 300-02.
345 Id. at 292-93.
345 1d. at 302.
3" Id.
348 1d. at 303.
349 1d. at 303-05. In Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 393 U.S. 690 0963), the Court held
just such an action to be preempted. 14. at 692, 698.
330 This approach was clearly rejected in Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 287-88.
"' 430 U.S. at 304.
"2 1d. at 305.
353 1d.
3" Id.
335 1d. at 305 n.13.
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the state court action, Justice Powell adopted safeguards analogous to
those required in Linn, restricting recovery to injury occasioned by "out-
rageous" conduct and cautioning the state courts to insure that damage
awards not be excessive. 358
It is noteworthy that the Court has finally applied some order to the
ad hoc exceptions that have been carved from the Gannon rule. Judged by
its past performance in this area, the Court in Former comes out well on its
formulation of the general test for preemption questions, but not as well on
its application of this test to the facts at hand.
For the first prong of the test, Justice Powell required that the activity
not be protected by the NLRA. 357 Thus, the Court plainly modified the
strict Garmon test so that the "arguably prohibited" category is no longer
sufficient in itself; it is now necessary to examine further whether the other
two conditions of the new test have been met. This further inquiry is not
unreasonable given that state regulation of federally prohibited activity will
less obviously result in conflicts detrimental to federal labor policy than will
regulation of protected activity; it is significant, however, that Farmer is the
first post-Garmon case in which the Court has treated "protected" and
"prohibited" activities differently. Indeed, in its 1970 decision in Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge, the Court had stated that such an approach
would be "unsatisfactory." 358 The Farmer Court did not account for its
change of view since Lockridge.
The second prong of the Farmer standard, that of "substantial state in-
terest" is simply a make-weight test. Virtually any state interest can be
deemed "substantial" by the Court, especially since Justice Powell offered
no clue as to what is required to achieve substantiality. 358 Although this
consideration was clearly present in the prior cases, as Justice Powell re-
formulated it in Farmer the requirement loses whatever substantive content
it ever had. In previous cases, the Court used language such as "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility" to describe substantial state in-
terests,38° but such language is of necessity dropped here since intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a relatively recent development in tort
law."' One is left with the conclusion that the Court has never taken the
"state interest" requirement seriously in the past and that it is unlikely to
do so in the future.
Clearly then, it is the third prong of the Court's test in Farmer, the
possibility of state interference with federal labor policy, that is the key to
the decision's meaning. Not surprisingly, it is here that the Court broke the
most new ground. The third prong of the Farmer test appears to be an ex-
panded and amplified version of previously ignored language in Justice
Clark's opinion for the Court in Linn. 382
 There, Justice Clark implied a
35" Id. at 305-06. Linn mandated a malice requirement analagous to that of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 383 U.S. at 65-66. Justice Powell also noted the
need to show actual emotional distress for recovery, parallel to Linn's requirement of actual in-
jury. See 430 U.S. at 306.
3" 430 U.S. at 302.
258
 403 U.S. at 290 (1970).
259 See 430 U.S. at 302-03.
399
 See, e.g., Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. at 62; San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
391
 430 U.S. at 302-03.
3" 383 U.S. at 63.
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distinction between overlapping state and NLRB issues in which the Board
can give a remedy and those in which it cannot.. Justice Powell's articulation
of the test is not a model of clarity; he lays out the relevant considerations
but fails to indicate how they are to be weighted. 3 " 3 This vagueness not-
withstanding, the third part of the test seems clear enough to help state
courts in deciding preemption cases. The evil that Justice Powell was trying
to avoid is the threat of state courts deciding federal labor questions;
otherwise he is trying to pregerve the applicability of state law to labor
disputes. 3" 4
The view of the proper scope of preemption reflected in Farmer is
significantly narrower than that which the Court has taken previously. The
decision clearly gives up the attempt to prevent state courts from entering
monetary judgments that may affect deleteriously the roughly equal bal-
ance of power that is the goal of national labor policy. The decision may
also serve to unleash state courts, with only a warning to avoid excessive
judgments, whenever a state action does not require deciding a question
parallel to one the Board would make in an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing. These dangers are limited, however, because if Fanner is applied
straightforwardly according to its terms, the decision is unlikely to produce
any great increase in permissible state court actions. No matter what theory
a state claim is based upon, it will still be preempted under Farmer if it in-
volves arguably protected conduct, if its elements are the same as those of
an unfair labor practice charge, or if it would require a decision on the
merits of any dispute which could form the basis of an unfair labor practice
charge. The major area which Farmer clearly opens to the state courts
seems to be claims of intentional torts unrelated to prohibited conduct.
These should be few.
A greater danger to federal labor law preemption policy is that the
Court may not enforce the standard announced in Farmer quite as rigidly
as the standard seems to require by its terms. Indeed, the Court stretched
its standard very thin to fit the facts of Farmer. In the reasoning of the state
court, hiring hall discrimination was clearly the underlying "outrageous"
conduct on which this action was based. 3 "5 The Supreme Court remanded
after holding such a basis to be impermissible and preempted as having too
great a potential for undue interference with federal regulation. 3 " On re-
mand, the case supposedly will be retried on the only basis the Court left
open—that the tort is "a function of the particularly abusive manner in
which the discrimination is accomplished." 3 " Presumably, the plaintiff will
be able to introduce evidence of discrimination only to establish the context
of the claim, and such evidence must be followed by a limiting instruction
to the jury. Under these circumstances, one wonders whether it is reason-
able to expect that the jury will disregard evidence of hiring hall dis-
crimination and come to a conclusion with regard to the "outrageous"
method of accomplishing the discrimination that is not based .upon an im-
plicit finding of such discrimination. It is theoretically possible, but seems
altogether unlikely in practice that any jury could arrive at an award of
3"3 See 430 U.S. at 298-99.
" 4 /(1. at 299-300.
3" Id, at 306-07 n.13.
"6 Id. at 306-07.
"T Id. at 305.
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damages without first finding discrimination, a decision which the Court
purports to reserve exclusively for the NLRB. 368 Thus, in applying his rel-
atively strict standard, Justice Powell went well beyond the limits that stan-
dard would would seem to require. 369
This unrealistic application greatly confuses the likely effect of Fanner.
The judicial exceptions to the general preemption rule have long needed
judicial housecleaning and ordering. Although uncertainties remain, 370
 the
decision in Fanner is a potentially promising start toward the formulation of
a standard clear enough to be applied consistently by the state courts."'
One of the greatest difficulties in the preemption area, however, has been
the Court's seeming application of a wholly different analysis each time it
has decided a preemption case. In this light the real worth of the attempt
in Fanner to formulate a clear standard must be judged by the Court's fol-
368
 Note that it thus becomes very significant that Powell worded the test only to require
that "the state court tort action can be adjudicated without resolution of the 'merits' of the un-
derlying labor dispute." Id. at 304 (emphasis added). If, as this case seems to indicate, this
means that only a theoretical possibility of avoiding such resolution is required, then the test
potentially exempts much more from preemption.
"6
 That the Court may not be altogether serious about its test can be inferred from the
Court's handling of two prior cases. Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), which
the defendants relied heavily on in their brief, is distinguished in a footnote by claiming that
there the Board might have found the union's alleged discriminatory action to be protected as
a lawful hiring hall practice, and thus there was a substantial possibility of conflict in permit-
ting concurrent state court jurisdiction. 430 U.S. at 300 n.9. But since the plaintiff in Fanner is
unlikely to obtain relief in state court without an implicit finding of hiring hall discrimination
(which again the NLRB might find to be protected), the exact same potential conflict exists in
this case. What makes the purported distinction really strange is that a much better ground of
distinction is not mentioned, for it is clear that in Borden the underlying issue which was to be
decided on the merits in state court was exactly the same issue which could come before the
NLRB. Justice Powell's ignoring this distinction may indicate that he, at least, does not take all
of the opinion at full face value.
A second case, Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), is almost to-
tally ignored by Powell, and he does not even attempt to distinguish it. Again the case could
have been distinguished on the same basis; the underlying issue that would be decided by the
stale court is the same one that would concern the NLRB in an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing. If Powell is seriously attempting to pull all of the Court's past cases in this area into some
cohesive standard, one wonders why he passed so lightly over these two important decisions
when ample grounds of distinction were so apparent.
"° See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), which apparently still stands unimpeded
as creating a separate preemption exception for duty of fair representation cases. The most
significant remaining problem is International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617
(1958), which continues to be cited as an exception, but which for all intents and purposes has
been restricted to its specific facts since Lockridge. One other favorable result of Farmer should
be the lessened importance of the exception for cases which are a "peripheral concern" of
federal labor policy. This exception, which is almost totally devoid of substantive content, was
originally created in Garman to explain Gonzales. 359 U.S. at 243-44.
371
 In the preemption area, a clear rule that hopefully can be applied uniformly is ar-
guably more important than the actual substance of the rule, within limits at least. The sub-
stance of the rule affects the overall labor-management balance of power, but only indirectly,
and in any case the system can be rebalanced in other ways if some imbalance should eventu-
ally result. Now that the Court has made sonic accommodation (in Laburnum, Russell, Linn, and
now Farmer) to the interests of individuals injured by activities within the scope of federal
labor regulation, the Court's focus should shift to formulation of a clear rule to achieve na-
tional uniformity and equity. The Court, as it admitted in Lockridge, has been experimenting
with preemption rules for quite a while. 403 U.S. at 276. See, e.g., Automobile Workers v. Wis-
consin Employment Rel. Ed., 336 U.S. 245 (1949). The time has hopefully come to clean up
the mess this experimentation has left in its wake.
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low-through. If the Court continues to apply the same basic analysis in fu-
ture cases, and applies it honestly, then Farmer could be a substantial step
toward the uniform and equitable decision of preemption questions. If so,
then Farmer will stand as one of the Supreme Court's most positive con-
tributions to labor law in the 1976 Term. If not, Farmer will take its place
as another ad hoc exception to the preemption doctrine having no general
application and contributing only confusion to an already confused area of
the law.
C. Extension of Arbitrability—Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery
& Confectionery Workers Union
In Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers
Union, 372 the Supreme Court further extended the scope of the strong pre-
sumption favoring arbitration of disputes involving the interpretation and
application of collective bargaining agreements. 373 The Court, in a seven-
to-two decision, 37" required an employer to arbitrate a dispute over sever-
ance pay which arose from events occurring after the union's termination
of the collective bargaining agreement."' The union had attempted to ob-
tain arbitration of its claim that severance pay rights were vested under the
expired contract after the employer permanently closed the plant following
the contract's termination and refused to give any severance pay."" The
Court held that the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, which provided for the arbitration of "any grievance," covered this
dispute, which the Court said arose under the contract, although after its
termination. 377
The rationale of Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court was
confined to the well-recognized premise that the duty to arbitrate is a
purely contractual obligation."'" Although the employer argued that this
premise required that any obligation to arbitrate must necessarily end with
the termination of the contract, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "the
parties' intent,"..as expressed in the contract grievance arbitration provision,
was to arbitrate disputes arising after contract termination. 37" He pointed
out that the arbitration clause did not expressly exclude disputes arising
from events occurring after contract. termination, even though the parties
must have been aware of the strong presumption of arbitrability under
federal labor law policy. 3 " Noting that the parties had clearly expressed a
general preference for arbitral resolution of their contract disputes, Justice
Burger insisted that the termination of the collective bargaining agreement
had "little impact" on the considerations which led the parties to prefer ar-
bitration of their disputes during the contract's term."'" Instead, the Chief
172 430 U.S. 243 (1977).
ma Ser United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83
(1960).
374 430 U.S. at 244. Justice Stewart dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist.
373 1d, at 255.
""Id. at 247.
ITT Id. at 255.•
315 1d. at 250-52.
379 Id. at 253.
38° Id. at 253-54.
Mi ld.
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Justice found that there is "a basis" for concluding that the parties intended
to arbitrate all grievances arising out of the contractual relationship, even if
they arose after the contract's termination. 382
Chief Justice Burger's effort to limit the Court's opinion to contrac-
tual interpretation results in a wholly unsatisfactory opinion. Clearly, the
Court reached beyond contractual principles in arriving at its decision. The
contention that the parties' awareness of the federal labor policy favoring
arbitration is any indication of their intent is unpersuasive on the facts of
this case. The specific question decided by Nolde Brothers had never before
been faced by the Court and the lower federal courts had split on the is-
sue. 383 Justice Burger's argument based on the parties' failure specifically to
exclude arbitrability in this situation attributes to them powers of foresight
unlikely to be matched in reality. It is similarly unrealistic for Justice
Burger to assert that the termination of the contract does not alter mark-
edly the considerations behind the parties' original decision to resolve
their disputes through arbitration. For the employer, contract termination
drastically reduces the benefits to be gained from arbitration. More impor-
tantly, the union is no longer bound to any no-strike agreement given in
return for an arbitration obligation. Ever since Lincoln Mills, 3 " 4 this ex-
change has been recognized to be the major reason for an employer to
agree to a broad arbitration clause. Once the union is no longer bound by a
no-strike obligation, the entire rationale of the policy favoring arbitration
collapses. Accordingly, there is no basis for presuming that the parties in
Nolde Brothers intended to arbitrate once the contract had terminated
thereby removing the union's no-strike obligation.
Furthermore, in a situation where the employer intends to close the
plant permanently, as in Nolde Brothers, there is no continuing relationship
with the union to concern the employer. The value of arbitration as a
means of encouraging a harmonious working relationship' between labor
and management thus becomes irrelevant. An employer may believe that
there is little to gain and much to lose by agreeing to arbitrate in this situa-
tion. The Court's evident assumption here was that, even though the union
could still challenge the employer's action by filing suit in federal court
under section 301 of the NLRA, an arbitrator is less likely than is a court to
uphold fully the employer's action since most arbitrators are likely to com-
promise claims and seek "equitable" solutions to contract grievance disputes
of the sort raised in Nolde Brothers. Therefore, while Justice Burger ad-
vanced several reasons for extending the obligation to arbitrate beyond the
3" Id. at 255.
"'Compare United Steelworkers v. H.K. Porter Co., 64 L.R.R.M. 2201, 2202-03 (W.D.
Pa. 1966) (rights arising under expired contract are arbitrable); Local 595, International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Howe Sound Co., 350 F.2d 508, 511, 60 L.R.R.M. 2065, 2066 (3d Cir. 1965)
(same); and General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local 512, United Rubber Workers, 191 F. Supp.
911, 914, 49 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004 (D.R.I. 1961), affd mem. 294 F.2d 957, 49 L.R.R.M. 2004
(1st Cir. 1961) (same) with Milk Drivers v. Thompson's Dairy, Inc., 80 L.R.R.M. 3403 (D.D.C.
1972) (per curiam), affd mem., 489 F.2C1 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (held claim not arbitrable with-
out discussing whether rights were vested); Ward Foods, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery & Confec-
tionery Workers Union, 360 F. Supp. 1310, 1312, 83 L.R.R.M. 3108, 3109 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(held claim not arbitrable without discussing whether rights were vested in expired agree-
ment).
$84
 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). See, e.g., Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 255, 248 (1970); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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termination of the contract, these reasons are not persuasive when mea-
sured against the practical realities of the collective bargaining situation.
In deciding Nolde Brothers, the Court relied heavily on its 1964 deci-
sion in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Liviniston. 3" Although Wiley is known as a
decision on the successor doctrine, the Court in that case also held arbitra-
ble a claim for severance pay based on an expired agreement. However,
this claim first had been asserted by the union while the contract was still in
effect. 386 Beyond this factual distinction between Nolde and Wiley, the Nolde
Court's reliance on the latter case is surprising since many had thought that
the Wiley precedent was virtually dead387 after the Court's decisions in
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 388 and Howard Johnson Co.,
Inc. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Board. 3" Thus, Wiley did not dictate the
Court's result in Nolde Brothers in finding the dispute arbitrable. It
nevertheless clearly provided a sufficient predicate for the decision in Nolde
Brothers without requiring a quantum leap in reasoning or a major shift in
policy, especially since the intervening precedents of Burns and Howard
Johnson were seemingly ignored. Indeed, in one respect, Wiley went further
than Chief Justice Burger apparently was willing to go in Nolde Brothers; the
Court in Wiley at least noted that:
a collective bargaining agreement ... is not in any real sense the
simple product of a consensual relationship. Therefore, although
the duty to arbitrate ... must be founded on a contract, the im-
pressive policy considerations favoring arbitration are not wholly
overborne by the fact that Wiley, did not sign the contract being
construed. 38°
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Nolde Brothers would have been more per-
suasive with a similar concession that, in the absence of specific contractual
language, the scope and applicability of an arbitration clause can and
should be influenced by national labor policy considerations wholly apart
from what can be discerned of that elusive commodity known as "the con-
tracting parties' intent."
Justice Stewart, joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist, articulated sev-
eral objections to Chief Justice Burger's line of reasoning, but only in a
very confused fashion. Although Justice Stewart seems to have believed
both that Justice Burger's appraisaof the contracting parties' intent is un-
realistic, and that there is insufficient reason to extend the policy favoring
arbitrability to the situation in Nolde Brothers, 3" he altogether failed to
385 376 U.S. 543 (1964). The Court in Nolde Bros. also makes reference to its later sum-
mary reversal in Piano & Musical Instr. Workers Union, Local 2549 v. W.W. Kimball Co., 379
U.S. 357 (1964), rev'g 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964). 430 U.S. at 252. The Court now claims
that this summary action, which cited Wiley, indicates that Wiley did not depend upon the fact
that the union first requested arbitration before contract termination. Id. However, as Justice
Stewart points out in his dissent, the dispute in Kimball also clearly commenced before the
agreement there expired. Id. at 257-58 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"" 376 U.S. at 548.
387 See, e.g., R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 580 (1976).
388
 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 	 •
ass
	 U.S. 249 (1974).
n° 376 U.S. at 550 (footnote omitted).
331 430 U.S. at 256 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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separate these two lines of thought. The result is a substantial loss of coher-
ency in what might otherwise be a strong dissent.
A rationale for the decision in Nolde Brothers grounded in the national
labor policy favoring arbitration would have had much to recommend it.
As the court of appeals in Nolde Brothers pointed out, the question of the
employee's claimed right to "vested" severance pay is primarily a matter of
construing the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, and such
questions generally are better determined by an arbitrator than a court. 392
If the Court had considered the nation labor policy of arbitration, the
weaknesses in Chief Justice Burger's opinion which resulted from his bas-
ing his opinion on the presumed intent of the parties could have been
avoided.
It is unclear exactly what the practical effect of the Court's decision in
Nolde Brothers will .be. Although Chief Justice Burger's "intent" analysis,
freed as it is of any restraints of reality, could be used to reach the opposite
result, the decision in Nolde Brothers probably does not disturb those lower
court cases which have held that grievances not involving claims of "vested"
rights are not .arbitrable if they arise after an agreement has expired. 393
Such an extension of Nolde Brothers is unlikely because, as stated in the
Fourth Circuit's decision in that case:
No hold that a company had to arbitrate an employee discharge
or a lockout that occurred after expiration of a contract provid-
ing for arbitration would mean that an employer who once
agreed to submit its managerial actions to potential arbitration
would in effect have agreed to do so for all time. 394
Thus, Nolde Brothers's extension of arbitrability after contract termination
will likely be limited to cases in which the union can formulate a plausible
argument that management has violated a right "accrued" or "vested" by
the lapsed agreement..
The Court's decision in Nolde Brothers must be counted as one of the
very few significant victories for labor during the 1976 Supreme Court
Term. This aside, the decision is consistent with sound labor policy and will
not prove to be overly burdensome to management. If employers desire to
avoid the effects of this decision, they will have to bargain specifically for
either explicit limitations to arbitrability or clearer statements of the non-
vesting nature of items such as vacation and severance pay. Still, it must be
remembered that Nolde Brothers also will apply in situations where the par-
ties are working only temporarily without a contract while negotiating a
new agreement. In such cases, the continuing relationship between the par-
ties provides a sound policy basis for implying a continuing duty to arbi-
trate grievances concerning "vested" rights claims arising under the old con-
tract. Such arbitration will avoid magnifying the tensions between union
392 Local 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v. Nolde Bros., Inc., 530 F.2d
548, 556, 91 L.R.R.M. 2570 (4th Cir. 1975).
393 See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Maize Prods. Co., 492
F.2d 409, 86 L.R.R.M. 2438 (7th Cir. 1974) (lockout), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1947); Procter
& Gamble Indep. Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 2752 (2d
Cir. 1962) (employer's discipline of employees for walkouts and refusal to accept overtime
work assignment), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
394
 530 F.2d at 553, 91 L.R.R.M. at 2574.
52
1976 LABOR LAW DECISIONS
and management which are likely to be at a peak when the old contract has
expired and the parties have yet to negotiate a new agreement. It is not
unreasonable to impose this duty on the employer, even in the absence of a
return no-strike pledge by the union, 2 " since both parties benefit in the
long run from keeping old grievances from adding fuel to the parties' con-
flict over a new contract. 3" Thus, while Nolde Brothers was a victory for
unions, it also represents an extension, of the policy of arbitration to a situa-
tion where the burden on management to comply with the decision is
minor. As this result may achieve greater industrial peace and dispute set-
tlement, both labor and management may be said to be the winners.
D. Subcontractor's Trust Fund Contributions—Walsh v. Schlecht
In Walsh v. Schlecht, 397 the Supreme Court upheld the legality of a
subcontracting clause in a collective bargaining agreement between a gen-
eral contractor and the Oregon State Council of Carpenters. 3 " The dis-
puted agreement required the general contractor to pay contributions to
certain employee benefit trust funds based on the number of hours of
work performed by carpenters employed by a subcontractor who did not
sign the collective bargaining agreement and whose employees therefore
would not be eligible for benefits under the trust fund. 309 In upholding
this agreement, the Court rejected the general contractor's contention that
the subcontracting clause violated section 302(a) (I) of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 40° This section generally prohibits agreements by employers to pay
money to any representative of their employees. Sections 302(c) (5) and (6),
however, exempt written agreements to pay money into trust funds
established "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such
employer.' ,401 Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement at
issue in Walsh, the general contractor, upon subcontracting work to a non-
signatory employer, agreed that either the subcontractor would be bound
by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement or the general contrac-
tor would keep records of the subcontractor employees' jobsite hours and
make the required contribution himself. 4 "2 The general contractor did
395 The union's no-strike pledge might be extended by implication to be of "cotermin-
ous application" with the employer's duty to arbitrate, under Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 381-82 (1974). Even though the union thus might be held to an im-
plied promise not to strike over any grievance arising after contract termination which is still
arbitrable under Nolde Bros., this is unlikely to have any practical effect. The union clearly
would still retain the right to strike for other reasons not having to do with the expired con-
tract (i.e., to influence the negotiations for a new agreement), and is very unlikely to carry out
its strike threat over an "old" dispute. That would remove the strike as an effective weapon in
bargaining for a new contract, which is likely to be a much higher union priority.
306 Two of the most interesting questions raised by Nolde Bros. are left unresolved by the
Court. In footnote 8 of the opinion, the Court makes it clear that it is expressing no view on
the "arbitrator's authority to consider arbitrability" after the case is referred back to arbitration
by a court. 430 U.S. at 255 n.8. The Court also notes that "we need not speculate as to the
arbitrability of post-termination contractual claims which, unlike the one presently before us,
are not asserted within a reasonable time after the contract's expiration." Id.
39T
	 U.S. 401 (1977).
398 /d. at 403, 410-11.
399 1d. at 403.
4 ° 9 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(I) (1970).
4°' 29 U.S.C. § I86(c)(5), (6) (Supp. V 1975).
492 429 U.S. at 405.
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neither. Instead, the subcontractor employer directly paid his own
employees the amount per hour that would have been paid into the trust
fund so that as a nonsignatory employer he was paying the same amount in
wages and fringe benefits as were signatory employers. 403 The trustees of
the fund which benefited from the payment under the collective bargaining
agreement brought suit to enforce the subcontracting clause. 4"
The general contractor in Walsh argued that the collective bargaining
agreement was illegal because the language in the subcontracting clause re-
quired him to contribute to the trust fund "on behalf of" or "for the ben-
efit of" the subcontractor's employees.405 Since the subcontractor's
employees were not allowed to participate in the trust fund, the general
contractor asserted that the agreement requiring contribution for their
benefit was illegal.
The Court, however, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, simply dis-
agreed with this interpretation of the subcontracting clause. Rather, the
Court interpreted the trust to require that the petitioner make payments to
the trust "measured by" the number of hours of work performed by the
subcontractor's employees. 406 Under this interpretation only employees of
the general contractor or other signatory employers, and not those of the
subcontractor, would benefit from the trust. Thus, the agreements fell
within the exception of sections 302(c) (5) and (6) to section 302(a) (1). 407
Several lower federal court decisions previously had held that an em-
ployer does not violate section 302 merely by paying additional money into
trust for his own employees even though the amounts paid in are "mea-
sured by" the hours worked by another employer's nonunion ernployees. 408
Justice Brennan expressly approved these holdings in Walsh, stating that a
"measured by" clause "is consistent with the wording of §§ 302(c) (5) and
(6) [and] does no disservice to the congressional purpose in enacting § 302
to combat 'corruption of collective bargaining through bribery of employee
representatives by employers.' "409
As construed by the Court, the subcontracting clause in Walsh had the
general effect of narrowing the general contractor's cost advantage from
the use of nonunion subcontractors by requiring the general contractor to
pay the amount- of fringe benefits the subcontractor's carpenter employees
4" Id. at 405-06.
4" Id. at 406.
405 1d. at 407. Article four of the Carpenters Master Labor Agreement between General
Contractors Assns. and Oregon State & S.W. Wash. Dist. Councils, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters, with which Walsh had agreed to comply by Memorandum Agreement, required
any subcontractor of the employer to be bound by the provisions in the agreement unless the
employer maintains records concerning the subcontractor's employees. See id. at 405 n.3.
429 U.S. at 407-09.
4 ° 7
 The Court expressly agreed that if the subcontractor's employees had been eligible
for benefits, this would violate § 302(a)(1). 429 U.S. at 407. See Moglia v. Geoghegan, 403 F.2d
110, 116, 69 L.R.R.M. 2640, 2643 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 919 (1969).
4" See, e.g., Budget Dress Corp. v. Joint Bd. of Dress & Waistmakers' Union, 198 F.
Supp. 4, 12, 49 L.R.R.M. 2332, 2338 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd, 299 F.2d 936, 49 L.R.R.M. 2798
(2d Cir. 1962); Kreindler v. Clarise Sportswear Co., 184 F. Supp. 182, 184, 46 L.R.R.M. 2444,
2445 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 542, 548-49, 45
L.R.R.M. 2789, 2793-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), affd, 279 F.2d 115, 46 L.R.R.M. 2372 (2d Cir. 1960).
4 °' 429 U.S. at 410-11 (footnote omitted), quoting Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419,
425-26 (1959).
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would have earned if they belonged to the union. 41 ° Such a subcontracting
clause, however, becomes an outright penalty which may make it more ex-
pensive to use a nonunion subcontractor than a union subcontractor in this
case and on any contruction job to which the Davis-Bacon Act applies. 411
Under the Davis-Bacon Act, all construction trade employees on federally-
funded construction jobs must be paid "prevailing wages," generally the
local union rate including fringe benefits. The only option for a nonunion
subcontractor when the Davis-Bacon Act applies is to pay his employees the
union rate plus the additional amount, that otherwise would be contributed
to the various union trust funds if the subcontractor were eligible to contrib-
ute to them. This is what the subcontractor did in Walsh. Despite this
extra payment by the subcontractor, the Court in Walsh ruled that the gen-
eral contractor remained liable under the subcontracting clause for an
identical amount of contributions. As a result, both the nonunion
employees and the trust fund received the fringe benefits and there was, in
effect, a double payment. The contractor in Walsh argued that this double
payment penalty frustrated the purpose of the Davis-Bacon Act in that it
increased his labor costs over the minimum required by the Act. Justice
Brennan dismissed this argument by noting that the Act was designed to
benefit employees, not contractors, and merely fixed a floor under wages
on government projects. 412 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded, wages and
benefits higher than this floor in no way frustrate the purpose of the
Davis-Bacon Act.
This decision may be viewed as another victory for labor during the
1976 Term. By decreasing the cost advantage of using nonunion labor, the
Court reduces the incentive for using such labor. Furthermore, in a case
such as Walsh where the Davis-Bacon Act applies, the requirement that the
general contractor make the agreed payments to the union fund in addi-
tion to paying union wages to nonunion workers will favor the use of union
workers. While the case may be seen as a union victory, it was by no means
a radical decision by the Court. Moreover,.the near unanimity of the deci-
sion, coupled with the Nixon Bloc's support of Justice Brennan's opinion,
indicates the lack of important ideological issues in Walsh. 413
E. Section 401(e) of the LMRDA —Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery
In Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 414 the Supreme Court once
again construed section 401(e) of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA). Section 401(e) provides in part that a union
member "in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold
office (subject to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) .... "415
'" In Walsh, contributions to the trust funds were payable at an aggregate rate of 96"
per hour of carpentry work done. 429 U.S. at 404-05.
4 " 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1970).
429 U.S. at 411, quoting United States v. Binghampton Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 171,
176-77 (1954).
4 " Justice White, the lone dissenter, accurately observes that the contested payment "is
simply a penalty for employing a nonsignatory subcontractor." However, this point is largely
irrelevant and White offers no compelling reason for the Court to void the parties' agreement
and thus take the contractor off the hook. 429 U.S. at 412 (White, J., dissenting).
414 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
1 " 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970).
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In Steelworkers, the Court gave a narrow interpretation of what constitutes
"reasonable qualifications." At issue in the case was a provision in the
United Steelworkers International Constitution which limited eligibility for
local union office to union members who had attended at least one-half of
the regular monthly meetings of the local union held during the three
years prior to the election of officers. 416 The effect of this eligibility restric-
tion was to disqualify 96.5 percent, or all but 23 of the 660 members in
Local 3489, from eligibility for union office. 417
 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the meeting attendance rule was
not a "reasonable qualification" within the meaning of section 401(e). 418
Since the same Steelworkers rule had previously been found to be reason-
able by the Sixth Circuit, 419
 the Supreme Court in granting certiorari
sought to resolve this conflict between the circuits. 42 °
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court relied heavily on the
Court's 1968 decision in Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Union Local 6, 4" an opin-
ion which he also authored. 422 The earlier decision had found unreason-
able a rule which required candidates for local union offices previously to
have held elective union office. The effect of the rule in Hotel Employees was
to disqualify ninety-three percent of the local members from eligibility for
union office. 423
 It was unclear in Hotel Employees, however, whether the
Court was employing a "balancing test," weighing the exclusionary effects
of the rule against the legitimacy of the interest sought to be achieved, or a
stricter "effects test" focusing only on the exclusionary effects of the rule.
This uncertainty as to the test of "reasonableness" to be employed in a sec-
tion 401(e) case led to the conflict between circuits over the legality of the
Steelworkers' rule.
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan's opinion in Steelworkers fails to answer
clearly what test is required. His opinion appears, however, to have moved
toward a percentage-based "effects" test. In his opinion, Justice Brennan•
first stated the requirement, derived from Hotel Employees, that a rule to be
reasonable must be consistent with the LMRDA's command to unions to
conduct "free and democratic" elections. 424
 He then made the significant
observation that
an attendance requirement that results in the exclusion of 96.5%
of the members from candidacy for union office hardly seems to
be a "reasonable qualification" consistent with the goal of free
418 429 U.S. at 306.4171d. at
 307 .
4"
 Brennan v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers, 520 F.2d 516, 519, 89 L.R.R.M. 3211,
3215 (7th Cir. 1975).
419
 Brennan v. Local 5724, United Steelworkers, 489 F.2d 884, 891, 85 L.R.R.M. 2001,
2007 (6th Cir. 1973). However, similar meeting attendance requirements had been found to
be unreasonable by courts of appeals in the First and Third Circuits. See Usery v. Local Divi-
sion 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300, 1304, 93 L.R.R.M. 2870, 2874 (1st
Cir. 1976); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 405 F.2d 176, 178, 69 L.R.R.M.
2890, 2891 (3rd Cir. 1968).
"° 429 U.S. at 307 n.3.
421
	 U.S. 492 (1968).
422
 That opinion was unanimous, with Justice Marshall not participating.
423
 391 U.S. at 493-94, 502.
424
 429 U.S. at 309.
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and democratic elections. A requirement having that result obvi-
ously severely restricts the free choice of the membership in
selecting its leaders. 423
This statement sounds much like an "effects" test, indeed, it nearly states a
per se rule.
Justice Brennan avoided going that far, however, by treating the 96.5
percent disqualification in the case as if' it merely established a strong pre-
sumption of unreasonableness which could be overcome by a showing of
significant union interests justifying the rule. 42 ° Justice Bennan then went
on to conclude that the union's interests in encouraging attendance at
union meetings, especially by dissidents, and in assuring the election of
qualified and interested leaders did not outweigh the antidemocratic effect
of the rule. 427 The union had attempted to distinguish Hotel Employees on
the ground that, unlike the prior office rule in .that case, the rule in Steel-
workers on its face disqualified no one; rather, members disqualified them-
selves by not taking the trouble to attend meetings. 428 In answering this ar-
gument, Justice Brennan noted the practical nature of local union politics.
There is usually no permanent opposition party within a union, and oppo-
sition to the incumbent leadership is sporadic, often arising in response to
particular issues and generally only when elections are upcoming. 42° The
Steelworkers' meeting attendance rule forced would-be opponents to decide
upon a candidacy at least eighteen months in advance of an election, when
there might be no hot issues and only minimal interest. Thus, according to
the Court, the practical effect of this rule was likely to impair the oppor-
tunity for the general membership to choose alternatives to incumbent
leadership. 43° This argument seems superficially persuasive, yet its use in
the Steelworkers opinion only serves to muddle the test being applied by the
Court. The test obfuscates whether the Court is concerned mostly about
the percentage of members disqualified by the rule, or about the effect of
requiring the planning of candidacies' eighteen months in advance.
The Court's reluctance to adopt unequivocally a pure percentage-
based "effects" test is not hard to fathom. Such a test would require the
Court to hold that any attendance rule is unreasonable per se. Unions
clearly have a strong interest in seeing that their members have at least
some basic familiarity with the problems of running a union before they
run for office, and some limited meeting attendance rule seems a reason-
able and direct way of' achieving this result. Yet it is apparent from the
facts of Steelworkers that, no matter how minimal an attendance rule the
local had, not many members would have satisfied 4. 431 Thus, the adoption
42'Id. at 310.
"" See id. at 313-14.
-mid. at 310.
44" ird .
429 Id. at 310-11.
13" Id. at 311. The Court cites no authority for these propositions other than the Secre-
tary of Labor's brief. See id. at 311 n.7. However, this understanding of practical union politics
does seem to agree with the academic commentators. See D. Box & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 70, 84-85 (1970).
43' attendance at the monthly meetings over the three years prior to the elec-
tion was 47 out of 660. The 10 officers were required to attend. If the other 37 attendees
were different people each month, at the end of three years each nonofficer would have at-
tended just two meetings. 429 U.S. at 307 n.4.
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of any significant "effects" test based on the percentage of members eligible
to run for office probably would invalidate most meeting attendance rules.
The low level of interest in ordinary, day to day .union business is such that
any requirement of faniiliarity with union affairs will likely eliminate a
large number of members from eligibility for candidacy. Thus, adoption of
a per se "effects" test in Steelworkers would have been irreconcilable with
legitimate union interests.
In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, ,
argued that the Court's holding is an "unwarranted interference with the
right of the union to manage its own internal affairs." 4 " Justice Powell
overstated the case, however, when he claimed that the Court extended the
reach of Hotel Employees "far beyond [its] holding and basic rationale." 433
Actually, Steelworkers adopted an approach almost identical to that of Hotel
Employees, the only difference being slightly more emphasis on the "effects"
test. Justice Powell would have restricted the application of Hotel Employees
to eligibility rules that have the inevitable effect, predictable at the time the
rule is adopted, of disqualifying a large proportion of the membership. 434
Yet, far from being the "basic rationale" of Hotel Employees, these factors
were not even discussed in that opinion.
In support of his view that the proper test under section 401(e)
should be deferential to union interests, Justice Powell emphasized that the
disqualifying effect of the Steelworkers' meeting attendance rule was volun-
tary, the product of the members' free choice. 435 But both this argument
and his argument that the Steelworkers' rule did not have the "inevitable
effect" of disqualification are based on the theoretical notion that members
have the right to come to all the meetings. Additionally, such arguments
ignore the realities of local union politics and the normal disinterest of the
membership recognized by Justice Brennan. This failure to deal with the
practical reality that the average union member does not go to union meet-
ings merely to preserve the option of running for office eighteen months
hence, just in case an issue calling for ouster of the union leadership
should arise, is the greatest shortcoming of Powell's dissent.
The Powell, Rehnquist and Stewart position resembles a "states rights"
approach to labor relations, evidenced by their concern about " 'unnecessary
governmental intrusion into internal union affairs.' " 4" The dissent also
seems to foresee increased instability in labor relations resulting from the
invalidation of meeting attendance rules of the sort at issue in Steelworkers.
Justice Brennan clearly believes that the invalidation of the Steelworkers'
rule may make it easier for temporarily aroused union members to displace
established leadership in heated and emotional election campaigns. Justice
Powell, however, seems to think that such insurgency is most likely to occur
where a vocal dissident faction takes a hard line on emotion-packed eco-
nomic issues, in contrast to a more moderate, realistic position taken by an
established leadership more familiar with and sympathetic to an employer's
432 1d. at 314 (Powell, J., dissenting).
433 1d. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting).
499 !d. at 315-16 (Powell, J., dissenting).
435 1d. (Powell, J., dissenting).
436 1d. at 314, quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Bottle Blowers Ass'n., 389 U.S. 463, 470-71
(1968); Wirtz v. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 496 (1968).
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financial limitations. Thus, although Justice Brennan may be correct in stat-
ing that the invalidation of this rule will help open up the union election
process, the results of this opening-up may be precisely what Justices Pow-
ell, Stewart and Rehnquist fear; it may tend to disrupt industrial stability by
putting more locals into the hands of militant leaders who will be much less
compromising in their economic demands. These fears, however, seem
exaggerated. In any event, industrial instability of this sort envisioned by
Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stewart may not be the worst thing that
could happen to the labor movement in the United States.
In Steelworkers, the more liberal wing of the Court, joined in this deci-
sion by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, emphasized the neces-
sity of encouraging democracy within the union. Two members of the
Nixon Bloc with Justice Stewart, in dissent, favored a "states rights" ap-
proach in this area, giving the union the freedom to govern its own in-
ternal affairs. This self-conscious restraint evidenced by the Steelworkers dis-
senters is one of the characteristics of the Nixon Bloc's approach to de-
cision making.
F. Definition of "Agricultural Laborers"—Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB
In Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 the Supreme Court resolved a
conflict of decisions among the NLRB and several courts of appeals over
the status of vertically integrated poultry businesses under the NLRA by
endorsing the Board's interpretation of the "agricultural labor" exemption
under the NLRA. 439 The Board consistently had refused to include as ag-
ricultural labor all the activity on large, integrated farming operations such
as Bayside. 439 The Board ruled that six truck driver employees of Bayside,
who trucked feed from Bayside's feed mill to one hundred and nineteen
Bayside chicken farms, were not "agricultural laborers" within the meaning
of section 2(3) of the NLRA and were therefore entitled to bargaining
rights under the NLRA. 44 ° Although in this case the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit enforced the Board's order, 44 ' the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits previously had denied enforcement to similar NLRB de-
cisions concerning the status of truck driver employees of integrated poul-
try businesses. 442 In these cases, the courts of appeals had ruled that such
employees were "agricultural laborers" specifically excluded from the
NLRA's definition of "employees" in section 2(3). 443
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court in
Bayside affirmed the decision of the First Circuit and agreed with the
NLRB's consistent determination that these truck drivers were not per-
427 429 U.S. 298 (1977).
"5 1d. at 302-04.
435 1d. at 302.
44" M. at 299.
4 " NLRB v. Bayside Enterprises, Inc., 527 F.2d 436, 439, 90 L.R.R.M. 3304, 3306 (1st
Cir. 1975).
442 NLRB v. Strain Poultry Farms, Inc., 405 F.2d 1025, 1033, 70 L.R.R.M. 2200, 2207
(5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Ryckebosch, Inc., 471 F.2d 20, 20, 81 L.R.R.M . 2931, 2931 (9th Cir.
1972).
443 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) provides that the "term 'employee' .. . shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer ...."
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forming work "by a farmer," and thus were not excluded from the pro-
tections of the NLRA. 444 In its acquiescence in the Board's narrow view of
the agricultural exemption, the opinion in Bayside indicates that the Court
would not question the determination made by the Board even if there was
equal reason to decide the other way. 445
Since 1946, Congress has annually provided, in riders to the approp-
riations acts for the Board, 446 that the meaning of the agricultural labor
exemption in the NLRA is to be determined pursuant to the definition of
agriculture given in section 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 447
In Farmer's Reservoir & Irrigation Co. a McComb, 449 the Court interpreted
the FLSA definition as having two branches—primary farming, meaning
actual farming activity, and secondary farming, meaning work performed
"by a farmer or on a farm" incidental to farming operations. 449 The appli-
cation of the FLSA definition to large vertically integrated poultry busi-
nesses like Bayside raises some troublesome issues. Bayside's operations in-
cluded breeding farms, hatcheries, a feed mill for producing its own
chicken feed, and a processing plant where the poultry was slaughtered
and dressed. 45 ° The actual raising of the chicks until they are ready for
processing was done by independent contractor farmers, or "contract
growers." 4" The disputed employees in Bayside were truck drivers whose
sole task was to deliver feed from the Bayside feed mill to contract grow-
ers. 452
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Stevens first brushed aside the
argument that Bayside's entire operation is primary farming simply by stat-
ing that some of Bayside's operations, such as the hatchery, are agricultural
and some, such as the feed mill, are not. 453 The feed drivers' work
nevertheless could constitute secondary farming, according to Justice Ste-
vens, if it is work performed "by a farmer" or "on a farm."'" Since Bayside
did not contend that the drivers worked "on a farm," Justice Stevens thus
narrowed the question to whether the character of the Bayside activities in-
volving the drivers made such drivers "farmers." 455 He then held that
"[Once the status of the drivers is determined by the character of the work
which they perform for their own employer, the work of the contract farmer
cannot make the drivers agricultural laborers." 456 Admitting that this decision
"' 429 U.S. at 302-03.
4'5 This position is consistent with the Court's longstanding practice to uphold a Board
decision choosing between two equal but conflicting views. See, e.g., NLRB v United Ins. of
America, 390 U.S. 254, 260 (1968); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269
(1956); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
"6 The latest such rider is 90 Stat. 23 (1976).
4" 29 U.S.C. § 203(f) (1970), provides in relevant part: "'Agriculture' includes farming
in all its branches (including) the raising of ... poultry, and any practices ... performed by a
farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations ...."
"6 337 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1949).
449 1d. at 762-63.
45 °429 U.S. at 301.
451 Id.
"'Id. at 299.
453 /d. at 301.
454 Id. at 300-01.
455 Id. at 301.
456 td. at 303.
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might "with nearly equal reason be resolved one way rather than another,457
the Court opted to respect the consistent position of the NLRB as the "agency
whose special duty is to apply this broad statutory language." 458 The Court
therefore upheld the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice in Bayside's
refusal to bargain with the drivers.45'i
The real importance of Bayside is not its specific holding, but rather
the Court's narrow formulation of the question before it. Justice Stevens'
analysis, mirroring the Board's approach, broke down the employer's oper-
ations into narrow categories and closely scrutinized the character of each
category for its agricultural content. This differs significantly from the way
the Court last examined the agricultural exemption in 1955. Then, in
Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 46° a case arising under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 4" Justice Clark writing for the Court emphasized the broad scope
of the exemption and found that employees of' a large sugar plantation who
operated a plantation's private railroad and worked in its equipment repair
shops were exempted agricultural laborers.462 The Maneja Court reasoned that
the plantation should not be penalized because its size and degree of modern-
ization enabled it to achieve substantial specialization , of labor. 463 In other
words, the Maneja Court looked at the purpose of the plantation as a whole, in
that case the growing of sugar cane. Thus, it apparently was willing to exempt
most of the activities incidental to that purpose 484 —a sharp contrast to the
segmented analysis which Justice Stevens employed in Bayside.
Bayside did not overrule Maneja, since the activities in the latter case
were "on a farm" rather than "by a farmer." Nevertheless, Bayside indicates
that today the Court might examine much differently the questions pre-
sented in Maneja. Indeed, the Court's reasoning that an employee's status is
determined by the work he performs for his employer rather than where he
performs it seems to indicate that the Court is willing to go even further
than the Board already has in closely scrutinizing the activities of each
employee asserted to be exempt as an agricultural employee, and exempt-
ing only those who are themselves engaged in actual farming activities.
It is hard to articulate any compelling policy reason why large agricul-
tural businesses such as Bayside should be exempted altogether from the
provisions of the NLRA and FLSA. Such large agribusinesses are much
more similar to the large manufacturing concerns which are fully subject to
4 " Id. at 302 (footnote omitted), quoting, Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Farmer's
Irrigation, 337 U.S. at 770, which essentially admits the arbitrary nature of the "nice dis-
tinctions" involved in the interpretation of the FLSA.
" 8 429 U.S. at 304.
455 1d. at 299.
4" 349 U.S. 254 (1955}.
' 61 29	 § 201 et seq. (1970).
4 ° 2 349 U.S. at 260-64.
4" Id. at 261. Justice Clark did find that the sugar cane processing operation was not
exempt under § 3(f) after a lengthy discussion. M. at 264-70. Justice Burton dissented from
this part of the opinion, and was joined by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Id. at 275.
"'But in making the factual determination [as to whether a particular operation
fell within the agricultural exemption), we must keep in mind that the question
here presented is it limited one: is the operation (involved) part of the ag-
ricultural venture? If it is agriculture, albeit industrialized and involving highly
specialized mechanical tasks, we must hold it to be within the agriculture exemp-
tion.
Id. at 265.
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these statutes than they are to the small family operated farms for which
the agricultural exemption originally was created. The Court in Bayside has
served warning to these agribusinesses that the agricultural exemption will
no longer receive the broad scope that it has in the past. The Court also
has effectively given the NLRB the go-ahead to exempt only those opera-
tions of agricultural businesses which involve actual farming activity. The
change, though not startling, could prove significant. That the issues presented
in Bayside did not raise any ideological questions for the Court is evidenced by
the unanimous decision as well as by Justice Stevens' comment that the case
easily could be decided the other way. It remains to be seen whether this un-
animity will continue when the Bayside reasoning is applied to other agricul-
tural businesses.
• It is difficult to generalize about the Supreme Court decisions in the
n-iore traditional areas of labor law under the National Labor Relations Act,
Labor Management Relations Act and Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act. Probably the most noteworthy thing to be said is that the
effect of the ideological split on the Court was somewhat less pronounced
in these decisions. Two of the six decisions in this area, Farmer and Bayside,
were unanimous. Four of the opinions were written by justices who are not
part of the Nixon Bloc. These included two opinions by Justice Brennan, in
Walsh and Local 3489, where he was joined by individual members of the
Bloc.
The only real disappointment for labor among these cases was the de-
cision in Pipefilters, the Court's most significant decision in this area. The
impact of Pipefiteers, however, should be tempered by the collective bargain-
ing process and it is necessary to allow that process to work before judging
the effect of Pipefiiters on the union's ability to preserve work for its mem-
bers. The Farmer decision may pose some problems for labor in the future;
however, the Court's attempt in Farmer to formulate a clear standard for
exemption under the Garman preemption rule is unquestionably one of the
brighter spots of its work during the 1976 Term,
HI. LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In recent years the growth of labor relations law in the public sector
has presented numerous issues for judicial resolution. Against this
backdrop the 1976 Supreme Court Term produced several significant de-
cisions involving questions of labor relations law in the public sector. 465 The
Court decided four cases in this field, three of which raised the question of
the first amendment rights of public sector employees, and a fourth which
addressed the procedural due process rights of employees dismissed from
employment in the public sector. Like the private sector labor decisions,
these cases are less indicative of a "Nixon Bloc approach" than are the
Court's decisions concerning equal employment. However, the cases do
suggest that the Nixon appointees are not entirely sympathetic to collective
bargaining in the public sector.
"5
 As Professor Benjamin Aaron observed last year, "labor law is becoming more and
more a subdivision of constitutional law ... [anal cases involving issues of public sector labor
law represent a growing and increasingly important part of the Court's work." Aaron, Labor
Law Decisions of The Supreme Court, 1973-76 Term, 92 LAB. REL. REP. 311, 312 (BNA 1976).
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A. Constitutionality of the Agency Shop in Public Sector Employment —
Abood v. Detroit Board of' Education
The most important case of the 1976 Supreme Court Term involving
labor relations in the public sector was Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 4 R 6
In Abood, a strongly divided Court ruled that a union which was the exclu-
sive bargaining agent For public sector employees could properly collect a
"service charge" from nonunion employees to defray the costs of collective
bargaining, contract administration and grievance handling. 467 The Court
vacated and remanded a Michigan Court of Appeals decision which held
that, where nonunion employees had failed to state the specifics to which
they objected, state law could constitutionally permit the use of the non-
union employees' fees for political and ideological purposes unrelated to
collective bargaining:His The Supreme Court held that the nonunion
employees' first amendment rights would be infringed if the service fee
were used by the union for political activities unrelated to collective bar-
gaining, 469 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Michigan
courts to hear evidence on the plaintiffs' claim that certain union expendi-
tures were for political and ideological purposes outside the scope of collec-
tive bargaining, and to determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a
rebate of a portion of the fees they had paid to the union under the
"agency shop" arrangement. 47°
The decision for the Court was written by Justice Stewart, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and White. Justice Stevens filed a separate con-
curring opinion with a limited caveat to Stewart's opinion; 4 " Justice Rehn-
quist filed a separate concurring opinion reluctantly joining the Court's
judgment; 472 and Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun, filed a concurring opinion clearly at odds with the basic reason-
ing of the Court. 473
At issue in Abood was the constitutionality of a provision of the Michi-
gan Public Employment Relations Act 474 which authorizes public employers
and unions to agree to an "agency shop" arrangement as a part of a collec-
tive bargaining contract. 475 Pursuant to such agency shop arrangements, all
public employees who are represented by a union serving as an exclusive
bargaining agent under the Michigan law are required, as a condition of
continued employment, to pay the union a "service fee" equal to the
amount of union dues. 476
466 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
467 Id. at 232.
4" Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 98-100, 230 N.W.2d 322, 325-27
(1975).
46° 431 U.S. at 234.
470 1d. at 240-42. Because the case came. to the Court following a judgment on the
pleadings, the plaintiffs had not presented evidence to support their contention that certain of
the union's activities, generally referred to by plaintiff as "economic, political, professional, sci-
entific, and religious in nature," id. at 213, in fact fell outside the scope of collective bargain-
ing. Id. at 236.
47 Id. at 244 (Stevens, j., concurring).
"2 Id. at 242 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
4" Id. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
'" MICH. COMP. Laws ANN. § 423.210 (1973).
4 " 431 U.S. at 211.
"6 Id.
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The plaintiffs challenged the constitutional validity of this statute on
two grounds. First, they argued that an agency shop agreement in the pub-
lic sector is an unconstitutional deprivation of first amendment rights be-
cause it amounts to requiring membership in a union as a condition of pub-
lic employment. 477 Second, they argued that compelling nonunion
employees to pay a service fee which supports political and ideological ac-
tivities unrelated to collective bargaining violates their first amendment
rights by requiring endorsement of the activities supported.'"
In considering the legality of' such compulsory service fees to the ex-
tent that they are used to support collective bargaining activities, Justice
Stewart in his plurality opinion relied heavily on the Court's judgments in
Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson 4" and International Association of
Machinists v. Stree1. 48° In Hanson, the Court upheld the enforcement of a
union shop agreement that was authorized by the Railway Labor Act,
noting that the Act "expressly allows those agreements notwithstanding any
law 'of any State.' "481 The judgment in Hanson was premised on a finding
of "governmental action" in permitting such agreements.482 The Court
ruled that, notwithstanding the serious questions thereby posed under the
first and fifth amendments, 483
 Congress could authorize the adoption of
union shop provisions in order to promote labor peace and to permit
unions and employers to require that employees who obtained the benefits
of union representation share in the cost of collective bargaining. 484 In
Street, the Court faced for the first time a claim that portions of the monies
collected pursuant to a union shop agreement adopted under the authority
of the Railway Labor Act were being used by the union to finance the
campaigns of political candidates. 485 Again sidestepping the broad constitu-
tional issues,488 the Court in Street concluded that the Railway Labor Act
should be construed narrowly as prohibiting the use of compulsory union
dues for political purposes."' Although the Court in Street ruled that ob-
jecting employees were entitled to a rebate of whatever portion of their
compulsory dues were used for political purposes, 488 the Court upheld the
validity of the union shop as a whole. 489
On the basis of these decisions, a majority of the Court in Abood con-
cluded that nonunion public sector employees properly may be required to
477 1d. at 226.
4 " Id. at 234.
479 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
44°367 U.S. 740 (1961).
"' 351 U.S. at 232.
"'Id. at 231-32.
493
 The union shop agreement was challenged as a violation of the first amendment be-
cause of its infringement upon freedom of association, conscience and thought. Id. at 236.
The agreement was also challenged as a violation of the due process clause because it denied
nonunion employees the right to work, a form of deprivation of liberty. Id. at 234.
"LI Id. at 233.
4 " 367 U.S. at 744, 746-47.
4"9 The plaintiffs in Street claimed that their rights of freedom of speech under the first
amendment and to due process tinder the fourteenth amendment were infringed because the
fee required by the union shop agreement was used in large part to finance political cam-
paigns and to promote political and economic doctrines which the plaintiffs opposed. Id. at
744, 746 n.4,
497 /d. at 750.
4"
 Id. at 775.
4 "fd. at 771.
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support the objectives of collective bargaining by giving financial aid to
their exclusive bargaining agent pursuant to a lawful agency shop agree-
ment. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stewart refused to distinguish
Abood from the decisions in Hanson and Street merely because the Abood case
involved public rather than private employees. He dismissed the plaintiffs'
argument that Abood was distinguishable from Hanson because government
employment was involved, noting that Hanson also involved "governmental
action.""" Furthermore, Justice Stewart refused to find that the admittedly
political nature of public sector collective bargaining requires greater first
amendment protection for public sector employees."' He made the telling
observation that "[title differences between public- and private-sector collec-
tive bargaining simply do not translate into differences in First Amendment
rights." " 2 Justice Stewart thus was convinced that since "governmental ac-
tion" was involved in both the public and private sector cases, Abood was
governed by Hanson and its progeny. Accordingly, Justice Stewart found
that the agency shop provision compelling support of union collective bar-
gaining activities was constitutional.
In support of this holding, Justice Stewart perceived three primary
justifications for allowing agency shop contracts in the public sector. First,
agency shop contracts are a necessary adjunct to the principle of exclusive
representation; 4 " 5 second, agency shop contracts fairly distribute the costs
of collective bargaining and avoid the problem that nonunion employees
will benefit from the fruits of collective bargaining as "free riders;" 4" and
third, agency shop agreements promote the cause of labor peace by reduc-
ing the likelihood of "confusion and conflict that could arise if rival ...
unions ... each sought to obtain the employer's agreement ..." on dis-
puted subjects of bargaining.4 " 5 These justifications are also drawn from
the Court's prior rulings in Hanson and Street.'"
In considering whether the plaintiffs in Abood were entitled to recover
from the union for expenditures made for political causes which plaintiffs
opposed, Justice Stewart found that the Michigan Court of Appeals deci-
sion dismissing the plaintiff's' claim for failure to indicate the precise politi-
cal activities to which they objected was inconsistent with prior case law. 4 " 7
Justice Stewart looked both to the Court's decision in Street and to its later
decision in Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen 4 " 8 in making
this determination. in Allen, the Court held that where employees express
general opposition to "any political expenditures by the union," they have
stated a sufficient cause of action. 4 "9 The appropriate remedy for plaintiffs
who successfully prove such a claim, the Allen Court then suggested, is a
decree which would refund to plaintiffs a pro rata portion of the union fee
reflecting the ratio of union expenditures for political activities to total
""431 U.S. at 226.
'' Id. at 231.
4" Id. at 232.
453 Id. at 220-24.
"4 Id. at 221-24,
495 /d. at 224.
4" Street, 367 U.S. at 759.62; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 231, 235.
457 431 U.S. at 240-41.
458 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
459 Id. at 118 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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union expenditures, and which would reduce by the same proportion the
fee required of plaintiffs in the future. 5" In upholding the claim for re-
covery of political expenditures in Abood, Justice Stewart noted that, like the
employees in Allen, the plaintiffs in Abood had set forth in their complaint
their opposition to any expenditures not directly related to the collective
bargaining process. 50 ' He further observed that requiring greater spec-
ificity would unfairly burden the plaintiffs:
To require greater specificity would confront an individual
employee with the dilemma of relinquishing either his right to
withhold his support of ideological causes to which he objects or
his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public dis-
closure. It would also place on each employee the considerable
burden of monitoring all of the numerous and shifting expendi-
tures made by the Union that are unrelated to its duties as exclu-
sive bargaining representative. 5 °2
Thus, Justice Stewart found that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action for
deprivation of their first amendment rights where they alleged merely a
general opposition to union expenditures not related to collective bargain-
i ng.
In finding that agency shop agreements in the public sector are con-
stitutional and that public employees may recover for expenditures not re-
lated to collective bargaining, the Court refused to distinguish between the
first amendment rights of public and private employees. Nevertheless, the
Court recognized that public sector collective bargaining contracts give rise
to special problems given the unique nature of collective bargaining in the
public sector. The Court stated:
There can be no quarrel with the truism that because pub-
lic employee unions attempt to influence governmental policy-
making, their activities—and the views of members who disagree
with them—may be properly termed political. But that charac-
terization does not raise the ideas and beliefs of public employees
onto a higher plane than the ideas and beliefs of private
employees. 5 ° 3
Justice Stewart stressed that a public employee "who believes that a union
representing him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public pol-
icy is not barred from expressing his viewpoint." 504 Thus, public employees
may, without regard to agency shop payments or union policy, still support
political candidates and causes, join political parties, vote, express political
and ideological views in public or in private and even oppose positions
taken by the union in collective bargaining. 505 The issue in Abood, as articu-
lated by Justice Stewart, thus reduces to a question of the limits on the
permissible use of funds exacted from objecting nonunion employees pur-
suant to a lawful agency shop agreement.
"° Id. at 122.
'°' 431 U.S. at 241.
5" Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).
"'Id. at 291.
a" Id. at 230.
50 Id.
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It is in discussion of these limits that the Court's opinion in Abood
raises as many questions as it answers. Justice Stewart initially clarified that
fees contributed for collective bargaining activities, which he identified as
"[t]he tasks of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agree-
ment and representing the interest of employees in settling disputes and
processing grievances," plainly are constitutionally permissible. 5" He also
indicated that collective bargaining costs may include the services of
lawyers, expert negotiators, economists, a research staff, and general ad-
ministrative personnel. 5 ° 7 Finally, he stated that a union is entitled to sup-
port from nonunion employees to defray the costs of collective bargaining
activities even though lain employee may very well have ideological objec-
tions to a wide variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as
exclusive representative." 598 Justice Stewart ascribed broad scope to this
right to command support:
[An employee's] moral or religious views about the desirability of
abortion may not square with the union's policy in negotiating a
medical benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a
union policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing
that to be the road to serfdom for the working class, while
another might have economic or, political objections to unionism
itself.. .. "[But] [a]s long as they act to promote the cause which
justified bringing the group together, the individual cannot
withdraw his financial support merely because he disagrees with
the group's strategy." 509
At the same time, however, Justice Stewart indicated that unions and
public employers are prohibited "from requiring any of the appellants to
contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose as a condi-
tion of holding a job as a public school teacher."5 " What he meant by this
was not explained. It is noteworthy, though, that Justice Stewart used
"ideological cause" rather than "political cause" in this formulation of the
Abood test. He thereby recognized that collective bargaining in the public
sector is in many respects an "inherently political" process. Consistent with
such recognition, Justice Stewart acknowledged that public employees who
are permitted to bargain collectively may well have more influence on their
employer, a political entity, than do employees who bargain collectively in
the private sectors [
Although Justice Stewart perceived differences in the political content
of public and private sector labor issues, he saw no principled basis for dis-
tinguishing between the public and private sectors with.respect to the issue
of the constitutionality of an agency shop clause once a state has, adopted
a legislative scheme which permits collective bargaining by public em-
ployees.512 In other words, for Justice Stewart the decision whether pub-
lic employee unions should be entitled to participate in the political process
5°°
	 at 221-22.
5°' Id. at 221.
3°$ /d. at 222.
50 ' Id. at 222-23, quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 778.
515 431 U.S. at 235.
"' Id. at 228-29.
512 /d. at 229.
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as an organized force is a decision for a state to make. To the extent that
unions limit their activities to "collective bargaining activities" authorized by
state law, they are entitled to bargain for an agency shop clause to ensure
support from all employees who are represented by them. Justice Stewart
conceded that this conclusion gives rise to "difficult problems in drawing
lines between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may
be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining,
for which such compulsion is prohibited." 513
 He intimated, without decid-
ing the issue, that "collective bargaining activities" may well include the
costs associated with securing legislative ratification and related budgetary
and appropriation decisions necessary to implement collective bargaining
agreements in the public sector, but he did nothing to define "ideological
activities." 514
At the end of his opinion, Justice Stewart strongly suggested that
unions adopt voluntary plans by which dissenters would be afforded an in-
ternal union remedy to protest against union expenditures for ideological
causes. 515 He also suggested that a court might appropriately defer judicial
proceedings to await the result of any such internal union proceeding. 5 "
These issues prompted Justice Stevens to write a separate concurrence in
which he explicitly called for the development of such internal union pro-
cedures. He asserted that "the Union should not be permitted to exact a
service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure which
will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even temporarily, to fi-
nance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining." 5 "
The majority opinion in Abood affirmed the labor law principles upon
which the union shop is permitted in the private sector and found them
equally applicable in the public sector. The opinion also set forth the con-
stitutional basis for denying unions the right to make political or ideological
expenditures with funds contributed by employees who oppose such ac-
tivities. In so doing, Abood went a step beyond Street in its legal approach, if
not in its result. The plurality opinion, however, provides little guidance
for distinguishing between activities related to public sector collective bar-
gaining and ideological activities.
Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, remained faithful to Jus-
tice Powell's dissenting opinion in Elrod v. Burns. 518 In Elrod, the Court
ruled that governmental employers violate the first and fourteenth
amendments when they discharge or threaten to discharge public
employees solely because of their partisan political affiliations. 5 " Justice
Rehnquist, with the Chief Justice, joined in Justice Powell's dissenting opin-
ion in Elrod. There, Justice Powell argued that the state interest in patron-
age hiring is sufficient to override the first amendment interests of the
employees affected by the practice, and indeed that patronage practices to
515 Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
5 ' 5 1d. at 240.
51 A Id at 242.
5" Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5"
 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
51"
	 at 372-73. This decision had the effect of declaring unconstitutional the system of
political patronage hirings in Cook County, Illinois.
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some extent further first amendment interests by encouraging political ac-
tivity at the local level. 520 In Abood, Justice Rehnquist said he was con-
strained to concur in the majority opinion because he was "unable to see a
constitutional distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement
that a public employee be a Democrat or a Republican or else lose his job,
and a similar requirement that a 'public employee contribute to the
collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union." 5 " Accordingly, Justice
Rehnquist relied on his view that public employees have limited first
amendment interests as the basis for concurring in the plurality opinion.
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Abood apparently aban-
doned his position in Elrod v. Burns. Justice Powell concurred only in that
portion of Justice Stewart's plurality opinion which held that the first
amendment rights of public employees are violated by a union's expendi-
ture of part of a service fee for political activity to which the employees are
opposed. 522 He disagreed with the plurality's holding that an agency shop
in the public sector is constitutional. Justice Powell argued that the Court's
decisions in Elrod and Buckley v. Va1eo 523 militate against any finding that
public employers and unions can condition the employment of nonmem-
bers on the payment of a service fee to a union. 524 In Buckley, the Court
found unconstitutional a provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, as amended in 1974, 525 which limited the amounts that individuals
could contribute to federal election campaigns. 528 Justice Powell argued in
Abood that "[tlhe only question after Buckley is whether a union in the pub-
lic sector is sufficiently distinguishable from a political candidate or com-
mittee to remove the withholding of financial contributions from First
Amendment protection."527 Justice Powell stated that in his view no rea-
soned distinction exists. 528 Thus, Justice Powell concluded that a public
sector union is so akin to a political party that the freedom to disassociate
from it and its positions should be accorded first amendment protection. 52 °
It is cliff-let& to reconcile Justice Powell's newfound concern for in-
dividual first amendment rights in Abood with his dissenting opinion in El-
rod. To maintain consistency with Elrod Justice Powell should have joined
"° Id. at 387, 384-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
821 431 U.S. at 243-44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
S 2 YId. at 244 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
523 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5" 431 U.S. at 255-59 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
' 24 2 U.S.C.	 431 et seq. (Supp. V 1975).
225 424 U.S. at 58-59. The expenditure limitation is found in 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)
(Supp. V 1975).
5 R 7
 431 U.S. at 256 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
428 1d, (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
"8 Id. at 256-58 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
Additionally, Justice Powell attempted to distinguish Hanson, relied upon by the major-
ity, by arguing that "Whe State in this case has not merely authorized agency-shop agreements
between willing parties; it has negotiated and adopted such an agreement itself." Id. at 253.
Justice Powell's attempt to distinguish Hanson was answered by Justice Stewart in a footnote to
his opinion. Justice Stewart found Justice Powell's assertion that Hanson and Street were in-
applicable to Abood "startling" in light of Justice Powell's concession that Hanson involved gov-
ernmental action. Justice Stewart further observed that nothing in Hanson suggested that the
union shop agreement in that case was not closely scrutinized because the government action
consisted only of the statutory authorization of a private agreement. Id. at 226 n.23.
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with Justice Rehnquist in Abood. Instead, he maintained that, in order to
sustain a union shop clause, the government should be required to meet a
kind of "compelling state interest" test. 530 This test Justice Powell stated
only in general terms: for each union expenditure of compelled contribu-
tions, he would have the state prove that such contribution is "necessary to
serve overriding governmental objectives." 5 " This opinion conveniently
overlooks some of the more recent judgments in which the Court seem-
ingly has diluted the first amendment test applied in situations involving
public employees and public employment. 532 Accordingly, one wonders
whether Justice Powell's change of heart about the first amendment rights
of public employees might have more to do with his feelings about collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector in general and unions in particular than
with his concern for public employees' civil liberties.
Some may argue, as Justices Rehnquist and Powell seemingly did in
Abood, that unions are "political" organizations. Nevertheless, the primary
function of a union is to advance the wellbeing of employees by securing
better wages, hours and conditions of employment rather than to act as a
political party by promoting the general aspirations of a heterogeneous
constituency. The judgment of the Court in Abood gives legal weight to this
primary function and makes clear that any nonconsenting employee may
prevent a union's expenditure of any of his monies for partisan political or
ideological causes; concomitantly, all employees are still free to engage in
political or ideological activities of their choice without regard to contrary
positions that may be taken by their union.
A host of questions remain to be answered in the wake of Abood. The
most important issue for the lower courts will be to give meaning to the dis-
tinction between "political and ideological activities" and "collective bar-
gaining activities." One way to approach this distinction may be for the
courts to differentiate between "political" activities and "partisan political"
53° Id. at 263.64 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
53 ' Id. at 264 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
532
 This trend was recently noted by Justice Rehnquist in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238 (1976), where he stated that:
In Pickering v. Board of Education, after noting that state employment may not be
conditioned on the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, the Court stated
that "[alt the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the state has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general." More recently, we have sustained comprehensive and substantial re-
strictions upon activities of both federal and stale employees lying at the core of
the First Amendment. U.S. Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers; Broadrick v.
Oklahoma.
Id. at 245 (citations omitted). In Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), the Court ruled that the
Hatch Act prohibitions against federal employees taking an active part in political manage-
went or in political campaigns were not unconstitutional. Id. at 556. in Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601
(1973), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Oklahoma State Merit System Act that
prohibited any state-classified employee from being "an officer or member" of a "partisan
political club" or "a candidate for any paid public office." Id. at 602, 606. The law also forbade
the solicitation of contributions "for any political organization, candidacy or other political
purpose" and the participation "in the management or affairs of any political party or in any
political campaign." Id. at 602 n.l. In both Leiter Carriers and Broadrick, the Court rejected ar-
guments that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that the statutory prohibitions
were too broad. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 579-80; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607-08, 610.
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activities. This is the test used effectively by the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) in its voluntary internal
union procedure adopted for nonmembers who wish to object to union ex-
penditures of agency shop fees. In a recent decision by the neutral
AFSCME Review Panel, arbitrators ruled that the following activities were
"collective bargaining activities." 5"
(5) Expenditures for dissemination of information preparatory to
and during the collective bargaining process.
(6) Expenditures attendant to securing the ratification of the
contract, including legislative ratification where required (i.e., by
the legislature, city council, school board, or other legislative
group).
(7) Advertisements in support of a union position in collective
bargaining.
(8) Money to support the institution as a collective bargaining
agency; e.g., payments for representatives, collective bargaining
campaigns, organizing new constituencies, expenses attendant to
unfair labor practice charges, and decertification petitions.
(9) Political lobbying to support legislation, to effect change in
legislation, including legislation to protect the union as a collec-
tive bargaining institution. 5 4
The Panel ruled that expenditures in these categories were not rebat-
able. While the Panel admitted that a public sector union is more political
than one in the private sector, it noted that much of the public union's
political activity is directed toward legislatures in order to achieve contract
ratification. Such political activities, the Panel observed, are the raison
d'etre of the union's role as a collective bargaining agent, and these ac-
tivities, though political, are not "partisan" political. 535 Accordingly, the
Panel set forth a distinction between collective bargaining activities and
ideological causes: .
If the union lobbies for legislation ... in the context of demands
made within the collective bargaining process, expenditures for
such activities would not be rebatable. On the other hand, where
the union supports "causes" which are sought for the benefit of
society in general, then, even though such causes benefit union
members too, they will be deemed to be "ideological" endeavors
and, therefore, rebatable.5"
It is hard to know whether Abood will prove in the long run to be a
significant victory for unions. Much will depend on how courts develop the
definition of "ideological activities." Undoubtedly, this question will engen-
der a significant volume of litigation. In the light of some of the dicta in
Justice Stewart's opinion, unions will be well advised to develop voluntary
internal union procedures to handle dissenting employees' objections to the
purposes of union expenditures. 537 In developing such procedures, unions
5" AFSCME Review Panel Decision 74-30 (1977) (unpublished opinion).
534 1d. at 8-9.
53° Id. at 8-10.
5 " Id. at 9.
"7
 431 U.S. at 240.
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will also be well advised to heed the warning of Justice Stevens and
establish procedures which ensure that funds exacted from nonmembers
are not used, even on a temporary basis, to support activities outside the
scope of collective bargaining. 535
In Abood the Court clarified the scope of first amendment rights of
public employees with respect to the agency shop. Although the Court was
sharply divided, a plurality took the position that a public employee has no
greater first amendment interest in not being compelled to pay a service
fee than does a private employee. While upholding the constitutionality of
agency shop agreements compelling nonmembers to pay a service fee for
the expenses of collective bargaining, a plurality of the Court set forth a
constitutional basis for prohibiting union expenditure of compelled fees for
ideolOgical purposes. In its potential grant of power to public employee
unions, Abood is perhaps the most significant of the Court's public
employee collective bargaining decisions of the 1976 Term. This was one
decision in which the Nixon Bloc had little impact. Although all concurred
in some part of the decision, its members were isolated in their opinions—
Justice Rehnquist joining with the majority opinion reluctantly, and Justice
Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurring
only in part. Thus, it was the non-Bloc Justices who articulated the ration-
ale of Abood, with Justice Stewart, the go-between, writing the opinion; and
the decision did not carry the stamp of the Burger Court.
B. The First Amendment and Exclusive Bargaining–Madison Joint School
District No. 8 v. WERC
Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 5" which preceded the judgment in Abood, represents the Su-
preme Court's first attempt to reconcile a public employee's freedom of
speech under the first amendment with the principle of bargaining
exclusivity for a majority union. The case arose after a nonunion teacher
spoke and presented a petition to a school board at a board meeting open
to the public, during a portion of the meeting devoted to public com-
ments. 54 ° The teacher's speech and accompanying petition supported de-
ferring the inclusion of a "fair-share" provision in the collective bargaining
agreement then under negotiation between the board and the teacher's
union."' The negotiations were at a stalemate, and one of the major points
of disagreement was the union's insistence on this fair-share provision. 542
The union filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Commission (WERC) regarding the board's permitting the non-
union teacher to speak at the public meeting, and the Commission con-
cluded that the board had engaged in a prohibited labor practice by
"negotiating" separately with the nonunion teacher. 543 WERC ordered the
539 Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring).
639 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
5 4 °Id. at 169, 171.
"'Id. at 170-72.
5 42 id. at 169.
343 1d. at 172-73. The WERC found inter alia a violation of Wis. STAT, I1 1.70(3)(a)4
(1974), which provides in part:
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board not to permit employees other than the union representatives to
speak at board meetings on matters subject to collective bargaining. 544 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, also finding impermissible the
"negotiation" between the nonunion teacher and the board, and holding
that the teacher's first amendment rights were limited by a "clear and pre-
sent danger" test "in order to avoid the dangers attendant upon relative
chaos in labor-management relations." 545
 The United States Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, although two con-
curring opinions rested on narrower grounds than did Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court. 54 a
Chief Justice Burger began his analysis by noting that the "danger of
relative chaos" resulting from nonexclusive bargaining does not justify cur-
tailing protected speech. 5 " The Chief Justice then articulated three distinct
grounds for reversal. First, he decided that the statement of the nonunion
teacher did not constitute "negotiation" with the school board, since the
nonunion teacher did not attempt to bargain or offer any bargain with the
school board. 549
 Second, Chief Justice Burger found that WERC's order
was an "effective prohibition on persons such as ... [this teacher] from
communicating with their government," a restriction which in this case
would "seriously impair the board's ability to govern the district"549 and
which was "the essence of' prior restraint." 550
 Finally, the Chief Justice de-
termined that the teacher's speech took place in a public forum open to
public: expression. 5 " As such, Chief Justice Burger found the speech pro-
tected on the basis of two prior cases: first, Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion, 552
 which demonstrated that school teachers retain their first amend-
ment rights as "citizens" to comment about public matters concerning the
school system and second, Police Department v. Mosley, 553
 which showed that
once a public forum is opened to public discussion, the government cannot
discriminate among speakers on the basis of the content of their speech.
(a) II is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer individually or in concert
with others;
4. To refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of' a major-
ity of its employees .... Such refusal shall include action by the
employer to issue or seek to obtain contracts ... with individuals in
the collective bargaining unit ....
a44
	 U.S. at 173.
a" 69 Wis.2d 200, 211, 215, 231 N.W.2d 206, 212, 214 (1975).
54' 429 U.S. at 177. justice Brennan concurred in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall.
Justice Stewart concurred separately.
" 7 Id. at 173-74,
54 "/4. at 174.
"c' N. at 176, 177.
550 1d. at 177.
551 Id. at 174-75. In its analysis of first amendment rights the Court has afforded special
protection to speech presented in a "public forum." The concept of public forum focuses on
the historic use of streets and other public places as areas in which citizens may air their ideas
and assemble freely. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939); Hague v, C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939),
a" 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
605-06 (1967).
5"
 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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Together, these two precedents precluded the school board from limiting
public discussion at an open meeting on the basis of either the employment
of the speakers or the content of their speech.554 Thus, Chief Justice
Burger concluded that the teacher's speech was protected by the first
amendment.
The Chief Justice also specifically reserved the question whether "true
contract negotiations" between a public body and its employees may be reg-
ulated consonantly with the first amendment. 555 This reservation appar-
ently stimulated Justice Brennan to file a separate concurrence in which he
made it clear that he sees no constitutional difficulties in applying the prin-
ciple of bargaining exclusivity in the public sector. 556 Justice Brennan based
his concurrence entirely on Police Department v. Mosley, 557 finding that the
open meeting of the school board constituted a public forum, thereby open
to public discussion. However, Justice Brennan went on to note that in
situations not involving public forums, the employee's first amendment in-
terest might not prevail. Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded that
"there is nothing unconstitutional about legislation commanding that in
closed bargaining sessions a government body may admit, hear the views
of, and respond to only the designated representatives of a union selected
by the majority of its employees." 558
Justice Stewart also filed a separate concurrence, resting on even nar-
rower grounds. He stressed that the nonunion teacher in Madison School Dis-
trict was speaking "simply as a member of the community," and was merely
expressing an opinion. 558
 Justice Stewart apparently was unwilling to join
Justice Brennan in relying solely on the public forum analysis because he
sought to avoid infringing upon the broad authority of a public body "to
structure the discussion of matters that it chooses to open to the public." 580
The judgment of the Court in Madison School District was dictated by
the handling of the case by WERC and the Wisconsin state courts. WERC's
blanket order prohibiting almost all communication by teachers with the
school board was vulnerable to attack under virtually all of the major first
amendment doctrines which the Court has applied in the last twenty
years. 58 ' This difficulty was compounded by the Wisconsin Supreme
s" 429 U.S. at 175-76. The language of Mosley alone, seems to fit this case perfectly. See
408 U.S. at 96. However, Mosley involved a statute prohibiting all but labor picketing near
school grounds, id. at 92-93, and was actually decided on equal protection rather than first
amendment grounds. Id. at 101-02.
555 429 U.S. at 175. This formulation also leaves in question whether Chief Justice
Burger believes that no speech other . than "true contract negotiations" may be regulated.
"° Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
5" Id. at 178-79 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
555 Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
6°"Id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). However, the Court notes that
the nonunion teacher was not speaking merely as a member of the community, since he
opened his statement to the Board by saying he represented "an informal committee of 72
teachers in 49 schools." Id. at 176 n.11.
16°Id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
asp
	 for the Union conceded at oral argument that the order was overbroad, id.
at 176 n.11, and the Court's failure even to mention that form of analysis is a pretty clear in-
dication that the once powerful "overbreadth doctrine" is now virtually dead. Nor could this
order possibly be upheld as merely a "time, place, or manner" regulation. See, e.g., Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965). Nor was the regulation of "conduct", rather than "pure
speech". See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 569 (1965). Finally, the governmental in-
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Court's use of the obviously inappropriate "clear and present danger" stan-
dard to uphold the order. 562 Since the result in the case was so clearly re-
quired, Madison School District provides only a limited indication of how the
Court will balance freedom of speech and exclusivity of representation in
closer cases.
Madison School District should have only limited impact on public sector
labor relations, for allowing all teachers' viewpoints to be heard in the pub-
lic forum will not drastically undercut exclusivity of representation. Still,
Justice Brennan justifiably was concerned about the openings created by
the Court's reliance on grounds beyond the public forum aspect of the
case and by the Court's express reservation of questions as to the permissi-
ble extent of regulation of public employee contract negotiations. These
openings raise some possibility that the Court could extend first amend-
ment protection to certain nonpublic communications between nonunion or
dissident union member employees and their public employer. Such an ex-
tension could be read to establish a specific implied right to communicate
with the government in the context of public sector collective bargaining. 663
A decision to this effect could denigrate significantly the majority union's
exclusive representation of all the employees in the bargaining unit thereby
substantially weakening the effectiveness of public employee unions. How-
ever, Justice Burger's observations in footnotes to his opinion that "public
bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may hold
nonpublic sessions to transact business"5 " and that "the union ... [can
make] its position known to the school board ... at closed negotiating ses-
sions,"5  seem to militate against any such extension in the near future.
This suggestion that public employees may negotiate in closed sessions,
thereby precluding interference with the union's status as exclusive bargain-
ing agent, takes on greater weight.in light of the Court's later decision in
Abood. Although produced by a fragile majority, the holding in Abood that
terests advanced to support the regulation involve the direct suppression of communication,
impermissible under the first amendment. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977). Furthermore, this was not the least restrictive alternative
available. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
" 2
 The clear and present danger standard in its most recent formulation by the Su-
preme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), provides that speech may be sup-
pressed 1) where it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and 2) where
it is "likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447 (footnote omitted). The test has usually
been used by the Court only in cases involving the advocacy of the overthrow of the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919). The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the standard applicable by first finding
that Holmquist's statement to the Board was unlawful negotiation. 69 Wis.2d at 211, 215, 231
N.W.2d at 212, 214. The test is clearly inapplicable in light of the Supreme Court's finding
that Holmquist's statement was not negotiation, but protected speech presented in a public
forum. 429 U.S. at 174-75. By either characterization, Holmquist's statement was neither di-
rected to nor likely to result in "imminent lawless action . " The test's use in the present case is
a perfect example of its critics' accusation that it is too malleable to protect free speech suffi-
ciently.
563
 For example, in a case where the School Board does not hold public comment ses-
sions, these arguments could be used to allow employees wishing to express a viewpoint dif-
ferent from the union's to have access to private Board meetings in order to communicate
with their government as long as their communication falls short of seeking to bargain or,
otherwise negotiating. See 429' U.S. at 176.
5" 429 U.S. at 175 n.8.
" 5 1d. at 176 n.9.
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public sector unions may compel payment of a service fee by nonunion
members gives specific support to the concept of exclusive representation
in the public sector.'"
Given the first amendment, rights raised and the posture in which
these rights were presented, the decision in Madison School Board was
among the easier decisions of the Supreme Court's 1976 Term, as its
unanimity demonstrates. Nevertheless, the decision is somewhat disturbing
in its intimations that the exclusive bargaining representative status of pub-
lic employee unions may be limited. While the first amendment rationales
of the decision were entirely correct on their terms, the Court focused ex-
clusively on these, ignoring, as Justice Brennan's opinion suggests, the pro-
blem of bargaining exclusivity. This suggests a propensity to focus on the
political aspects of public employee bargaining rather than its labor aspects.
This propensity in turn suggests that the Burger Court does not look
favorably on public employee collective bargaining, a disfavor reflected in
Justices Powell's, Burger's and Blackmun's concurrence in Abood. 567 Neither
Abood nor Madison School District betray a risk that the Burger Court will
allow this disfavor the rein it has given its hostility to Title VII. But they do
show a trait that bears watching.
C. The First Amendment and Dismissal of Public Employees—Mount Healthy
Board of Education v. Doyle
In Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 568
 the Court discussed the
standard of causation required to prove that a public sector employee was
dismissed due to the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.'" The
claim in Mount Healthy came from a nontenured teacher who alleged that a
school board decided not to rehire him because of his exercise of protected
first amendment freedoms."' In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, a
unanimous Court held that a finding that constitutionally protected con-
duct played a "substantial part" in the employer's decision not to renew the
teacher's contract does not, by itself, entitle the teacher to reinstatement."'
5°' See text and note 493 supra.
5"7 See text and notes 522-529 supra.
""429 U.S. at 274 (1977).
"" Id. at 285-87.
570 Id. at 281-84. This claim was almost identical to one which the Court held cognizable
in Perry v. Sindermann. 408 U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972). There, the Court held that nontenured
teachers in general may be discharged for any reason or even no reason, but may not be dis-
charged for constitutionally protected conduct. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 569 (1972) (nontenured teacher has no right to a statement of reasons and a hearing in
the decision not to rehire).
571 429 U.S. at 285. Before so holding the Court decided a number of procedural ques-
tions, Id. at 276-81. The Court first held that the plaintiff met the amount in controversy re-
quirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) because there was no legal
certainty at the time of suit that plaintiff would not have been entitled to more than $10,000.
429 U.S. at 277. Next, the Court avoided a potentially significant question of the relationship
between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) by holding that here it did not
present the sort of jurisdictional question which the Court would raise on its own motion and
that the issue had not been preserved by the Board. 429 U.S. at 277-79. Finally, the Court
held that local school boards in Ohio, such as Mt. Healthy's, do not have any 11th amendment
immunity from suit in federal court, Id. at 280-81.
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Rather, the Court stated that there also must be a finding that the school
board would not have reached the same decision as to the teacher's re-
employment in the absence of the protected conduct. 572
The district court. in Mount Healthy had concluded that the teacher
was entitled to reinstatement because a nonpermissible reason "played a
'substantial part' in the actual decision not to renew [his contract)." 573 This
conclusion was based upon the statement of reasons for the nonrenewal
which the school superintendent gave to the teacher. 574 The superinten-
dent listed two reasons for nonrenewal, only one of which was based on
conduct protected by the first amendment. 575 The Supreme Court objected
to the district court's conclusion that reinstatement was required even
though the court had found that "there did exist in fact reason ... in-
dependent of any First Amendment rights or exercise thereof, to not ex-
tend tenure."575 The existence of such an independent reason, Justice
Rehnquist noted, could be interpreted to mean that the school board would
have reached the same decision even if the constitutionally protected con-
duct had never occurred. 577 If this were the case, the teacher's constitu-
tional rights would not have been violated and remedial action would be
unwarranted.578 Thus, the Court concluded that a finding of a constitu-
tional violation requires a specific finding that the public employer would
not have reached the same decision as to the plaintiffs reemployment in
the absence of the protected conduct. 579
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Court's decision was based on its
concern that, without such a causation standard, a teacher who engages in
constitutionally protected conduct would be in a better position than the
otherwise equal teacher who does not. In effect, a teacher could ensure his
rehiring by doing something that is constitutionally protected and dramatic
enough inevitably to be on the minds of the decisionmakers. Additionally,
although not mentioned by the Court, lack of any causation requirement
similar to that which the Court imposed might lead to another problem. If
a teacher who is not rehired one year because of protected activity success-
fully files suit and obtains reinstatement, one might naturally infer that re-
employment decisions by the same decisionmaker in succeeding years will
continue to consider the previous protected conduct. The teacher has no
right to continuous reemployment; 580 yet, the inference that the de-
cisionmaker improperly is considering previous protected conduct could
make it difficult for either the decisionmaker or a court to determine just
what reasons must be present that were not present in the first decision in
5 '2 429 U.S. at 287.
573 hi. at 285. Justice Rehnquist also equated the district court's term "substantial" factor
with the term "motivating" factor as used in the Court's decision of the same day in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 & n.2I (1977). 429
U.S. at 287 & n.2. The Court in /Arlington Heights used the term "motivating factor" to mean
something less stringent than "primary" or "dominant." factor. 429 U.S. at 265-66.
57 429 U.S. at 282.83.
"5 id. at 283 n. I.
575 1d. at 285.
8 " Id.
578 1d. at 286.
"D Id. at 287.
5" Perry v. Sinderinann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (nontenured teacher has no
property interest in reemployment).
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order to allow the teacher to be dropped. 58 ' The causation standard
adopted by the Court in Mount Healthy avoids disparate treatment between
teachers who have exercised first amendment rights and those who have
not, and avoids judicial inquiry into the effect of prior conduct on later re-
hiring decisions.
The Court's' decision in Mount Healthy makes no substantial change in
the existing caselaw on the requisite degree of causation to be shown in dis-
charges for protected conduct. The Supreme Court previously had never
spoken to this issue, 582 but the lower federal courts have done so re-
peatedly.. Most frequently, these courts avoided difficult legal questions of
causation by finding as a fact that protected conduct did not play a sub-
stantial part in, the failure to renew, 8a When these courts have confronted
the causation question directly, they have formulated a wide variety of cau-
sation standards. Although the exact language of these standards has var-
ied, and no court applied a test identical to Justice Rehnquist's formulation,
the lower court decisions can be classified into three groups of roughly
equal size—those less strict, those substantially the same as, and those more
strict than the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Mount-Healthy.
The lower court cases in the less strict category generally have held
that the plaintiff must demonstrate merely that protected conduct was a
"substantial" or "partial" cause of the adverse decision, much as the district
court held in Mount Healthy. 584 In the more strict category, several district
courts have held that the protected activity must be shown to be the "pri-
mary" or "paramount" reason for the decision, a standard significantly
more difficult to meet than Justice Rehnquist's formulation. 585 Among the
481 See Rainey v. Jackson State College, 481 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973), where just this
situation arose. The court there held that the previous year's non-renewal for impermissible
reasons established as inference of similar reliance on impermissible reasons when the
university failed to renew again the next year. However, the court found that the university
had managed to overcome this inference with its evidence that the plaintiff's training and cre-
dentials were not of the needed type. Id. at 352. -
552 The most relevant Supreme Court decision is probably McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802.04 (1973), which considered the proper order and nature of proof
in actions under Title VII.
583 See, e.g., Poddar v. Youngstown State Univ., 480 F.2d 192, 194-95 (6th Cir. 1973).
5" E.g., Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 38, 477 F.2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (8th Cir.
1973) ("Even assuming Gieringer's report may have been only partially a factor in his
dismissal, if that report was protected activity, then the dismissal was still constitutionally im-
permissible." Report then held to be protected.). These decisions discuss the causation ques-
tion only in extremely limited fashion with little or no analysis; in fact, in most of these cases
the standards are just dicta, since the courts eventually upheld the employee's dismissal or
failure to be reemployed. See, e.g., Rostrop v. Bd. of Jr. College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569,
573 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Even if the exercise of a right protected by the first amendment were
only one of several reasons for dismissal, the dismissal would be unlawful ...." Nevertheless,
the dismissal was upheld since it was not even partially based on any protected activity.). See
also Giausam v. Murphey, 488 F.2d 197, 201, 204 (3d Cir. 1971); Roseman v. Hassler, 382 F.
Supp. 1328, 1339 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
585
 For example, in Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439 (D. Col. 1976), some members
of the University of Colorado Board of Regents admitted to considering several impermissible
factors in deciding not to hire a radical professor dismissed from another university for incit-
ing violent activities. The court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because he had
not shown that one or more impermissible reasons was the paramount reason for the refusal
to hire him. Id. at 446, 452. The court did not suggest any method by which the professor
possibly could have met this standard of proof. See id. at 446-49. Accord, Starsky v. William,
353 F. Supp. 900, 916 (D. Ariz. 1972) ("discharge will not be set aside-... so long as the in-
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courts that have applied a test comparable to that utilized by the Court in
Mount Healthy, Judge Thornberry of the Fifth Circuit most closely anti-
cipated the standard eventually adopted by the Supreme Court. 586 In a
Footnote to his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in Railey
v. Jackson Slate College, 587 Judge Thornberry asserted that the proper in-
quiry is to look at all the grounds for decision to see whether a nonrenewa]
or dismissal resulted from any constitutionally impermissible consid-
erations. 588 He then suggested the following causation standard: "feiven if
permissible reasons played a part in causing a certain action, if the action
would not have been taken but for reliance on an additional impermissible
ground, it should , be held to be sufficiently based upon a reason 'upon
which the government may not rely ....' "589 Justice Rehnquist's formula-
tion of the causation standard in Mount Healthy is substantially the same as
Judge Thornberry's, except that Justice Rehnquist put his test in the nega-
tive rather than the positive. Other decisions have employed similar tests,
though not as clearly articulated. 5" In general, the lower federal courts
have often mentioned in passing the question of the requisite degree of
causation, and where a court has closely analyzed the question, it has been
influenced by considerations much the same as those which Justice
Rehnquist found controlling. 581
valid reasons are not the primary reasons or motivation for the discharge"). See Note, Refusal
to Rehire a Nontenure Teacher fir a Constitutionally Impermissible Reason, 1970 Wis. L. Rtv, 162,
168-70 (suggesting the standard should be "primary" reason).
5 " judge Thornberry first articulated this standard in Fluker v. Alabama Slate Bd. of
Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971). He there stated that the plaintiffs "might [he able to] ob-
tain relief if they could establish ... that the university's [non-renewal] action was even par-
tially in retaliation for their [protected] anti-administration activities." Id. at 210.
5°7 481. F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1973).
5"/d. at 357 n.2 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
5"Id., quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597 (citation omitted).
590 See Hibbs v. I3d. of Educ. of Iowa Cent. Comm, College, 392 F. Supp. 1202, 1207-08
(N.D. Iowa 1975) (although committee discussed and considered relevant the plaintiff's first
amendment protected activities when making decision to fire the plaintiff', in light of the other
factors discussed and the fact that one of two teachers with equal seniority "had to go" because
of staff cutback, there was no violation of plaintiff's first amendment rights); cf. Ammons v.
Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff' denied relief' in action alleging employ-
ment termination because of sex discrimination where lower court found reasonable ground
for discharge unrelated to her sex).
5" See, e.g., Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 446 (D. Col. 1976); Starsky v. Wil-
liams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 916 (D. Ariz. 1972).
Moreover, the Court's decision in Mount Healthy faced an issue similar to that addressed
by various courts of appeals decisions which have reviewed judgments of the NLRB on unfair
labor practice claims of discriminatory discharge due to union activity. Several circuits, in re-
viewing NLRB decisions, have examined the degree of causation required to show that an
employee's discharge resulted from illegal discrimination. As the rule is commonly stated, "it is
no defense•to a daim of discriminatory discharge that the discharge may have had another
valid ground." Crenlo, Div. of GF Business Equip„ Inc. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 201, 205, 91
L.R.R.M. 2065, 2068 (8th Cir. 1975). As such, this forMulation is not determinative of the
precise point decided in Mount _Healthy because it does not answer whether the employee
would have been discharged absent the impermissible ground. Whether the latter must be
shown is still unclear under the NLRA. There have been conflicting decisions on this question.
Compare Marshfield Steel Co. v. NLRB, 324 F.2d 333, 337, 54 L.R.R.M. 2648, 2651 (8th Cir.
1963) (discharge discriminatory if union activity- weighed more heavily in the decision than
dissatisfaction with performance) with NLRB v. Great Eastern Color Lithographic Corp., 309
F.2d 352, 355, 51 L.R.R.M. 2410, 2412 (2d Cir. 1962) (even though discharges may have been
based upon other reasons as well, if the employer was in part motivated by union activity, the
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Since the substantive holding of the Court in Mount Healthy does not
appear to alter significantly existing law, the decision is important chiefly as
an expression of the Court's attitude toward first amendment claims of
public employees. The major problem in the decision is its failure to con-
sider the potential significance of the chilling effect that a public employer's -
action might have on other employees within the workplace. lf, for exam-
ple, a public employer dismisses an employee in substantial part because of
the employee's exercise of first amendment rights but it is found that the
employer would have dismissed the employee in any event for other per-
missible reasons, should it matter that other employees might be in-
timidated in their exercise of first amendment' rights? Employees who rec-
ognize that a fellow worker has beén fired in substantial part because of
protected conduct may be wary of exercising their own rights in the future.
In such cases, it might be well for the Court to add a caveat to Mount
Healthy which forecloses an employer from publicizing an impermissible
ground as a basis for a dismissal or nonrenewal decision. Except where the
employee lacks the requisite qualifications or certification to perform the
disputed job, the employee should be entitled to reinstatement if the em-
ployer's decision not to hire or rehire was based in substantial part on an
impermissible ground and the employer publicizes this fact. Mount Healthy
leaves for further resolution whether the Court will modify the decision to
take account of the problem of "chilling effect" on other employees.
Although it sets forth little new law, the Court's decision in Mount Healthy is
noteworthy for its unanimity in an area where the Court's decisions have
been badly fragmented.
D. Procedural Due Process Rights of Non-tenured Public Employees-
Codd v. Velger
In Codd v. Velger, 592 the Court considered the procedural due process
rights of a public employee allegedly stigmatized by dismissal from a
nontenured position. The plaintiff in Codd claimed that he was dismissed
from public employment as a New York City police officer without a pro-
per hearing or a statement of reasons. 593 The district court ruled that no
hearing was due since the plaintiff was a probationary employee and thus
had no property interest giving rise to a hearing right. 594 The plaintiff then
amended his complaint to claim that, because of the stigmatizing effect of
certain material that had been placed in his personnel file by his employer
at the police department, he was entitled to a hearing concerning this in-
formation as a matter of procedural due process. 595 The plaintiffs person-
nel file contained information indicating that he had put a revolver to his
discharges were violations of the NLRA). More recently, in Mead and Mount Constr. Co. v.
NLRB, 411 F.2d 1154, 71 L.R.R.M. 2452 (8th Cir. 1969), the Eighth Circuit reviewed a large
number of prior decisions and formulated a standard requiring a showing that but for the pro-
tected activities, the employee would not have been fired. Id. at 1155-57, 71 L.R.R.M. at
2453-54. This standard is similar to the test adopted by Justice Rehnquist in Mount Healthy.
6 2 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
5931d. at 624.
"I Id. at 624-25.
599 hl. at 625.
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head in an apparent suicide attempt while a trainee with the police de-
partment. 596 Prior to institution of suit, the plaintiff was unaware that such
information was part of his personnel record. 597 He alleged that disclosure
of this information to a subsequent private employer, who had been given
permission to review the tile resulted in discharge by that employer. 5"
There was no finding, however, that plaintiffs file was ever shown to any
other employer, nor any finding that the revolver incident was the official
reason for his discharge from public employment. 599 In addition, the plain-
tiff never affirmatively proved precisely what the "adverse information"
was in his personnel file!'°°
The district court ruled that plaintiff failed to prove that he had been
stigmatized by defendants and also that he failed to prove that defendants
had publicized or circulated any information about plaintiff's prior service
with the police department in a way that such information might reach
prospective employers. Accordingly, the court refused to grant the plaintiff
any relief."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed on both points, ruling that the information relating to the alleged
suicide attempt was of a kind that would impair employment prospects for
a person seeking police work and that the plaintiff was thus entitled to a
hearing to meet the charge. 602 The court of appeals also ruled that, since
plaintiff had no practical choice but to consent to the release of his person-
nel - file, defendant in fact had publicized and circulated the disputed
information. 603 The court observed that because a probationary police of-
ficer has little job protection, the department should ensure that the rea-
sons for discharge are confidential in order to avoid stigmatizing the
employee. fl04
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, avoided both of these
issues and ruled instead that the plaintiff was not entitled to procedural
due process because he failed to allege or prove that the report of his ap-
parent suicide attempt was "substantially false." 6" Justice Blackmun con-
curred in the opinion, and Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall,
Stewart and Stevens dissented!'" According to the Court, the allegation of
substantial falsity was an "essential element" in plaintiff's case. 607 The Court
reasoned that in the case of a nontenured employee who has suffered a
stigma as a result of a discharge decision, the due process requirement is a
hearing solely for the purpose of giving the employee a chance to vindicate
his name. The Court noted that no hearing could produce such a result
where the plaintiff had failed to challenge the truth of the allegation in-
volved. 608 Since, in its view, without alleging falsehood, the plaintiff had
596 Id. at 626.
597 Id. at 629 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 625-26.
"9 Id. at 626, 628.
65 ° Id. at 629 11.1 (Brennan J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 625-26.
Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir. 1975).
6" Id.
"4 1d. at 336.
"5 429 U.S. at 626.
"6 Id. at 629, 631.
607 Id. at 625.
00" Id. at 627-28.
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not alleged a liberty interest warranting procedural due process protection
and at the district court level had failed to establish a property interest
meriting such protection, the Court rejected the plaintiff's constitutional
claim."
The Court's strict requirement that the plaintiff allege falsehood
formed the center of the battleground for the dissenting Justices in Codd.
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens disagreed with the per curiam
opinion's allocation of the "burden of introducing truth or falsity into the
lawsuit." 6 " They argued, with considerable force, that once a plaintiff
alleges injury to his reputation and job prospects, the burden shifts to de-
fendants to prove that a deprivation of plaintiff's due process rights was
harmless."" Justice Brennan contended that this burden allocation is re-
quired by the Court's decision in Mount Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle." In Mount Healthy the Court held that in the case of an employee's
dismissal in part for conduct protected by the first amendment, the em-
ployer has the burden of proving that the employee would have been dis-
missed absent a consideration of the protected conduct. 6 " Similarly in
Codd, the employer should have the burden of proving that the deprivation
of a hearing did not harm the discharged employee. Justice Brennan
suggested in Codd that it is unfair to require a plaintiff to plead falsity in
his complaint."'" On the latter point, he argued that in certain situations it
would be unreasonable to hold a plaintiff responsible for failure to plead
falsity of an employer's charge. 6 " Justice Brennan observed, "in this in-
stance, respondent cannot be faulted for his failure to plead falsity, since
his complaint alleged that he 'does not know the contents of his personnel
file and has never seen or been advised of any derogatory matter placed in
his file.' " 6 " Justice Brennan noted that by the Court's decision, the plain-
tiff's case was rendered inadequate only in later stages of the litigation
when he discovered the charge in his•personnel file and then failed to chal-
lenge its accuracy:61
In contrast to the dissenters' concern with the burden of pleading fal-
sity, Justice Blackmun, in a significant concurring opinion, focused on the
nature of the information upon which the plaintiff's dismissal was based.
He emphasized that there is nothing in Codd to suggest that if the material
contained in plaintiff's file were accurate, it was not "information of a kind
that appropriately might be disclosed to prospective employers." 618
 Thus,
Justice Blackmun found that the Court was not presented with "a question
as to the limits, if any, on the disclosure of prejudicial, but irrelevant, accu-
rate information." 6 " While Justice Blackmun left the issue unresolved, the
clear import of his observation is that public employers may be constrained
666 Id.
"429 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Al Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8 ' 7 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
6" Id. at 287. See text and notes 568-79 supra.
6"
 429 U.S. at 630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 629 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
618 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 " Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6"Id. at 629 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
619 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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by procedural due process from gathering and making public information
of a stigmatizing nature, which, whether or not truthful, has little relevance
to an employee's credentials or performance. It is not clear, however, to
what relief an employee might be entitled under Justice Blackmun's formu-
lation upon proof that a former public employer has collected and dis-
seminated such information. Presumably, an untenured employee, who
legitimately can be dismissed for any reason whatsoever, will not be entitled
to reinstatement unless he can prevail under the Mount Healthy test of
whether a "substantial factor" in his dismissal was the consideration of con-
stitutionally protected conduct and whether he would have been dismissed
absent such impermissible considerations. 6" On the other hand, it would
seem likely that the employee will be entitled to an award of damages
under Justice Blackmun's test if the forbidden dissemination of irrelevant
damaging material is shown to limit the employee's job opportunities with
prospective employers.
It is interesting to consider how Justice Blackmun might allocate the
burden of production in a claim alleging prejudicial disclosure of accurate
but irrelevant information. That his discussion focuses on the kind of in-
formation an employer might disseminate suggests that Justice Blackmun
agreed with the per curiam opinion's allocation of the burden on the plain-
tiff to plead the falsity of a charge as an element of a deprivation of due
process. By analogy, in a claim concerning a stigma imposed by a prej-
udicial disclosure, it would appear that Justice Blackmun would require the
plaintiff to raise the issue of the "appropriateness" of the information.
One final question raised in Codd was whether the plaintiff had a pro-
perty interest in not being discharged which would give him a separate en-
titlement to procedural due process under state law, Justice Stevens, who
was criticized severely for his negative answer to such a question in a prior
procedural due process decision,"' did a turnabout in Codd. In his dissent-
ing opinion he suggested that the plaintiff may have had such a property
interest because the applicable state law appeared to protect the plaintiff
against arbitrary discharge. 622 Justice Stevens also pointed out that the
plaintiff in Codd could have obtained review of his dismissal in state court
under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. 623 Such pro-
tections, if indeed provided under state law, would have given the plaintiff
a property interest and an entitlement to procedural due process. Thus, ac-
cording to Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justice Stewart on this ques-
tion, the case should have been remanded to the court of appeals for a
finding on this issue. 624
In addition to deciding that the plaintiff must allege the falsity of the
information relied upon for his discharge in his claim for deprivation of
due process, the Court's per curiam opinion also raised the issue of the
substantive standard of review to be used in a hearing on such a claim. In
unnecessary dicta, the Court suggested that, even if the plaintiff had
alleged correctly that the charges against him were false, procedural due
" I° 429 U.S. at 287.
"' Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
'1 " 429 U.S. at 639-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" 4 Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 631 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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process would not require a hearing at which it would be determined
whether the discharge of the employee was proper.° 23
 That is, procedural
due process would give the plaintiff the right to a hearing only for the
purpose of giving him the bare opportunity to clear his name.
This apparent limitation on the scope of review required by pro-
cedural due process provoked Justice Stevens to write a long, scathing dis-
sent in Codd. Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that "due process requires that the hearing include the issue whether
the facts warrant discharge." 626 Thus, according to Justice Stevens, a hear-
ing is required not only to establish the truth or falsity of a charge, but also
"to provide a basis for deciding what action is warranted by the facts." 6" In
adopting this view, Justice Stevens nearly embraced a lust cause" standard
as a part of the procedural due process requirement. Such a standard is
significantly more meaningful than the fading protection accorded to pub-
lic employees pursuant to the substantive due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment. 628 Codd is the first procedural due process case in
which the Court has discussed whether a substantive standard of review is
applicable where a nontenured employee claims the denial of a liberty in-
terest by a public employer's actions. Unfortunately, because of the confu-
sion concerning the deficiencies in plaintiff's pleadings, 62° Codd scarcely
presented the best case for resolution of this issue. 63°
It is difficult to assess the future impact of Codd, because of the con-
fused factual situation and the Court's dicta. Justice Brennan suggested
that the ruling in Codd "is likely to be of little practical importance." 6" He
may be correct if the case is read narrowly to require only that an un-
tenured plaintiff must prove the falsity of an employer's charges in order to
receive procedural due process protection of a liberty interest. If, on the
other hand, the opinion is also taken to mean that procedural due process
does not require that a hearing include the issue of whether the facts war-
rant discharge, then the decision may be monumentally significant. One
can only hope that this latter issue will be left for resolution on another day
since it plainly was not germane to the basic judgment of the Court in
Codd, which addressed only the factual question whether the plaintiffs pro-
cedural due process rights were deprived by his denial of a timely hearing.
In Codd v. Velger, the Supreme Court put another nail in the coffin
housing the procedural due process doctrine. After the Court's landmark
decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth 632 and Perry v. Sinclermann, 833 pro-
cedural due process appeared to offer public employees a significant pro-
tection against the loss of property and liberty interests in public employ-
ment. However, Roth and Sindermann have proved to be the highwater
625 /4. at 628.
226 Id. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
622 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
628 See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244-45, 247 (1976).
928 See text and notes 596-600 supra.
'3° Not only did the plaintiff fail to plead allegations of falsity, as required by the per
curiam opinion, the plaintiff did not even request a delayed hearing. Rather he sought re-
instatement and damages based simply on the denial of a timely hearing. 429 U.S. at 625 n.l.
Accordingly, the standard of review for such a hearing is beyond the scope of the plaintiffs
case.
831
 429 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
632 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
°" 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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marks of this protection. Recent decisions by the Court make it clear that
procedural due process is a diminishing right that will afford little protec-
tion to public employees who wish to challenge dismissals from public
employment. The Court sounded what amounted to the death knell of
procedural due process in Bishop v. Wood, 634 a decision which Professor
Benjamin Aaron characterized as "outrageous" and "a miscarriage of jus-
tice."635 Unfortunately, Codd v. Velger fits in, the same mold with Bishop v.
Wood.
Codd is the most disappointing decision among the Supreme Court's
1976 decisions affecting labor relations in the public sector. Perhaps more
foreboding than the result in Codd were the dicta concerning the substan-
tive standard of review in a nontenured employee's dismissal claim. Defini-
tion of this standard has been a significant unresolved issue in the pro-
cedural due process field. To take up this issue on muddled facts in a case
in which the Court already had found no claim to have been stated was ut-
terly gratuitous. Codd is by no means the only example of the Burger Court
stepping beyond the bounds of the case to reach for results which restrict
individual redress, but it is perhaps the worst such example.
In the Court's 1976 Term decisions concerning the relationship be-
tween the first amendment and public employee collective bargaining, the
members of the Nixon Bloc showed some reservations about the de-
sirability of collective bargaining in the public sector. Such reservations,
however, did not intrude into the Court's decisions, and as Chief Justice
Burger's footnotes in Madison School District suggest, 636 they are not likely to
bear fruit. Indeed, the status of public employee collective bargaining re-
mains a matter of state law. In its 1976 decision in National League of Cities
v. Usery, the Court demonstrated a solicitude for the states in their
capacities as public employers. 637 It would be consistent with this solicitude
for the Burger Court to give the states considerable free rein in establish-
ing their own scheme for public sector collective bargaining.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS AFFECTING
LABOR RELATIONS LAW
The Supreme Court in its 1976 Term rendered five opinions which
affect labor relations but which belong to no particular branch of labor law.
These miscellaneous cases concerned the constitutionality of a regulation
which prohibited prisoners in a state penitentiary from participating in
union activities, claims for unemployment benefits for strikers and AFDC
benefits for strikers' dependent children under the Social Security Act, a
claim that procedure under the Occupational Safety and Health Act vio-
lates the seventh amendment, and a claim for accrued pension credits
under the Military Selective Service Act. While the decisions in this cate-
gory were not substantively the most significant products of the Court's
Term, some nevertheless exemplify the influence of ideology on opinions
authored by members of the Nixon Bloc.
631 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
11" Aaron, Labor Law Decisions of The Supreme Court, 1975-76 Term, 92 LAB. REL. REP, 311,
335, 337 (BNA 1976).
('" 429 U.S. at 175 n.8, 176 n.9.
637 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976).
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A. The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners—
Jones. v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 638 the Nixon Bloc
of Justices once again had an opportunity to enunciate its renewed empha-
sis on "states rights" in constitutional adjudication. In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court in Jones ruled that the North Carolina Department of
Correction does not violate either the first amendment or equal protection
rights of a prisoners' labor union by prohibiting inmates from soliciting
other inmates to join the union, by prohibiting all union meetings within
the prison, and by refUsing to deliver packets of union publications mailed
in bulk to several inmates for redistribution among other prisoners. 1i 39 In
reaching this result, the Court reversed a judgment of a three-judge district
court which had enjoined prison officials both from preventing inmate so-
licitation of union membership from other prisoners and from refusing re-
ceipt of union publications sent by bulk mail'" The lower court also ruled
that the union should be "accorded the privilege of holding meetings
under such limitations and control as are neutrally applied to all inmate
organizations ...." 641 -
Justice Rehnquist summarily disposed of the plaintiffs' claim that the
regulations violated their first amendment rights by declaring that the re-
striction on solicitation and meetings was "rationally related to the reason-
able, indeed to the central, objectives of prison administration. "342 Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that a prisoner's first amendment rights must give way
to the extent that they are " 'inconsistent with [prisoner status] or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."'" Justice
Rehnquist was impressed by the statements of prison officials who specu-
lated that a union would increase friction between inmates and corrections
personnel.° 44 Justice Rehnquist did not inquire whether these speculations
of the prison officials were well-founded. Rather, he stressed that the Court
must give appropriate "deference to the decisions of prison adminis-
trators."6" He thus concluded that, absent a showing by the plaintiffs that
the prison administrators' beliefs about the adverse effects of prison unions
were unreasonable, the Court must defer to the expert judgment of prison
officials!'" Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, expanded upon
this "states rights" view. In Chief Justice Burger's view, prison officials are
under no constitutional obligation to allow inmate unions. He viewed the
decision to allow such a union as within the province of prison officials' ex-
pert knowledge."' Both of these opinions made deference to prison offi-
cials their touchstone.
°a6
	 S. Ct. 2532 (1977),
' 3°M. at 2540-44.
"° North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937, 946 (E.D.
N.C. 1976).
8411d .
" 2 97 S. Ct. at 2540.
843 ,P.rat quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
8" 97 S. Ct. at 2538-39.
"std. at 2538.
"9 /d. at 2539.
"7 Id. at 2544 (Burger, J., concurring).
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One especially troublesome aspect of Jones is the Court's willingness to
uphold a prison regulation that fails to distinguish between solicitation for
membership involving "simple expressions of individual views as to the ad-
vantages or disadvantages of a Union" on one hand, and solicitations to
"collectively engage in a legitimately prohibited activity" on the other. 84 "
Even Justice Rehnquist appears to have suggested that the former category
of speech is always protected, even in a prison context. Yet, as Justice Ste-
vens correctly noted in his dissent, the challenged regulation in Jones ap-
pears to prohibit all forms of union solicitation and thus should be held to
be overbroad."'" Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist seemed satisfied that since
prisoners are not prohibited from becoming members in a union or from
believing as they choose, there is no substantial impairment of first
amendment rights in this setting." 5" Since he found that the institutional
reasons For the regulation are sufficient against the first amendment rights
asserted by the prisoners, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the prisoners
could not prevail upon an overbreadth theory.
The plaintiffs also had claimed that the prison officials denied them
equal protection by giving bulk mailing and meeting rights to the Jaycees,
Alcoholics Anonymous and even the Boy Scouts, but denying these same
rights to a union!'" Justice Rehnquist rejected this claim, reasoning that
the district court had erred in treating a prison as a public forum and thus
imposing a strict equal protection standard in measuring access to this
forum." 52 Not surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist found a rational basis for the
distinction between organizational groups, in part because he saw the
Alcoholics Anonymous and Jaycees as serving a "rehabilitative purpose ...
in harmony with the goals of the prison administrators ...." 653 Since Jus-
tice Rehnquist found that a prison is not a public forum, the reasonable be-
liefs of the administrators that the union activity was inconsistent with the
goals of the prison were sufficient to override the equal protection claim.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, asserting that:
DV' the mode of analysis adopted in today's decisions were to be
generally followed, prisoners eventually would be stripped of all
constitutional rights, and would retain only those privileges that
prison officials, in their "informed discretion," designed to rec-
ognize. The sole constitutional constraint on prison officials
would be a requirement that they act rationally!'"
Justice Marshall is probably correct in his perception of the effect of Jones.
What is most distressing about Jones, however, is not the result as much as
what Justice Marshall generously calls the Court's "mode of analysis."
Justice Rehnquist's mode of analysis in Jones recalls Professor David
Shapiro's observation' that, while Justice Rehnquist "is a man of consider-
" 4"1d. at 2541,
649 Id. at 2545 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
n'Id. at 2545.
" 1 Id, at 2537.
652 1d. at 2542. Under the first amendment, once a forum has been made public, gov-
ernment may not exclude persons from the forum based on the content of their speech. See,
e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
"3 97 S. Ct. at 2543.
°"Id. at 2549 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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able intellectual power and independence of mind, the unyielding character
of his ideology has had a substantial adverse effect on his judicial prod-
uct. ""55
 His mode of analysis in Jones is also reminiscent of his similar ef-
forts in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert' and Kelly v. John,son. 657 In Gilbert, for
example, Justice Rehnquist applied fourteenth amendment analysis when
dealing with a Title VII claim and dismissed EEOC guidelines which had
been accorded great deference in the past!'" In Jones, Justice Rehnquist, as
Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, ignored the basic requirement of a
substantial justification for the infringement of first amendment rights. 659
Instead, Justice Rehnquist applied a reasonable relationship standard. 66 °
His analysis amounts to a holding that a state may act freely with respect to
first amendment rights so long as what it does is consistent with what it
wants to do or what it believes is right. In short, his analysis amounts to no
first amendment protection at all. One suspects that, to the Jones Court,
first amendment rights do not amount to much when they belong to prison
inmates. Jones thus reflects the disturbing tendency of the Burger Court,
with Justice Rehnquist as its chief theoretician, to bend its analysis and
established Supreme Court doctrine to its ideological predilections.
B. Unemployment Benefits for Strikers—
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory
In Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,""' the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of an Ohio statute that disqualified from unemployment
benefits any claimant whose unemployment was "due to a labor dispute
other than a lockout at any factory ... owned or operated by the employer
by.which he is or was last employed."fi 82 The Court addressed the peti-
tioner's claim that the statute violated his fourteenth amendment rights and
conflicted with federal social security taws!'" Notably, the petitioner did
• not claim that the National Labor Relations Act conflicted with or pre-
empted the Ohio statute, and the Supreme Court explicitly declined to con-
sider the relationship between these federal and state laws."'
Plaintiff Hodory was furloughed by United States Steel (USS) at
Youngstown, Ohio when reduced fuel supplies resulting from a nationwide
United Mine Workers Union Strike of USS coal mines caused a plant's
shutdown. 665 His subsequent claim for employment benefits was disallowed
655 Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HAM. L. Rev. 293 (1976).
g58
 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
"7 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
g58 See text and notes 91-95 supra.
"" 97 S. Ct. at 2545-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
""Id. at 2543.
"" 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
" 2 Otuo RF.y. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Baldwin's 1975).
""' Before doing so, the Court disposed of a claim by amid curiae that federal absten-
tion was appropriate. 431 U.S. at 477-81. The Court's inquiry focused on the two "primary
types of federal abstention": Pullman abstention, Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941), which is appropriate if a state court interpretation of a challenged statute may
eliminate or alter materially the constitutional question presented; and Younger abstention,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which focuses on concerns of comity and federalism.
"1 431 U.S. at 475 n.3.
gg5 Id. at 473.
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by the Ohio Bureau of Employment pursuant to the Ohio statute on the
basis that he was unemployed "due to a labor dispute" at USS mines.° 88
Hodory filed in district court a class action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as-
serting that the Ohio statute conflicted with the Social Security Act
(SSA),8 " and that the statute as applied violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment."" The basis of his com-
plaint was "that the State may not deny benefits to those ... [whose] un-
employment is 'not the fault of the employee.' "669
The district court found that the Ohio Bureau of Employment Ser-
vices "failed to demonstrate a rational and legitimate interest in dis-
criminating against 'individuals who were unemployed through no fault of
their own and who neither participated in nor benefitted froth a labor dis-
pute involving another union and their employer.' " 8 " Accordingly, the di-
strict court held that, as applied to such individuals, the Ohio statute vio-
lated the equal protection and due process clauses." 71
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice
Blackmun,"2 rejected the reasoning and judgment. of the district court.
The Court first considered Hodory's contention that a proper reading of
the Social Security Act showed that "involuntariness" was the key to eligibil-
ity for receiving benefits. In disposing of this claim, the Court emphasized
several points. First, although the legislative history of the Social Security
Act suggested that Congress intended involuntary unemployment to be a
necessary condition of. receiving benefits, it was not the sole or sufficient
condition to be taken into account. 673 Second, the existence of waiting
periods, maximum benefit periods and other such typical provisions of un-
employment compensation schemes reflected both "the understanding that
... [states] do not grant full benefits immediately and indefinitely, even to
those involuntarily unemployed ... [and] concern that the States might
grant eligiblity greater than their funds could handle." 824 Third, Justice
Blackmun also rejected Hodory's alternative argument that the Federal Un-
employment Tax Act"' preempted state law concerning inclusiveness of
the unemployment program. 178 On the contrary, Justice Blackmun stated
that when Congress wanted to restrict compensation it would do so
explicitly and that the absence of such restriction indicated congressional
intent to allow the states to regulate this area."'" Since it thus rejected both
of Hodory's statutory preemption claims, the Court went on to deal with
the constitutional issue raised in the case.
116431,1.
"'Social Security Act of 1935, § 303(a)(1) and (3), as amended, 42 U.S.C.-H 503(a)(1)
and (3) (1970).
""" 431 U.S. at 475.
CD9 Id .
17" Id. at 476, quoting Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. 408 F. Supp,
1016, 1022 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
" 71 408 F. Supp. at 1022.
"" justice Blackmun wrote for eight justices. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of the case. 431 U.S. at 493.
mid at 482-83.
"" Id. at 483-84.
675 26 U.S.C. H 3301 - 11 (1970).
1176 431 U.S. at 488-89.
"" 431 U.S. at 488.
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Hodory challenged the Ohio labor dispute disqualification as un-
constitutionally irrational discrimination. The Court almost summarily dis-
posed of this contention. The Court premised that the legislative distinc-
tion was presumed to be valid. 678 Hodory argued that the state was irra-
tional because its broad scope did not consider where the labor dispute
causing unemployment took place or the degree of participation in the dis-
pute by the disqualified individual!'" However, the challenged statute did
not involve a fundamental interest or particularly affect any protected
class. Accordingly, the Court employed a "relatively relaxed" standard
which reflects its view that the creation of distinctions generally involves
policy determinations best made by a legislature. 68° Looking to the ration-
ality and not the wisdom of state social and economic policy, the Court
found the Ohio statute rational. on its face."'
In considering the rational basis of the Ohio statute, the Court con-
ceded that Hodory's exclusion might seem harsh. 682 Nevertheless, the
Court observed, any policy with respect to disbursements from the state
unemployment fund affects the rate of employer's contribution and the fis-
cal integrity of the fund as wel1. 683
 Since the disqualification at issue is
triggered by "a labor dispute other than a lockout," its effects on. employer
contributions approximate a kind of "rough justice." The employer who
locks out his employees during a labor dispute will find his contribution in-
creased; if, however, the union goes out on strike, the employer's contribu-
tions are not affected. 684 Justice Blackmun, white purporting not to pass on
the wisdom of such state neutrality in labor disputes, seemed persuaded by
the argument that, without the labor dispute disqualification, a union's abil-
ity to impose rising unemployment costs on the employer by striking would
increase the pressures on an employer to settle a labor dispute. 85 The
Ohio scheme thus effectively places the financial burden on the party
which makes the first move. In accepting this burden allocation, the Court
seemingly struck a balance between the harm to the individual denied
benefits and the possibility of harm to the fiscal integrity of the state un-
employment fund. .
Although the Ohio statute is rational for the purpose of equal protec-
tion analysis, it is somewhat difficult to see how its application is neutral
where the striking workers who cause layoffs are members of a different
union in other states engaged in nationwide strike. Their decisions are un-
likely to be tempered or affected by Ohio eligibility rules. It is, however,
difficult to question Justice Blackmun's recogntion that the protection of
the fiscal integrity of its compensation fund is a legitimate state interest and
a "continuing concern" of Congress. 686 Clearly, the Ohio interests are ra-
878 Id. at 489, quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976). Accord, Dandridge v. WillIliatns, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
78
 431 U.S. at 490.
""Id. at 490-91.
"' Id. at 491.
42 M.
8 " 3 Id. at 490.
484 Id. at 491.
488 Id. at 492.
m id.
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tional in that they are not logically inconsistent, and not in conflict with an
express federal policy. This is all that is required."'
The decision in Hodory offers little basis for criticism. The minimal
scrutiny rationale was clearly required and supported by a long line of
cases. That the decision was unanimous indicates that the case presented
little controversy. Although one may quibble with the characterization of
the statute as neutral where the workers affected by it are unemployed be-
cause of the actions of another union in another area, the Court's reasoning
in the case is sound. The only question left open by the Hodory decision is
the relationship between federal labor law and state unemployment com-
pensation law. The Court was clear that this is an issue to be decided on
another day.
C. Federal Nonregulation of Strikers' Benefits—Batterton v. Francis
In Batterton v. Francis,""" as in Hodory, the Supreme Court addressed
an issue arising under the Social Security Act. Relying in part on its
burgeoning theory of "cooperative federalism," the Court issued perhaps
one of its most outrageous opinions of the 1976 Term. The case concerned
the validity of a federal regulation" 89
 promulgated by the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) pursuant to rulemaking authority
delegated in section 407(a) of the Social Security Act."" This section deals
generally with a special Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program for children of "unemployed" fathers (AFDC-UF). The Secretary's
regulation set a monthly hours-of-work standard for defining "unemploy-
ment," and, in addition, provided that "at the option of the State, such def-
inition need not include a father whose unemployment results from par-
ticipation in a labor dispute or who is unemployed by reason of conduct or
circumstances which result or would result in disqualification ... under the
State's unemployment compensation law.""' The issue in Batterton, as
framed by the Court, was whether the regulation giving the states discre-
tion in determining who shall be denied benefits conies within the Secre-
tary's authority under the Social Security Act. 692
By a bare five to four majority, the Court, with justices White, Bren-
nan, Marshall and Stevens dissenting, held the regulation to be within the
Secretary's authority. 693
 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, rec-
ognized that the federal role in AFDC programs is greater than that in
other unemployment compensation programs," 4 and that. a "major pur-
41" The Court observes somewhat gratuitously that it need not consider whether a ran-
dom means of protection of the state fund would be rational since "the limitation of liability
tracks the reasons found rational above." Id, at 493.
6" 97 S. Ct. 2399 (1977).
6" Dependent Children of Unemployed Fathers, 45 C.F.R. § 233.100 (1976)..
°°" 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970). The statute includes in the category of "dependent child"
a "child who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment
... of his lather" and provides that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare shall set
the standards for determining unemployment.
"' 45 C.F.R. § 233.100 (a)(1) (1976).
6" 97 S. Ct. at 2402.
°"a /d. at 2409.
"'Id. at 2405. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs, v. Hodory, 431 U.S. at 488.
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pose" of a 1968 amendment of section 407(a) was to remove some of the
states' rulemaking authority thereunder." 95 Nevertheless, the Court over-
ruled several lower court decisions which had held the federal regulation
invalid as exceeding the Secretary's authority."' These lower court cases
had involved claims on behalf of families who were denied benefits pur-
suant to state rules because the fathers' unemployment resulted from mis-
conduct, strike activity or voluntary quitting."' The courts found that
under the Social Security Act as amended in 1968 the Secretary was to
issue national standards concerning state regulations. Since the regulation
at issue allowed individual state option, these courts determined that it
failed to establish a national standard and accordingly it was held invalid."'"
In determining whether the regulation in question exceeded the Sec-
retary's statutory. .authority, Justice Blackmun framed the question in the
case as whether the term "unemployment" as used in the regulation may be
interpreted as allowing a state to exclude from receiving AFDC-UF benefits
persons who fall within one of the three aforementioned categories; and,
hence, whether the regulation is proper. 699 The Court reasoned that since
Congress in section 407(a) expressly delegated to the Secretary of HEW the
power to prescribe standards for determining what constitutes unemploy-
ment, the Secretary's regulation has "legislative effect" and thus is entitled
to more than "mere deference or weight."'" The Court accordingly found
that the Secretary's regulation could be set aside only if it exceeds statutory
authority or if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not
otherwise in accordance with law."" 1
Justice Blackmun then proceeded to apply this narrow scope of re-
view to the instant regulation. He concluded that the standards in the chal-
lenged regulation are reasonable and accord with other AFDC provisions
and state plans which extend coverage only to those "involuntarily" un-
employed.'" Although granting that Congress' intent was to promote
"greater uniformity" in the administration of the AFDC-UF program, Jus-
tice Blackmun asserted that this aim could be accomplished without the
imposition of "identical standards" on each state."'" Further, Justice
Blackmun observed that since "the states'are free not to participate in the
program, ... the congressional purpose is not served at all in those states
where AFDC-UP is totally unavailable." 704 On this basis, Justice Blackmun
concluded that, in the spirit of cooperative federalism, the Court should
" 5 97 S. Ct. 2408. In Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 710 n.6, 719, the Court ob-
served that a purpose of the 1968 amendments was to eliminate variations in AFDC-UF
coverage among the states.
29° 97 S. Ct. at 2407.
887
	 v. Mason, 384 F. Supp. 1275, 1280-81 (D. Md. 1974) (voluntary quits); Fran-
cis v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp: 78, 81-82 (D. Md. 1974) (discharge for cause, labor dispute).
998
 Francis v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D. Md. 1974). The district court later
found the reasoning of this case to be applicable to the circumstances where the unemployed
parent had voluntarily quit his job. Bethea v. Mason, 389 F. Supp. 1274, 1280.81 (D. Md.
1974).
89° 97 S. Ct. at 2405.
'°1d.
7°' Id. at 2406, quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(C) (1970).
702 97 S. Ct. at 2406-07.
luld. at 2408-09.
704 1d. at 2409.
92
1976 LABOR LAW DECISIONS
not lightly infer that Congress did not want the Secretary to weigh local
policy considerations in formulating eligibility requirements. 7 ° 5 The Court
therefore upheld the regulation as both reasonable and within the Secre-
tary's authority.'"
As Justice White pointed out persuasively in dissent, however, the
Court's finding that the Secretary himself reasonably could have pro-
mulgated standards excluding unemployment due to a labor dispute from
the definition of "unemployment" for Social Security Act purposes assumes
the very point at issue."' The question is not whether the Secretary himself
validly could have applied the disputed standards, but whether his delega-
tion to the individual states of the option to do so was in clear conflict with
the language and intent of the 1968 amendment to the Act. Justice
.Blackmun's interpretation of the legislative history on this question is its
own refutation. Clearly the states which do not participate in the AFDC-UF
program also do not receive federal matching funds; thus, it is difficult to
understand the logic behind an assertion that when Congress does not
compel state participation in a federal program it thereby erodes its power
to impose uniform standards on those who choose to Join.
Batterton is a travesty of judicial reasoning. The Court's reliance on the
concept of "cooperative federalism" to allow the Secretary to recognize
"legitimate local policies in determining eligibility" 708 appears to be nothing
but a make-weight for a result which contradicts, congressional policy. As
Justice White noted, the judgment in Batterton ignores that "literally all of
the relevant legislative history repeatedly and unequivocally affirms the
strong congressional objective of creating a federal definition of un-
employment."'" While Batterton does not have the broad impact of some of
the other cases where the Nixon Bloc exerted its influence, it is perhaps the
1976 Term's most egregious example of the Burger Court, and more spe-
cifically the Nixon Bloc, using specious reasoning to support a result
dictated by extraneous ideology.
D. OSHA and the Seventh Amendment —Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
In Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commis-
sion, 710 the Supreme Court upheld the statutory scheme of the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) 7 " against a claim by two em-
ployers that enforcement procedures of the statute violate the seventh
amendment guarantee of a jury trial in civil actions.'" Under OSHA's
In Id.
7" Id.
"7 1d. at 2411 (White, J., dissenting).
708 1d. at 2409.
"" Id. (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
" 6 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
"' 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (1970).
71 :430 U.S. at 444, 447-49. The seventh amendment provides that "Ii]n suits at com-
mon law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved ...." U.S. CoNsT, amend. VII. The phrase "suits at common law" has been
construed to refer to cases tried prior to the adoption of the amendment in courts of law in
which jury trial was customary. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 453, 445-46 (1830). The
employer's position in Atlas was based on the contention that suit by the government for civil
penalties for violation of a statute such as OSHA is a suit for recovery of a money judgment
which is "classically a suit at common law." 430 U.S. at 449.
93
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
statutory scheme, federal safety inspectors are authorized to issue citations
when they find that an employer has committed a safety and health viola-
tion.'" The civil penalties for such violations range up to one thousand
dollars for serious violations and ten thousand dollars for willful or re-
peated violations. 7 ' 4 An employer may contest a penalty by requesting a
hearing before an administrative law judge of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), whose decision becomes the Com-
mission's final order unless reviewed by the full three member OSHRC. 715
An employer may also petition the appropriate federal court of appeals to
review a final Commission order, but factual questions on such review are
foreclosed to the extent that findings of the OSHRC are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. 7 " In Atlas Roofing, the employers asserted that the in-
ability to obtain a jury trial at any point in this process is unconstitutional.
They contended that the seventh amendment requires at a minimum the
opportunity to obtain a jury trial de novo in federal district court when ap-
pealing a final OSHRC order." 7
This argument was rejected by the Court. In a unanimous opinion," 8
the Court held that where new "public rights" created by statute. are in-
volved, 7 " Congress may assign the factfinding function and initial adjudi-
cation to an administrative forum with which a jury would be in-
compatible. 720 In his opinion for the Court, Justice White conducted a
wideranging survey of prior decisions, by the Court involving administrative
enforcement schemes and seventh amendment claims."' Justice White re-
lied primarily, however, on NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 722 and on
dicta in Crowell v. Benson 723 to develop this "public rights" theory. Under
this theory, Congress has broad authority to use administrative agencies,
rather than the courts, for the enforcement of new, statutorily-created pub-
lic rights. 724
 The underlying basis for this narrow view of the seventh
amendment's jury trial requirements would seem to be the Court's percep-
tion that
the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury
as the exclusive mechanism for factfinding in civil cases. It took
713
 29 U.S.C. §§ 658, 659 (1970).
" 4 29 U.S.C. § 666(a),(b) (1970).
" 5
 29 U.S.C. §§ 659 (c), 66I(i) (1970).
718 29 U.S.C.	 660(a) (1970).
"'Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990,
1011 (5th Cir. 1975).
718 430 U.S. at 461. Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision.
"9 See id. at 450. There was clearly a "public right" involved here, for OSHA is en-
forced strictly by the government and does not even rely on private complaints to initiate en-
forcement actions.
"' Id. at 455.
"' Id. at 450-55.
722 301 U.S. I, 48-49 (1937). In this decision upholding the constitutionality of the
NLRA, the Cotirt also found without merit the contention that the NLRB's authority to de-
termine the facts and to order backpay in an unfair labor practice proceeding violated the
seventh amendment. This holding can be read as being .based on either the statutory nature of
the proceeding or on the overall equitable nature of the proceeding, since backpay was re-
covered as an incident to an "equitable" order reinstating the employee.
723 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932) (disability claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
WOrkers Compensation Act does not require opportunity for jury trial under the seventh
amendment because within admiralty jurisdiction).
724
 See 430 U.S. at 452-55.
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the existing legal order as it found it, and there is little or no
basis for concluding that the Amendment should now be in-
terpreted to provide an impenetrable barrier to administrative
factfinding under otherwise valid federal regulatory statues."'
A decision by the Court in favor of the employers in this case in all likeli-
hood would have diminished quite substantially the effectiveness of the
OSHA enforcement scheme, despite the employer's assertions to the con-
trary. As the Supreme Court never fails to point out of late, the federal
courts are already overcrowded.'" The substantial delay before a required
de novo jury trial of an OSHA case could take place would,be an induce-
ment to more appeals than now are taken. Arguably, employers also could
persuade juries to reverse the OSHRC's decision or at least to lower penal-
ties more often than they could the federal circuit courts. In any case, the
commission would have to devote much more of its limited time and re-
sources to defending its orders in the courts. Among the significant addi-
tional burdens of such a procedure would be the preservation of evidence
and trial of factual issues.
The unanimous decision in Atlas Roofing resolves any lingering doubts
as to the constitutional status of the procedures of several administrative
agencies. It also suggests that the Supreme Court will not support attempts
to dismember OSHA judicially without a more compelling constitutional
basis for doing so."' While this may not seem much to cheer about, in the
context of the Court's other decisions in the 1976 Term it is a bright spot.
E. Accrued Pension Benefits of Veterans—Alabama Power Co. v. Davis
The Supreme Court' in Alabama Power Co. v. Davis 128 decided unan-
imously that section 9 of the Military Selective Service Act"" entitles a vete-
ran returning to his former job to credit under his employer's pension plan
for the period of his military service. 73 ° Section 9 requires that any qual-
ified person who leaves a permanent position to enter the military, satisfac-
torily completes his service, and applies for reemployment within ninety
days of his discharge from the military service, shall "be restored by such
employer ... to such position or a position of like seniority ...." 73 ' In ad-
dition, section 9 provides that any person so restored shall be "entitled to
participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pursuant
to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or
leave of absence ...." 732
725 Id. at 460.
725 Id. at 455.
"7
 This conclusion will be put to the test next Term, for the Court has agreed to review
a district court decision declaring warrantless OSHA inspections to be an "unreasonable
search"• prohibited by the fourth amendment. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D.
Idaho 1977), prob. jurisd. noted sub nom. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
"" 97 S. Ct. 2002 (1977).
"9 50 U.S.C. App. 459 (b) (1970), recodified and amended at 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (Supp. V
1975).
"D 97 S. Ct. at 2010.
50 U.S.C. App. § 459(b)(B)(i) (1970), recodified in 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(1) (Supp. V
1975).
"2 Id. at § 459(c)(1) (1970).
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Respondent Davis was a permanent employee of the Alabama Power
Company from 1936 until 1943, when he left for military service. Follow-
ing thirty months' service in the military, Davis resumed his position with
Alabama Power, where he worked until his retirement in 1971. Upon re-
tirement, Davis was paid pension benefits based only on the time he actu-
ally worked for the company. 733 Davis claimed that section 9 entitled him to
credit toward his pension for the time he spent in military service. 734 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama 735 and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 738 agreed with his claim. The
Supreme Court, noting a conflict among the circuits, granted certiorari,
and affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision. 737
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall cited two "guiding prin-
ciples" for defining the extent of protection afforded by section 9. 738 First,
under the Act, a veteran picks up his place on the seniority ladder where
he would have been had he been employed continuously at the position
during his period of service. 739 Second, since the Act is to be construed lib-
erally for the benefit of those who left private employment for military ser-
vice, the provisions of the Act cannot be modified by employers or by
agreements between employers and unions. 7 " Justice Marshall next traced
decisions in which the Court fixed standards for determining whether a
particular right claimed by a veteran is an aspect of "seniority" which the
Act protects. 741
Relying on these cases, Justice Marshall then employed a two-pronged
analysis to determine whether the pension credit claimed in Alabama Power
was protected by the Act. Under this analysis, according to Justice Marshall,
a benefit is a "perquisite of seniority" first, if it. "would have accrued, with
reasonable certainty, had the veteran been continuously employed," and
second, if "it is in the nature of a reward for length of service." 742 On the
facts of Alabama Power, the Court found that the pension credit sought by
Davis satisfied both the "reasonable certainty" and "nature of the benefit"
prongs of the test. Davis' work history indicated a "reasonable certainty"
that he would have accrued the pension credit but for his military ser-
vice; 743 and the lengthy period required before pension rights vested in-
dicated that the "true nature" of Davis' pension payment was a reward for
length of service.'" In this case "it is only the passage of years in the .
company's employ, and not the service rendered, which entitles the
employee to that increment."'" Moreover, the Court found, since the
733 97 S. Ct. at 2004.
734 Id.
735 Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Stipp. 880, 889 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
739 Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 542 F.2d 650 (5111 Cir. 1976).
73 ' 97 S. Ct. at 2004.
73' 97 S. Ct. at 2005, citing Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275,
284-85 (1946).
739 97 S. Ct. at 2005, quoting Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 284-85.
74° 97 S. Ct. at 2005, quoting Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285.
"' 97 S. Ct. at 2005-07. See Foster v. bravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92, 97 (1975); Accardi v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 383 U.S. 225 (1966); Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 376 U.S. 169,
180-81 (1964); McKinney v. Missouri-K.-T.R. Co., 357 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1958).
742 97 S. Ct. at 2007.
143 1d. at 2008.
744 Id.
745 Id. at 2009-10.
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payment formula was based on earnings at the time of retirement, both the
employer's cost and the payment received by Davis corresponded directly
with the length of his service with that employer.'"
The decision in Alabama Power is neither earthshakingly significant
nor surprising. It is important insofar as it clarifies the law in an area
where there was some minor disagreement among the courts of appeals. In
view of some of the decisions which the Burger Court rendered in the 1976
Term, Alabama Power's innocuousness is perhaps a relief.
Three out of the Court's five miscellaneous labor law decisions in the
1976 Term were unanimous. The unanimity of these decisions reflects
their generally sensible logic. By contrast, the two decisions in which there
were dissenting opinions, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.
and Batterton v. Francis, were products of the Nixon Bloc. The opinions in
both were written by Nixon Justices. In both, the Bloc made up the decisive
core of the Court. Both decisions sounded the themes of' arch self-restraint
and ideological result orientation which echo through all of the 1976 Term
decisions on which the Burger Court placed its stamp.
CONCLUSION
Looking back on the 1976 Supreme Court Term, a few bright spots
can be discerned. One is the Court's adherence in Dothard to the "effects"
test for Title VII cases, especially coming on the heels of the decision in
Gilbert with its language suggesting a reexamination of that test. Another is
the decision in Abood upholding a public sector agency shop agreement.
One more is the opinion in Farmer, which potentially gives both coherence
and flexibility to the labor law preemption exceptions previously carved out
from the Garmon rule. Most of the other positive results involved more
minor issues and cases whose impact on their particular area of labor law
will be limited. Nolde Brothers is an example of this category. The impact of
the extension in that case of the presumption of arbitrability to events oc-
curring after the termination of a collective bargaining agreement may well
be tempered by the collective bargaining process itself.
Although no single pattern to the Court's twenty-five labor relations
decisions is evident, some themes do emerge. These themes, however, do
not show as bright spots. Above all, in the field of its most significant labor
law decisions of the Term, Title VII, the Court trumpeted a retreat in the
developing case law. Teamsters and Gilbert by themselves close clown major
fronts of attack on employment discrimination in future Title VII litiga-
tion. Teamsters significantly limits remedies for past employment discrimina-
tion. Gilbert, by signalling a possible reconsideration of the Title VII effects
standard, may foreclose attack on all subtler forms of employment dis-
crimination which presently are reached under Title VII, but which are
difficult to remedy under fourteenth amendment standards.'"
746 1d. at 2010.
7." Civil rights advocates can take some consolation from the selection of Justice Stewart
to write the opinions in most of the important Title VII cases. Justices Rehnquist's analysis in
Gilbert, where established principles were either tortured—as in his application of equal pro-
tection analysis to Title VII claims—or ignored—as in his treatment of EEOC guidelines—
indicates that civil rights advocates fared much better with Justice Stewart than they would
have with Justice Rehnquist.
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A second major theme of the 1976 Term labor decisions was the
Court's continued reluctance to give full effect to the proscription against
sex discrimination in employment. Although Gilbert posed difficult issues,
its result is clearly hostile to equal rights for women insofar as the decision
makes it difficult to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under
Title VII. Justice Stewart's opinion in Dothard does much to nullify Gilbert,
but the ultimate judgment in Dothard that the challenged regulation consti-
tuted a bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title VII seems
inconsistent with the principles stated in the body of that decision. Thus,
even if a woman can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
stereotypes of women which some members of the Court displayed in
Dothard may still block success on the merits. While 1976 may have been In-
ternational Women's Year in the world at large, it was not a good year for
women before the Supreme Court.
As a third theme, the Nixon Bloc gave some indication of a hostile re-
action to collective bargaining in the public sector. In his opinion in Madi-
son School District, Chief Justice Burger raised questions about the constitu-
tionality of exclusivity in public employee bargaining. In Abood, Justice
Powell argued for the adoption of a compelling state interest test to vali-
date.a union shop clause in the public sector. These opinions may portend
a difficult future for adherents of unions in the public sector.
A fourth theme, reflective of the Court's predilection for ideological
stretching for results, was the poor quality of the judicial reasoning in
many opinions. Some of the more important decisions were needlessly de-
structive of established precedents, as exemplified by the treatment ac-
corded EEOC guidelines by Justice Rehnquist in Gilbert. Many of the opin-
ions are unduly long and include judgments on matters not before the
Court. For example, the dicta in Robbins & Myers, while helpful in clarifying
the relationship between arbitration and Title VII, were clearly superfluous
to the issues before the Court. The opinions most satisfactory in their rea-
soning frequently were briefer and more narrowly focused, such as in
Walsh v. Schect and Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Re-
view Commission.
Finally, the Nixon Bloc of Justices continued to fertilize their view of
"states' rights" in constitutional adjudication. Although this view has been
more pronounced in areas of law in which federal constitutional rights con-
flict more directly with interests of the states than in labor relations law, it
was noticeable in the tones, Batterton and Hodory decisions. In these cases the
Court was deferential to local policy concerns and
the
 decisions made at the
state level even where that deference was at th  expense of federally
created interests or rights. It is curious, however, that the Nixon Bloc
seemed to abandon its deference to state interests in Abood where the issue
centered around the legitimacy of a state-mandated agency shop payment
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to unions in the public sector. The opinion in Abood is noticeably lacking in
any language of the Nixon Bloc concerning the states' interest in allowing a
union shop agreement.
The effect of the Nixon Bloc ideology and mode of analysis was pro-
nounced in cases where they chose to exert their influence. The most im-
portant decisions of the Court, in cases such as Teamsters and Gilbert, were
also the ones in which the Nixon Bloc was most visible. The discouraging
results of these decisions were equalled only by their unprincipled reason-
ing. Since many of these cases raise questions that will have to be answered
in succeeding terms, it is likely that the impact of the Nixon Bloc will be
felt for some time to come.
Reading the labor law opinions which the Burger Court issued in the
1976 Supreme Court Term leaves one with a sense of shock. This shock
stems less from the Court's distinctly conservative leaning than it does from
the Court's seeming tendency in many of its opinions to aim for results
without regard for legitimate reasons, existing precedent or relevant legisla-
tive history. Some of the opinions, such as Pipefitters, are plainly disingenu-
ous; some, such as Gilbert, are devoid of intellectual integrity; some, such as
Teamsters, are openly defiant of well-established precedent. These decisions
and many others at times seem more devoted to exposition of personal
ideology than to careful judicial reasoning.
In conclusion, it may be said that the 1976 Term was a kind of bar
mitzvah for the Burger Court and the Nixon Bloc in particular. But many
will not celebrate the occasion.
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